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the 1990s, the number of people in the UK who are employed in the public sector has increased by 1.5 million (1990–1999) (Department of Health 2000).

There is a growing emphasis on the need to improve the quality of care in the public sector. The Department of Health (2000) has set out a number of key objectives for the public sector, including the need to improve the quality of care, to reduce the waiting time for treatment, to improve the efficiency of the system, and to improve the financial performance of the system. The Department of Health (2000) has also set out a number of key objectives for the private sector, including the need to improve the quality of care, to reduce the waiting time for treatment, to improve the efficiency of the system, and to improve the financial performance of the system.

The Department of Health (2000) has also set out a number of key objectives for the voluntary sector, including the need to improve the quality of care, to reduce the waiting time for treatment, to improve the efficiency of the system, and to improve the financial performance of the system. The Department of Health (2000) has also set out a number of key objectives for the independent sector, including the need to improve the quality of care, to reduce the waiting time for treatment, to improve the efficiency of the system, and to improve the financial performance of the system.

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THE NEGOTIATIONS
FOR THE
PEACE OF THE DARDANELLES,
IN 1808-9.

VOL. II.

LONDON :
Printed by A. SPOTTISWOODE,
New-Street-Square.

THE NEGOTIATIONS
FOR THE
PEACE OF THE DARDANELLES,
IN 1808-9:

WITH DISPATCHES AND OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS.

BY
THE RIGHT HONOURABLE
SIR ROBERT ADAIR, G.C.B.

BEING A SEQUEL
TO THE
MEMOIR OF HIS MISSION TO VIENNA IN 1806.

IN TWO VOLUMES.

VOL. II.

LONDON:
PRINTED FOR
LONGMAN, BROWN, GREEN, AND LONGMANS,
PATERNOSTER-ROW.

1845.

Ott 564.4

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CORRESPONDENCE.

No. I.

*To Marquis Wellesley, H. M. Secretary of State for
Foreign Affairs.*

Pera, February 22d, 1810.

MY LORD,

I HAVE this day received the honour of your Lordship's circular despatch, announcing that the King had been graciously pleased, on the resignation of Earl Bathurst, to appoint your Lordship to be his Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for the Foreign Department.

I beg leave to congratulate your Lordship on this distinguished mark of his Majesty's confidence.

I have the honour to be, &c.

No. II.

To Lord Wellesley.

Pera, February 22d, 1810.

MY LORD,

SINCE my despatch No. X., dated February 10., nothing has occurred to vary the situation of affairs at the Porte. The language of Bonaparte's speech

to the French legislative body, respecting Turkey, continues every day to make deeper impression. A translation of it, omitting the offensive parts, has injudiciously been sent in to the Seraglio by the French Minister. The Ottoman Ambassador at Paris had forwarded a true copy; the artifice of the French Minister has added, consequently, to the indignation already caused by this speech, by an attempt to conceal its matter.

Your Lordship must not expect, however, a declaration, or indeed any steps on the part of this Government, against France. The Porte seems to be satisfied with having obtained a thorough knowledge of Bonaparte's hostile dispositions, without thinking it necessary to guard against them by dismissing an Embassy so advantageously posted to give them effect, or by any measure of military precaution on the frontiers contiguous to the French power.

The Porte has received certain advices, that the whole of the Russian army encamped on the right bank of the Danube had suddenly withdrawn itself, and that its head-quarters were transferred to Bucharest. Very anxious inquiries have been addressed to me for information as to the design of this movement. Partly from intelligence received from Vienna, and partly from conjecture, I have submitted the following outline as the plan of the Russian campaign, earnestly and anxiously repeating my exhortations to the Ottoman Government to call forth all its powers in order to face the dangers which threaten the Empire from so many quarters:—

“Russia, being now in possession of all the fortresses on the left of the Danube, and having no present view of extending herself on the right bank of

that river, is secure from offensive operations on the part of Turkey towards Moldavia. She feels herself at liberty, therefore, to push on her own operations by carrying the war into Servia, of which province, with the assistance of the population, and the possession of Belgrade, there is nothing to prevent her complete and permanent occupation. Her progress thus to the very heart of the Turkish European Empire will be assisted by France, who, with one of her armies under the denomination of rebels, and with another under its regular name, ostensibly sent to suppress those rebels, will in the mean time occupy the whole of the Turkish power in Bosnia. While the principal force of Turkey is directed to this quarter, a naval expedition from Sebastopolis is to attack Varna, to threaten the provinces on this side of Mount Hæmus, and even to alarm the Porte for the safety of the European castles at the mouth of the Bosphorus. The success of this plan would obviously leave the Ottoman Empire in Europe at the mercy of Russia and France, and enable the Emperor Alexander to repay the compliment of his confederate on his own annexation of Walachia and Moldavia to his dominions, and to declare to his Senate at St. Petersburg that he felt equal joy, and as little jealousy, at the annexation of the Morea to the dominions of Bonaparte."

The Ottoman Ministers, to most of whom individually this communication has been made, and who have forwarded it to the camp of the Grand Vizir, concur in opinion with me with regard to the probability, in all its points, of this plan of campaign. Their preparations for defence are on a corresponding scale. The Sultan has appointed two Sourugi Pachas, officers invested with extraordinary powers, and never

named except in great emergencies, from whose activity a levy of not less than 300,000 men is expected. The exertions to fit out a large fleet are active and unremitting. But the essentials of both army and fleet are equally wanting. They have no officers for either service: for the navy they have not even seamen. And in the articles of provisions, stores, ammunition, and, above all, money, the deficiency is more than great—it is become in a very high degree alarming.

I have the honour to be, &c.

No. III.

To Lord Wellesley.

Pera, February 22d, 1810.

MY LORD,

I HAVE the honour of informing your Lordship that the Grand Vizir has sent orders to the Tefterdar to conform to the precedent established at the exchange of the ratifications of the Treaty of Alliance between Great Britain and Turkey in 1800, in regard to the official presents to the respective Chanceries for Foreign Affairs in the two countries. But I am afraid, from a conversation which has passed between this officer and Mr. Pisani, that so strictly is it intended to follow this precedent, that no larger sum than 24,000 piastres (the exact sum received on that occasion) will be issued on account of the Foreign Office in England, which, at the present rate of exchange, will produce little more than 1200*l.* sterling.

Having thought it my duty to insist on a recog-

nition of the principle of the former transaction, I cannot enter into a disgusting discussion with the Turkish officers on the mode of executing its detail. I trust, however, that the liberality of his Majesty's Government will not allow my forbearance to debate a question of this nature to operate to the disadvantage of the gentlemen concerned in its decision.

I have the honour to be, &c.

No. IV.

To Lord Wellesley.

Pera, February 22d, 1810.

MY LORD,

LORD COLLINGWOOD having, in compliance with instructions from the R. H. the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, sent up the Salsette frigate to Smyrna, for the convenience of my embarkation, and having, in my despatch No. IV., of the 26th December, 1809, stated to your Lordship's predecessor my intention of availing myself of his Majesty's gracious permission to return to England towards the end of this month, if the peace between Great Britain and the Porte should appear to me to rest on a basis sufficiently solid to leave me no apprehensions for its stability, I now take the liberty of acquainting your Lordship, that although for obvious reasons I could not fix the exact day, I have officially notified my intended speedy departure to the Ottoman Government.

It is, I believe, the intention of the Sultan to

honour me with an audience on taking leave, but whether public or private I do not as yet know.

I have the honour to be, &c.

Separate.

To Lord Wellesley.

Pera, February 22d, 1810.

[STATING that an order had been obtained from the Caimacan to the Vaivode of Athens, for the embarkation of the antiquities collected by Lord Elgin.]

No. V.

To Lord Wellesley.

Pera, March 13th, 1810.

MY LORD,

I HAD the honour of informing his Majesty's Government in my despatch No. IV., to Earl Bathurst, that a son of Baron Hubsch had just then been sent on a pretended journey to Warsaw, but in reality to St. Petersburg.

This person returned ten days ago. He was the bearer of fresh proposals of peace from the Russian Government, contained in two letters, of which I have now the honour to state the substance.

The first, dated January 10th, was a letter from Count Romanzoff to Baron Hubsch. The Count acquaints him, "that he wrote by command of the Emperor,

to express the Emperor's astonishment at the indifference with which the Ottoman Government received the overtures to peace so frequently made on the part of Russia; that the Emperor could not help testifying his surprise that the Ottoman Government should abandon the holy cities of Mecca and Medina, where the authority of the Sultan had ceased absolutely to be recognised, and whose inhabitants were exclusively Mussulmans, and persist so obstinately in having back Walachia and Moldavia, whose inhabitants were all Greeks, and consequently ought rather to belong to Russia than to the Porte; *that the Emperor Alexander took great interest in the independence of the Turkish Empire*, and offered peace to Turkey as being essential to its preservation; that Baron Hubsch was authorised to make this communication to the Ottoman Government, and to observe to it at the same time, that the Emperor had not yet pushed the war to extremity; but that if once it were seriously to recommence, a decisive battle might bring the Russian armies to the gates of the capital, and might oblige the Emperor*, *in the end*, to adopt the new system."

The second letter was from the Danish Minister at St. Petersburg †, strongly exhorting the Porte to make peace, and stating that a refusal might drive matters to such a point, *that the Porte would at last be compelled to accede to the Continental system.*

It was long before the Ottoman Ministers, who dislike extremely the intervention of such an agent as Baron Hubsch, could be brought to grant him a con-

* Meaning, of Austria.

† To the same, Baron Hubsch.

ference to receive the communication of this proposal: At length they admitted him, on the 8th inst. I need scarcely add, that the proposal was rejected, and this Saxo-Danish mediation treated with contempt.

I have at the same time much satisfaction in acquainting your Lordship, that although I had secured other means of acquiring information of what is transacting at this important moment, the whole of what passed at this conference was communicated to me in confidence by the Reis Efendi.

Encouraged by this apparent advance, I strongly urged the necessity of softening the definitive answer to the Russian Government, with which Baron Hubsch is to send back his son, as soon as he receives it officially.

My reasons for thus advising the Ottoman Government are many and cogent. Your Lordship will in great part be apprised of them by my No. X., to Earl Bathurst; and since writing that despatch, an event appears to have occurred at St. Petersburg, which, if it has been correctly stated to us here, may lead to the most important results.

The event I allude to, is a fundamental change in the administration of the Russian Government. We are assured that the discontents of the Russian nobility at Moscow had risen to such a height, that the Emperor had been obliged to name a council of thirty-five, at the head of which is Mons. de Kotchoubey, specifically empowered to determine on all questions of peace and war.*

From the altered tone of the proposal conveyed by Baron Hubsch, I should almost be ready to hope that

* We were misinformed as to the nature and powers of this council.

this was a first step towards a change of system at the Court of St. Petersburg; or at least of such a change as may lead Russia in the end to make separate overtures to Great Britain. Your Lordship will not fail to remark that Russia departs totally from the demand insisted upon in the month of March last, and since that period frequently renewed, that Turkey shall accede to the new system.

Time will not allow me to enter into the different topics to which this subject obviously leads, and for which I reserve myself until I shall next have the honour of writing to your Lordship. I forward this despatch by an accidental opportunity for Malta.

I have the honour to be, &c.

No. VI.

To Lord Wellesley.

Pera, March 15th, 1810.

MY LORD,

My letters from Vienna inform me that a treaty has very lately been concluded between Bonaparte and the Elector of Saxony, by which the latter engages to keep up a constant force of 60,000 men within the Duchy of Warsaw. Of this force, 15,000 men are to be paid by France, and funds are already assigned for that purpose.

I hasten to acquaint your Lordship with this very important fact, which in the new situation of the relations between France and Russia, arising from the intended marriage of Bonaparte with a Princess

of the House of Austria, may be made use of to effect a material change in the sentiments of the Emperor Alexander towards Great Britain.

I have at the same time the satisfaction of informing your Lordship, that the copy of the treaty of 1807, between Bonaparte and the Shah of Persia, together with the observations by which I accompanied them in the month of December last, have been delivered into the hands of the Emperor Alexander.

I have the honour to be, &c.

Separate. Five Inclosures.

To Lord Wellesley.

Pera, March 23d, 1810.

[FORWARDING despatches of the 4th February from Sir Harford Jones; and also transmitting copies of his letters to Mr. A. of the 12th and 13th February.]

No. VII. One Inclosure.

To Lord Wellesley.

Pera, March 31st, 1810.

MY LORD,

It was my intention this day to have reverted to my despatch No. V., and to have offered to Y. L. some remarks on the altered tone of Russia towards Turkey, if the subject of that despatch, and particularly what I should have taken the liberty of suggest-

ing upon it, were not substantially included in the relation, which I have now the honour of submitting to Y. L., of my proceedings at this Court in consequence of Bonaparte's announced marriage with an Austrian Princess.

The evils which this alliance is preparing for mankind it is unnecessary for me to dwell upon. I proceed, therefore, to explain to Y. L., with as much precision as I am able, the course which I have followed in order to counteract its influence on the councils of the Porte.

When this intended connection was first made known, it was naturally enough apprehended at the Porte that Austria was about to accede to the plan of partition. This certainly is not the fact: nor is it likely that Bonaparte should himself be desirous of carrying that project into immediate execution. Whatever may be his ultimate views on Turkey, his first object is to complete his Continental system, hitherto defective from the repugnance of Austria to become a party to it, and from the adherence of Turkey to her engagements with Great Britain. These, however, are the last obstacles he has to surmount; and all that he now seems to want, to render his scheme perfect in every part, and to enable him to combine Europe in one common bond against Great Britain, is to remove the remaining scruples of Austria, and to make himself master of the peace between the Porte and Russia.*

It unfortunately happens, that in any design to which an appearance may be given, however fallacious, of favouring the interests of Turkey in the negotiations

* Vide Letter to Count Stadion in the "Memoir," p. 458.

for this peace, France may reckon upon the sure co-operation of Austria. Every other view, and apparently every other wish of the Court of Vienna, centres for the present in that of keeping Russia away from her frontier. This immediately pressing interest, aided no doubt by just resentment against Russia for the part taken by that Power in her recent discomfiture and spoliation, impels Austria (at whatever expense to Great Britain, and eventually to that cause to which she must herself look for her future deliverance,) to concur in whatever project Bonaparte may make a semblance of concerting with her, in order to force Russia into reasonable terms of accommodation.

Symptoms of this growing disposition are already manifest in the hopes conceived by Austria of preventing the final annexation of Walachia and Moldavia to the Russian Empire. These hopes have their origin in her new connection. Here at once a ground is laid for strengthening this connection, and for extending to it every other political interest. With neighbouring Powers, animated by similar views, it is easy to find a form for giving effect to their operations; and under the name and pretence of a joint mediation for the Turkish peace, Bonaparte will find a ready method of drawing Austria further into his plans; of converting her acquiescence into support; and of involving her at length in all the guilt and ignominy of participation.

If to this obvious consequence the next probable result be added,—namely, that the peace between Russia and the Porte should be actually concluded under the auspices of these two Powers,—I look upon it that every prospect of recovering her ancient foot-

ing in Europe will be closed on Great Britain, perhaps for ever. Even Turkey will be gathered to that Continental league, of which the calamitous effects are now scarcely worth the naming, compared to what they must become in any future condition of the world.

For it must be plain to every man that the new system is meant to reach far beyond the measure of which it is pretended to be but the instrument. The author of this system may content himself just now with binding the Chiefs of his subject States to some form of compact under which he may call for their contingents in men and money towards the formation of a grand invading army to force what he calls "the Maritime Peace." He well knows the futility of such a menace in the present high condition of the military power of Great Britain; but he knows, that if peace be ever made under such a compact, the compact itself, and consequently his own power in Europe, becomes as fixed and as durable as it can be rendered by human contrivance. He knows too, what a mortal instrument a confederacy of this nature, acting through an embodied disciplined diplomacy from one end of Europe to the other, will then become in his hands; what injuries it will enable him to inflict on the persons and property of Englishmen impounded within his subject circle; what vexations, what galling affronts, he can make us endure through its lowest agents, even at the British Court itself; and what inexhaustible means it will afford him of carrying on WAR DURING PEACE, to the perpetual annoyance, and, finally, to the certain ruin of the British name and nation.

I scarcely need excuse myself to Y. Lp. for the

early fear with which the view of so many dangers affected me ; but I stand in need of all the indulgence of his Majesty's Government for the step which it has led me to hazard. Your Lordship will therefore forgive my entering rather at large into the motives of my conduct on this occasion.

Ignorant what changes this eventful marriage might produce in his Majesty's general dispositions with regard to Foreign Affairs, it seemed to me that I could scarcely err in the presumption, that while there remained a possibility, however faint or remote, of preserving the means of a future connection with the Continent, according to the ancient scheme of British policy, it was my duty to grasp at that possibility, and by every method in my power to secure it. Taking this principle for my guide, the appearance of things at the Porte seemed to warrant its immediate application. A snare was spreading for Turkey, into which the combined efforts of the new Allies would insensibly lead her, and from which there could be no release, except on the condition of associating herself to the new system. To resist with effect the influence of France and Austria united, would at no time have been an easy task at this Court. It had become doubly difficult from my having no distinct ground on which I could take my stand in opposition to them. *Peace on good terms for Turkey* is now the point to which the councils of both of these Powers are tending, and in their progress to which they cannot prudently be opposed by the councils of Great Britain. I could not advise the surrender of the Provinces at a moment when the half-promised interposition of the new alliance offered hopes to Turkey that peace might be had at a lower price.

All confidence in me, and consequently all my means of action, would be irretrievably destroyed, if the mistrustful men with whom I have to deal were to suspect that the drift of any counsel I might offer them, or of any overture to combine the interests of the Porte more closely with those of Great Britain, was only to smooth the way for the admission of those hateful conditions. Nor was there any motive, on the other hand, that called upon me to risk the credit of the British Embassy in behalf of a Power with whose distinct views I am still unacquainted, and whose hostility towards Great Britain may, for aught I know to the contrary, be still unabated.

Amidst the perplexing considerations, however, of which the subject was full, it was clear to me that no time was to be lost in giving some impulse and direction to the Ottoman councils. The French and their partisans among the Turks had seized on the conjuncture to represent this alliance in the light conformable to their views. It was stated, and by many believed, to be the confederated union of the whole Christian World against Great Britain. I saw, therefore, all the importance of destroying this impression instantly, and particularly before the arrival of any proposals from France.

In my resolution to make some decisive effort for this purpose, I was strengthened by the result of an interview with the Austrian Internuncio; and in my choice of means, I was guided by information which had been sent me from Vienna of the temper and dispositions of the Court of St. Petersburg.

The Internuncio (with whom, notwithstanding the late peace between his Court and the French, I have, until now, kept up a friendly intercourse), imme-

diately on the arrival of his despatches from Vienna, came to my house, as well to communicate the information contained in them, as to assure me that the Emperor his master, in submitting to so mortifying a sacrifice, had by no means in view any political engagements with France. He read me a part of Count Metternich's despatch, which contained a declaration to this effect, and that the Emperor intended no more by a family alliance with Bonaparte than to secure the peace of his own dominions, and to consolidate the system which he had just established for their gradual recovery from the effects of so many disastrous wars. He then proceeded to inform me that he was specially instructed to give the same assurances to the Porte, and to quiet any apprehensions it might entertain in regard to the supposed accession of Austria to the system of partition. * * * * *

To balance the effect which this language, and above all the too probable avowal of a common interest between Austria and France, was calculated to produce, — to occupy the ground thoroughly at the Porte, — to prevent the mischiefs consequent on their concluding a peace with Russia under French and Austrian meditation, — and to give a direction to the policy of Turkey favourable to other views, the information contained in my letters from Vienna suggested to me a doubtful, indeed, but the only practicable expedient.

From these, under date of the 16th of February, and written before the secret of the Marriage Treaty was known to my correspondents, I learned that great mistrust of the designs of France had begun to be entertained at St. Petersburg; that the Court professed not to know in what relation it stood towards

that Power; and that overtures had been made at Vienna for a close union and concert. The chief motive to this change was stated to be a sudden alarm at the growing intimacy which had been observed between Austria and France. This alarm had been increased by some appearances in the Duchy of Warsaw by no means of a tranquillising nature. It was added, in the same letters, that the Treaty of 1807, between Bonaparte and the Shah of Persia, together with his renewed promise of fulfilling it, which I had sent to the Court of Vienna in the month of December last with the view of its being communicated at St. Petersburg, had by an indirect channel reached the hands of the Emperor Alexander.

On this information it appeared fair to reason, that if such were the sensations at the Court of St. Petersburg before either the Treaty of Marriage, or the Treaty with the Elector of Saxony for keeping up an army of 60,000 men in the Duchy of Warsaw, were known, the certainty of events so nearly and so essentially affecting the Russian Empire must teach the Emperor Alexander that it was high time to look to his own safety. The consolidation of his means of defence seemed no less a necessary consequence of any serious endeavour to disengage himself from his growing embarrassments:—and *here* there appeared a weak point in the system of our enemy, where an attempt might be made to break through the line which separates us from our natural connections with the North of Europe, and even to establish once more the basis of an alliance which hereafter might prove some counterpoise to the enormous power united under one head in the South.

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It followed, from all these considerations, that there

was an immediate necessity of devising some plan of pacification, in which Great Britain, the Porte, and Russia might eventually concur. The difficulty in the way of every such plan would be, to persuade Turkey to cede the Provinces at once, or to persuade Russia to desist from the demand of them. How hopeless would be the first of these attempts your Lordship is already aware. I do not know that the second is more easy. No general views, arising from a change of system with regard to Great Britain or Germany, are likely to make an impression in Russia favourable to the restitution of a territory long coveted by every faction which has governed its councils, possessed at this moment beyond the power of recovery, and incorporated into the Russian domains with the consent of France, — a consent very unlikely to be again obtained, if the opportunity of profiting by it were now foregone. No equivalent appeared answerable to these advantages; yet such an equivalent must be found, or no negotiation could proceed, or even be proposed to either party.

In going over the list of acquisitions which seemed capable of being held out as a bait to Russia, an object presented itself quite out of the common class; one which offered vast advantages to Russia, and one which it appears to me that Great Britain might concede without any great inconvenience. In her various projects of aggrandisement, Russia cannot have overlooked the West Indies. It is most certain that an establishment either there or on the continent of South America would be of infinitely more solid utility to her than the extension of her frontier in any direction whatsoever; and, besides the recovery of her commerce, now rapidly falling into the hands

of the Americans, would open sources of riches and prosperity to the southern provinces of that empire scarcely to be overvalued in the calculation of any reflecting Russian statesman. Nor would the risk to Great Britain be in reality serious; since, to whatever degree Russian industry might avail itself of these advantages, they would remain wholly in our power, and, instead of enabling Russia to distress us in any future war, would be rather a pledge in our hands for her adherence to her engagements, and at all events, an easy forfeiture for her abandonment of them.

If the foundation of this reasoning be just, it did not seem difficult for his Majesty, out of his conquests from France or Holland, to offer a suitable arrangement to Russia, with a view to the different objects which I have specified to your Lordship in the former parts of this despatch; and it did not appear to me improbable that his Majesty might think it more eligible to dispose in this manner of a portion of that superflux of colonial establishments, which the war had thrown into his Majesty's hands, than to retain them with a view to their restitution at a peace, considering what that peace must be, if the union of France, Austria, and Russia be previously consolidated.

It was, I confess, no weak argument with me, in favour of this speculation, that, if successful, all just cause of jealousy between Austria and Russia, and consequently all motive to a real union between Austria and France, would be done away with.

Taking for my foundation, therefore, the principle of a triple negociation for peace, or of a negociation between Turkey and Russia, in which Great Britain might be invited to join, on the 23rd instant I attended a meeting with the Reis Efendi, at which I

strenuously recommended that a direct overture to this effect should immediately be made by the Turkish Government to that of Russia. There are many topics in my present despatch which, as your Lordship will be aware, I could not prudently enforce at this conference; and in particular, I was obliged carefully to keep out of sight any eventual renewal, however distant, of a confederacy hostile to France. I felt it necessary also to give to my recommendation the air of an absolutely gratuitous effort for the relief of Turkey; but in order to prevent mistakes, and to obviate any future misrepresentation of the proposal itself, I delivered in, at the end of our conference, the memorandum which I have here the honour of enclosing to your Lordship, and which contains, in substance, the whole of what was said on my side.

Your Lordship will observe that I stand committed in reality to nothing. On the projected equivalent, the Turkish negociator is simply authorised to try the effect of an insinuation at the Russian Camp.

It is evident also, that if Russia should refuse to negotiate jointly with Great Britain and Turkey on the basis of this equivalent, but be ready to negotiate with Great Britain singly for a separate peace, there is nothing in the above proposal to prevent her.

But if Russia should consent, and if his Majesty should not deem it advisable to accede to a negotiation on this basis, things remain but as they were, with the advantage to Turkey of some months of further respite.

All that now remains for me to add is, that my proposal has been accepted with the greatest joy by the Turkish Government. It has been forwarded this day by the Grand Vizir; and the Sultan has been

pleased to accompany it by a Hatti-Scheriff full of the most friendly expressions towards his Majesty and the British Nation, and ordering the Grand Vizir to lose not a moment in making a formal overture to Russia for a tripple negociation.

I have the honour to be, &c.

Inclosure in No. VII.

Memorandum presented by Mr. Adair to the Reis Efendi, at a Conference on the 23d March, 1810.

THE secret of Bonaparte's marriage with an Austrian Princess is the dread entertained at Vienna of his intended marriage with a Princess of Russia. Austria was apprehensive, and with reason, that the effect of such an alliance would be, year after year, to deprive her of some fresh portion of her territories, and to reduce her ultimately to nothing. When Bonaparte made the proposal, therefore, Austria closed with it instantly, lest any hesitation or delay might cause Bonaparte to turn his eyes towards the Emperor Alexander, as he had done before at Tilsit.

This negociation could not be so secretly conducted at Vienna but that suspicions began to be entertained of it at St. Petersburg. The Emperor Alexander took the alarm. He began to see that Bonaparte had been cajoling him with the prospect of aggrandising his dominions on all sides, while he was entering into engagements which were to put an effectual stop to the further increase of his power.

Just at this period the Emperor Alexander obtained the knowledge of a secret Treaty between Bonaparte

and the Elector of Saxony, by which an army of 60,000 men, *partly French troops*, was to be constantly kept up in the Duchy of Warsaw.

By a fortunate coincidence of circumstances also, the Treaty of 1807, between Bonaparte and the Shah of Persia, by which Bonaparte engages to force Russia to evacuate the Georgian Provinces, and his recently renewed promise through Joannin to carry that Treaty into effect, were placed under the eyes of the Emperor Alexander at the very same time.

Disturbed at this prospect of affairs, which threatened the most serious consequences to Russia, and irritated at the deceit which had been practised upon him, the Emperor Alexander sent in all haste to Vienna to propose to that Court oblivion of the past, and the most intimate union and concert for the future.

The proposal came too late. The Emperor of Austria had already consented to the marriage of his daughter with Bonaparte.

Thus Russia becomes once more embroiled with France, while she is confirmed in her jealousy of Austria.

This conjunction of affairs presents a glorious opportunity to the Sublime Porte to extricate herself out of all her difficulties, and to conclude a safe and durable peace with Russia on the most honourable terms.

But this, like every other important project, must be managed with prudence and address. The opportunity must be seized upon without loss of time. Delay will enable France to recover her footing at the Court of St. Petersburg, which she may always hope to do, while the war lasts, by encouraging

Russia to make fresh acquisitions at the expense of Turkey.

Austria, and perhaps France herself, may also represent this conjuncture as favourable to Turkey: they may hold out the hope that their union will protect her against Russia. But the plain truth is, that it is the disunion, the jealousy, the mutual mistrust and hatred of all these powers towards each other, which will prevent them from injuring Turkey.

To enable Turkey to profit by this state of things, the following proposal is submitted to the wisdom of the Divan:—

To reject the offer of negotiation lately made through Baron Hubsch, as unsuitable to the dignity of the Porte; but to make an offer directly from the Vizir's Camp to Russia, of treating for a peace conjointly with Great Britain.

In order to induce Russia to agree to this overture, the advantages she would derive from a peace with England should be set before her in the light they deserve. But to bring matters to the conclusion desired, some explanation must be offered with regard to the terms on which a peace might be effected between the Porte and Russia.

On this capital point many difficulties undoubtedly present themselves. But difficulties are not impossibilities. They only become such by our not attempting to overcome them.

The case at this moment is as follows:—Russia insists on the provinces of the Danube. Turkey positively refuses to cede them. Is there nothing that Russia would accept instead? And might not England find her an equivalent in other parts of the world?

Russia has often looked with a longing eye to establishments in the West Indies. They certainly could be of the highest importance to her. Independently of their intrinsic value, she would be enabled through their possession to gain back her own trade, which is now wholly in the hands of America. This would be ten times more useful to her than any acquisitions on the Danube.

It is proposed, therefore, that the overture to be made from the Camp for a negociation comprising England, should contain an insinuation to this effect; and that some person of confidence and ability should be the bearer of it.

The dignity of the Porte will be fully preserved by this proceeding. She makes no advances. She returns an answer to an advance on the part of Russia. But she chooses another channel, and one more consistent with her greatness, and with the importance of the subject itself, than the channel of Baron Hubsch.

It is further to be observed, that this mode of arranging the dispute would leave to Turkey the incalculable advantage of still keeping Russia excluded from the Archipelago. And it may be worthy of serious consideration to Turkey, whether she would gain much by a peace with Russia, which should restore matters to the precise state in which they stood before the war. Russia would in that case still possess the effective sovereignty of the Two Provinces by the nomination of the Hospodars; and the Porte would have no right to oppose her re-establishing herself in the Ionian Islands.

No. VIII. Three Inclosures,

To Lord Wellesley.

Pera, March 28th, 1810.

MY LORD,

I AM sorry to be under the necessity of bringing under your Lordship's consideration the enclosed case of the ship *Madonna Caligata*, captured, in the month of September last, by a French privateer called the *Aigle*, and carried into Scio, where her cargo, consisting of various goods, the property of British merchants, has without any form of legal condemnation been landed and sold by public auction.

The *Madonna Caligata* was navigated under the Tripoline flag, and was captured by the above privateer within less than three miles of the coast of Scio.

This violation of the neutral territory of the Porte has been the subject of much discussion between the Ottoman Ministers and myself. The Porte, on my demand, had instituted a sort of inquiry into the facts of this case; but, by the two reports, which I have the honour of enclosing, and on which it has been intimated to me that the Porte means to ground its decision, your Lordship will see what little satisfaction an inquiry so conducted could afford.

One of these reports is from the Turkish Governor of Scio, to whom the examination of the facts above stated was referred, and against whose partiality and venality in the transaction I was obliged most strongly to remonstrate. The other is from a retired Pacha, who could report no otherwise than as the prevailing power commanded.

My complaint itself is not truly stated in the reference made to it by the Turkish Governor. That complaint set forth, that the Tripoline vessel was captured "within three miles of the shore," not, "under the cannon of the fortress." Not a word is contained in my memorial respecting a sum of 2,000 piastres paid to the Judge for the Ilam.

No evidence is brought to contradict the statements, on oath, of those who were eye-witnesses of the capture. They are only stated to be fishermen, and poor.

I need not point out to your Lordship the other palpable irregularities in this proceeding: and particularly the direct sale of the goods in a neutral port, without any pretence even of a legal condemnation.

Of the corruption of the Governor of Scio, I have the most convincing proofs.

Under these circumstances, I despair of obtaining any relief for the British merchants whose property has been thus unlawfully captured and sold, unless his Majesty's Government should think proper to interpose, by issuing orders to the Government of Malta to detain the two ships, the *Nôtre Dame de la Garde*, and the *St. Martino*, which, by a sentence of the Vice-Admiralty Court of the 17th of January, (since appealed against) have been ordered to be restored to the owners.

I have the honour to be, &c.

Inclosure A, in No. VIII.

*Case of the Ship Madonna Caligata, navigated under
Tripoline Colours, bound from Malta to Constanti-
nople, 1809.*

THE said ship departed from the port of Malta on the 2d of September, 1809, under British convoy, with a fleet of merchantmen bound to Smyrna, having taken on board, in part of her cargo, sundry merchandise (not contraband of war) the property of British merchants in Malta, consigned to British houses in Constantinople, the port of the said ship's destination. Arrived off the island of Scio, she fell in with a French privateer named l'Aigle, who captured her within gun-shot of the coast of the said island, off the village of *Timiane*, and carried her into the port of Scio. Her entire cargo was there landed and disposed of by the captors, immediately after her arrival, without recourse being had to any legal process whatever to establish the legality of the capture.

Representations of the above transactions, accompanied by regular testimonies, having been forthwith made to his Excellency the British Ambassador at the Ottoman Porte, on the part of the British consignees residing in Pera, a memorial was presented to the Ottoman Government, demanding restitution of the said property, on two distinct grounds; 1st, of the infraction of neutrality sustained by the Porte by the said capture, it having been made within the neutral limits of the Porte; and 2ndly, of the further infraction of its neutrality resulting from the actual sale of British property captured by the enemies

of Great Britain, without any legal condemnation thereof in the neutral port of Scio.

This memorial caused the Porte to issue orders to the Governor of Scio to transmit correct information of the said violation of neutrality committed within his jurisdiction. The reports of the said Governor, and of a retired Pacha in the same island, deny positively, and attempt to disprove the attested facts of the said infractions of the Porte's neutrality ; it being stated in the said reports, on the testimony of certain inhabitants of the island of Scio, that no such capture had been made within the observation of any individual on the island. But they carefully avoid adverting to the more serious infraction of the Ottoman neutrality by the sale of British property not legally condemned, by the enemies of Great Britain in the port of Scio.

The Porte confining itself to the first ground of complaint, which it considers thus explained and adjusted, declines giving any satisfaction on the second ; whereby the security of British commerce, and the property of British merchants to a considerable amount, are thus sacrificed, by the negligence and collusion of the Ottoman Government, to the piratical depredations of the enemies of Great Britain ; and in a sea where they have neither squadrons, stations, nor any legal means whatever for depositing and prosecuting even a legal capture,

No. IX.

To Lord Wellesley.

Pera, April 15th, 1810.

MY LORD,

I HAVE the honour of informing your Lordship that a considerable quantity of powder and lead, for the use of the Ottoman Government, and for which, as I stated in my despatch No. XII., to Earl Bathurst, I had applied to General Oakes at Malta, is arrived at the Dardanelles.

His Majesty's frigate the *Salsette* being also at the Dardanelles, and leave having been granted by the Ottoman Government for her coming up to Constantinople for the convenience of my embarkation, these stores will arrive here in a day or two under her convoy.

The timely assistance thus afforded to Turkey, and, above all, the readiness and good-will manifested by every servant of his Majesty on this occasion, will considerably strengthen our interest at Constantinople, and secure us from any loss of ground which might otherwise be to be feared if Russia should reject the overture of a joint negociation for peace.

I have the honour to be, &c.

Separate.

To Lord Wellesley.

Pera, April 15th, 1810.

MY LORD,

I HAVE the honour of acknowledging the receipt of your Lordship's despatch dated in January, and marked "Separate and Secret."

I will make every inquiry in my power respecting the manuscripts supposed to be in the possession of the Turkish Government, which the Marquis of Sligo is desirous of examining. In the present disposition of the Turks there can be no indiscretion in my asking for access to any collection of manuscripts which may be found to exist at Constantinople; although it is impossible to promise that the request will be complied with.

I have the honour to be, &c.

No. X. Three Inclosures.

To Lord Wellesley.

Pera, April 17th, 1810.

MY LORD,

THE increasing number of American vessels which arrive in the different Scales of the Levant, renders it necessary that I should apply to your Lordship for instructions how to proceed in continuing to grant the British protection to the subjects of the United States.

Notwithstanding the independence of America, the Porte has still considered them as British subjects; and our consuls, on payment of the dues to the Levant Company, have admitted them to all the rights and privileges secured to British subjects by the capitulations.

During the war between Great Britain and Turkey, the Americans carried on their trade under their own colours; and from the extreme looseness with which

affairs are conducted in this country, they appear to have done so without molestation. But of late the Porte seems disposed to levy the Rayà duty upon goods and vessels; and the Americans, having once been loosened from British jurisdiction, think themselves at liberty to choose the protection of any other Power.

The line I have hitherto taken has been that of bringing matters back, as well as I could, to their ancient channel. Here I find difficulties with the Ottoman Government; and, from the language they hold, I foresee that before long these difficulties will increase. I could wish therefore to know the intentions of his Majesty's Government in this respect, — first, whether I ought to continue granting the British protection to Americans; and, secondly, how far I ought to insist on the recognition by the Turkish Government of our right to protect them.

The only objection which it seems possible to raise against this practice, is the degree to which their trade may become detrimental to our own. To this, however, it may be answered, that as American vessels bring nothing but colonial produce, their trade does not interfere with ours in British manufactured goods.

On the other hand, the advantages derived to us from granting the British protection to the Americans are as follow : —

1. Their cargoes are almost always consigned to British merchants, members of the Levant Company, at Constantinople and at Smyrna.

2. The Levant Company receives a duty of consular upon the goods imported from America, and upon those that are shipped in return.

3. The proceeds of American cargoes are mostly remitted in bills to London in payment for manufactured goods ; and such return cargoes as are composed of the produce of Turkey are most commonly sent to Malta and England for a market.

These advantages would consequently be lost if the British protection were withdrawn from American subjects.

It seems, however, to be the general opinion of those with whom I have conversed on this business, that the continuation of this favour to America should be subjected to the following express condition : —

That the masters and supercargoes of American ships arriving at any port of Turkey, whether consigned to British or Foreign merchants, should conform in every respect to the regulations that British traders are subjected to by the bye-laws of the Levant Company ; namely, that they deliver to the British Chancellor, on their arrival, true manifests on oath of their cargoes ; and that the consignees of the goods make true entry of them with the treasurer of the Levant Company, to whom the consulage is to be paid. The same to be done at their departure with their return cargoes.

If these considerations should have weight with his Majesty's Government, I should further take the liberty of suggesting the propriety of making some immediate arrangement with the American Minister at London, in order that directions may be issued to all captains and supercargoes of American vessels to conform to the above regulation. This is become the more necessary, as of late they have made objections,

especially at Smyrna, to swearing to the truth of their manifests.

In order to elucidate this subject as much as possible, I have applied to the principal British houses established here and at Smyrna for information respecting the comparative increase of British and American trade with Turkey since the late Treaty of Peace, and I have obtained from Mr. John Lee of Smyrna, a gentlemen universally known and respected, the four tables which I have here the honour of enclosing.

With regard to the next branch of this subject, namely, the propriety of insisting on a recognition of the right of Great Britain to protect Americans, if I may venture to offer an opinion, it should be that we confine ourselves for the present to obtaining an acquiescence in the practice. It is all that we can do without stirring questions at the Porte which might greatly embarrass our other discussions.

I have the honour to be, &c.

No. XI.

To Lord Wellesley.

Pera, April 22d, 1810.

MY LORD,

I HASTEN to inform your Lordship, with the deepest sorrow, that yesterday the town of Pera was nearly reduced to ashes by one of the most dreadful fires ever remembered at this place.

I am not yet able to give your Lordship any de-
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tails of this calamity, as my time is wholly taken up by the effects of it.

The English palace, by great exertions, and by incurring a considerable expense, has been saved; but all the offices are destroyed. It blew a hurricane during the whole of this dreadful scene, and scarcely a drop of water was to be had, all the tanks being dry. The surrounding conflagration was at one time so violent, as to make it scarcely possible for any of us to keep his allotted station. During this moment, a wooden balcony at the palace began burning, but happily the fire was soon extinguished.

I have to acknowledge, with gratitude, the Sultan's great attention to me. He was present during the whole of this distressing day, and sent the Caimakan to the palace with orders to save it at every risk.

But the savage behaviour of the mob far exceeded what I could have believed from the most unfeeling barbarians. One person was detected by my servants endeavouring to convey fire from the burning offices to the palace. Others were guilty of the most shocking excesses.

Mr. Pisani's house has been saved, but has suffered much damage. Those of Mr. Anthony Pisani and Mr. Chabert have been burnt to the ground. They have been able to save very few of their effects.

Mr. Morier is also a great sufferer. Of the losses sustained in my family I have as yet no account.

I have the honour to be, &c.

No. XII. One Inclosure.

To Lord Wellesley.

Pera, April 24th, 1810.

MY LORD,

THE arrival of a confidential person from Vienna, by whose means I have had access to some papers of extreme importance, enables me to send to your Lordship the enclosed account of a circumstance attending the marriage of Bonaparte with the Archduchess Louisa, which may not be wholly without its use.

But what is of chief consequence at the present moment is the disclosure he has made to me of the object of * * * 's journey to Paris. It seems that Bonaparte has now seriously in agitation the re-establishment of the kingdom of Poland. With this view he has already proposed to Austria the cession of the two Galicias, and he is about to require from Russia the cession of her share of the second partition. The temptation held out to Austria for her consent was first a distant insinuation that the Crown of Poland might be placed at the disposal of the House of Austria. It is now reduced to mere indemnification on the side of Turkey. What indemnification is to be offered to Russia I have not heard; but if she should not consent to the cession proposed, of which there is no probability, the plan is to compel her, and then Austria is to have Walachia and Moldavia, and the Turks are to be offered the Crimea.

The task of re-establishing Poland is to be executed by France, and dispositions are making for it. The

force already marched into Spain, amounting, since the Austrian peace, to about 60,000 men, is not to be augmented. The French still in Germany, amounting to 80,000, are destined for the Duchy of Warsaw. In addition to this force, an army of native Poles is rapidly organising, and will amount to 140,000 men before the spring. To this will be added the Bavarian and Saxon contingents already under orders to march. With so large a regular force, and the expected insurrection of Russian Poland, success is reckoned upon as certain. Murat is to be the new King, and the whole of Italy to be incorporated with France.

The task of securing her own indemnification devolves naturally on Austria. * * * *

* * * * * * * *

The approach of this new and dreadful storm which is gathering around us makes me, I confess, more than commonly anxious that the basis of the negotiation offered by Turkey to Russia, which I had the honour of explaining at large to your Lordship in my despatch No. VII., may meet with his Majesty's approbation. The state of public opinion in Russia, even among our own friends, is described to me to be such as to place it out of the power of any Minister to consent to a peace with Turkey without something to show for the expenses of the war; and since Russia must, as a military measure, evacuate Moldavia and Walachia whenever Austria comes forward, the contest may prove fatal to her unless Turkey be previously neutralised. On the other hand, the peace once made with Turkey, these provinces become a barrier for Russia towards the south, and will enable her to bring her whole force to act on one line for her defence.

I have the honour to be, &c.

No. XIII.

To Lord Wellesley.

Pera, April 24th, 1810.

MY LORD,

WHEN next I shall have the honour of writing to your Lordship it is my intention to submit to the consideration of his Majesty's Government some ideas respecting the re-establishment of the order of Saint John of Jerusalem. One object of this measure would be the keeping together the remainder of our interest on the Continent; but its principal purpose would be that of laying the foundation for a totally new system of maritime warfare for the Mediterranean. The seat of sovereignty for the order might be transferred to Corfu, if ever that island should be rescued from the hands of France, or perhaps with more propriety to Minorca.

I have the honour to be, &c.

Separate.*To Lord Wellesley.*

Pera, April 24th, 1810.

[TRANSMITTING a copy of Sir Harford Jones's letter to Mr. Adair of the 1st of April.]

Mr. Stratford Canning to Lord Wellesley.

Pera, May 4th, 1810.

MY LORD,

It is with the greatest concern that I have the honour to inform your Lordship that Mr. Adair is so severely indisposed as to find himself at present utterly incapable of writing to your Lordship as he had intended.

I have the honour to be, &c.

Mr. Stratford Canning to Lord Wellesley.

Pera, May 4th, 1810.

MY LORD,

I AM directed by Mr. Adair to inform your Lordship that on the 2d instant he received from the Porte a communication respecting the supposed basis of negociation with Russia, which his Excellency explained at large to your Lordship in his despatch No. VII., of March 31st.

By this his Excellency was given to understand, that the Grand Vizir has resolved to defer making any such overture to Russia, until it shall be known what effect the late haughty rejection of the pacific advances made through Baron Hubsch may have produced.

The Turkish Government, no doubt, perceiving how ill their present resolution agrees with the readiness with which they at first embraced Mr. Adair's proposal,

and the gratitude they expressed to him for it, seem anxious to do away any idea of their having abandoned it altogether.

His Excellency trusts that your Lordship will not be surprised at such contradictions in the conduct of a Government which has ever acted upon principles peculiar to itself; in whose conception political measures are best matured by procrastination; and which, therefore, imagines that peace can as well be made to-morrow as to-day, and that it is always time enough to assume the tone of conciliation when that of defiance has failed.

I have the honour to be, &c.

No. XIV.

To Lord Wellesley.

Pera, June 1st, 1810.

MY LORD,

A SEVERE illness has disabled me during some weeks from attending to business. This is the first day that it has been in my power to resume my correspondence with your Lordship.

In my despatch No. XII. I mentioned to your Lordship the arrival of a confidential person from Vienna, from whom I had received a variety of information respecting the views and proceedings of that Court, and particularly the journey of * * * * to Paris. The same person, who has the means of thoroughly knowing the sentiments of the Court of St. Petersburg, conversed with me also, much at length, on the

subject of re-establishing the order of St. John of Jerusalem.

With any reasons for re-establishing this order, derived from the ancient principles of its institution, I will not trouble your Lordship in the present conjuncture of the world. The point to be decided is, how far it might be rendered useful against the enemy; and here many new considerations appear to present themselves.

The accession of Austria to the French system (to which it is to be feared that matters are rapidly tending) necessarily gives a new character to the war. What may be done by Great Britain in a war essentially and purely naval, never, I believe, has been tried; certainly it never can be tried to so much advantage as at the present moment. But if this war, now become absolutely naval, is also to be absolutely defensive, it may be long before we realise those objects of security for which alone we continue it; for Europe, gradually growing used to the barbarism into which it is falling from the stoppage of the great sources of its commerce, may in time lose the wish as well as the hope of recovering its former state of civilization and happiness. If, therefore, peace under the present circumstances be impracticable, if a mixed war can no longer be carried on, and if a defensive naval war is not likely to bring us speedily to our object, it follows, that we must have recourse to some new principle of maritime attack, conducted on the most extensive possible scale. Could all maritime communication, for instance, not only from state to state, but from province to province, and even from river to river, be effectually cut off from the enemy, and this within a period of time sufficiently short to make the

inhabitants of the Continent feel its consequences before the habits of enduring them become settled, there might still be a rational hope not only of affecting, to a great degree, but finally of subverting a power whose resources are at our mercy, and which never can renew what it loses.

In these ideas I cannot suppose that there is any thing new; but if, from the numberless exigencies of the war as it has hitherto been carried on, it neither was found eligible nor practicable to apply to this experiment all the means necessary to give it effect, perhaps the new condition of the world may lead his Majesty's Government to re-consider the reasons which may now be adduced for affording it a full trial. In the infancy of this sort of war we may admit, without offence to our gallant naval officers, that we have still much to learn before we can reach the perfection of the system to which it leads. No theory can give us this perfection. We can reach it through a course of experiments alone, repeated and improved upon year after year, and above all, inflexibly persevered in.

Of all the seas which touch the enemy's shore, the Mediterranean is that in which this experiment can best be tried. In this sea there are the great essentials of offensive maritime warfare, namely, naval posts, easily rendered impregnable to any means by which the enemy can assail them. Of the larger stations, Corfu, Cattaro, and the island of Elba, are yet wanting to complete the chain of our points of attack. Of these, it is certainly in our power to gain possession of Corfu, and I am assured, that with the aid of the Montenegrins, who are most anxious to ally themselves with us, Cattaro must follow. The island of Elba

presents greater obstacles, but although highly useful, this post is not immediately essential to the main object.

The next point is to get men. Great Britain can neither supply the number, nor perhaps the description, of men fit for all the details of this species of warfare. These may be found on the spot; and, if animated by the prospect of plunder, will soon come forward in sufficient numbers. The Ionian Islands already in his Majesty's possession offer a population of bold and hardy mariners capable, under good officers, of being led on to the most difficult enterprises. Sardinia might contribute her share. The Balearic Islands present another resource, and might afford a considerable body of men easily recruited from the Spanish continent. This population, to which it is to be hoped we may one day add that of Corfu and Cattaro, would enable his Majesty's government, at a very small expense, to arm and equip a number of galleys, and such other vessels to which the inhabitants of these islands are accustomed, and to assign them stations on the enemy's coasts, where, under the superintendence of the commander-in-chief of his Majesty's naval forces, they might, in a very considerable degree, effect the object to which I have here the honour of calling your Lordship's attention.

It would be to raise, discipline, and command a force of this description that I should propose the re-establishment of the Knights of the Order of St. John. These gentlemen, many of them of the highest military reputation in Europe, and who are now wandering about with scarcely the means of subsistence, would hardly fail to join their standard if due provision were

made for their support. Russia, if the Order should be restored without her consent, would most probably withhold the revenues of the Polish priories ; while if we suppose the restoration of the Order with her consent, we must suppose also a state of things in Europe under which the retention of her own possessions in Poland would be extremely precarious. The priories in Bohemia can no longer be counted upon. But it would scarcely be too much for Spain and Portugal, even admitting the temporary removal of these two monarchies from their European territory, to take upon themselves the support of the Order by assigning it priories in their vast empire in America.

For reasons already touched upon, Minorca appears preferable to Corfu for the seat of sovereignty, in the event of the revival of the Order. * * *

* * * * *

Material difficulties in the way of settling the Order at Corfu would also arise from the feelings of the inhabitants themselves. If any thing can be conjectured as to their sentiments from those of the six other islands of the Ionian Republic which are now enjoying the British protection, no form of government which should infringe upon that freedom and independence of which they have been taught to expect the confirmation, would be tolerated by the people.

Another very important objection, would be the bad effect which any arrangement respecting the Ionian Islands in the remotest degree favourable to the views of Russia would produce on the Ottoman government. Great Britain can be no party to such an arrangement without totally destroying her influence and her consideration at the Porte. She

would destroy it by inspiring Turkey with an incurable mistrust of her views. She would destroy it by reviving the Russian ascendancy in the Greek Islands. One principal source of that ascendancy exists now no more. The short-sighted policy which dictated the Treaty of Tilsit has struck Russia for ever out of the list of Mediterranean powers. She has by her own fault renounced an influence which she never can regain except by ours; and it is just that she experience the consequences of a connection which, after having caused such distresses to others, now makes her feel what she has lost for herself. By this act she has placed Great Britain in the station of the predominant protecting power of the Greeks; and although from the present state of the islands of the Archipelago, from the very little attention hitherto paid to them by Great Britain, from the total want of faithful and judicious agents among the inhabitants, and an infinity of other causes which can find no place in this despatch, there will be much to do before we can get into any regular system for the improvement of our influence among those islands; still it will not be hazarding too much to say, that within a very few years after the fall of Corfu they will be essentially ours; ours for the consolidation of our preponderance at the Porte while at peace with her, and ours for a new naval empire if she quarrel with us. But all these prospects would vanish if the Knights of St. John were to be re-established at Corfu.

On the other hand, there seems to be no solid objection to assigning them the island of Minorca, if it can be done with the consent of the Spanish government.

I submit this imperfect project to the wisdom of his Majesty's government; humbly requesting their

indulgence for the appearance of too forward a zeal on subjects not immediately within the concerns of my embassy.

I have the honour to be, &c.

No. XV. By the Black Joke Lugger.

To Lord Wellesley.

Pera, June 8th, 1810.

MY LORD,

I HAVE the honour of acknowledging the receipt of your Lordship's despatch, No. I., which was delivered to me by Mr. Cockerell on the 6th.

An express arrived here on the 4th instant from Buccarest, with letters for the French and Danish Ministers, and likewise for the Internuncio. Those for the Internuncio were delivered to him with great secrecy. They contain assurances that every difference between the Courts of Vienna and St. Petersburg was amicably adjusted, and that the missions between the two courts had been reciprocally re-established, although to be filled by Ministers of the second order.

The Internuncio has received also the copy of an ukase, by which the Emperor Alexander definitively annexes Walachia, Moldavia, and Besarabia to the Russian Empire. It is also stated that the Vizir had made an overture for peace to General Kaminski, who had answered, that peace *never* could be restored unless Turkey would consent to surrender the three provinces, and acknowledge the independence of Servia.

In the mean time the hostile operations of the respective armies are uncommonly languid. Instead of a formidable invasion of the Turkish provinces on this side of the Danube, we hear only of some small corps of Russians occasionally endeavouring to join the Servians, but (as the Turks assure us) constantly defeated in that object. On the side of Turkey nothing is undertaken; and indeed with sufficient reason, as she has no army in a fit state to meet the enemy. The Grand Vizir has not 50,000 men at his disposal. All naval operations appear to be absolutely renounced, although the Captain Pacha is very busy in preparing to set sail for the Black Sea.

The dispute between the French commander in Croatia and some Bosniac chiefs, (who, originally excited by the French, persisted in retaining possession of a part of Austrian Croatia which they had occupied during the war, and which has since been ceded to France,) is adjusted. The territory has been evacuated by the Bosniacs, but not until General Marmont had marched with a part of his army against their principal fortress.

My correspondence is again open with Vienna.

* * * * *

I have the honour to be, &c.

No. XVI. One Inclosure.

To Lord Wellesley.

Pera, June 8th, 1810.

MY LORD,

THE inclosed report of a conference which Mr. S. Canning has held by my direction with the Reis Efendi will serve for the present to apprise your Lordship of certain pretensions which the Turkish government seem disposed to bring forward. As the circumstance alluded to in the inclosed paper is still under consideration, I do not think it necessary to trouble your Lordship with any details of it; and as I am now doing my utmost to prevail upon the ministers of the Porte to desist from their pretensions, I shall postpone any further explanation of them until my departure from Constantinople. Should I fail in my endeavours, I will then take the earliest opportunity of giving your Lordship all possible information upon a subject of so much interest and importance.

I have the honour to be, &c.

Inclosure in No. XVI.*Mr. Stratford Canning to Mr. Adair.*

Pera, April 30th, 1810.

SIR,

IN obedience to your Excellency's directions I went to the Porte this morning and had a conference with the Reis Efendi, respecting the prize carried into Smyrna on the 17th instant by Captain Maltass, and detained there by the Turkish Government.

I endeavoured to explain the whole case, by reading to him Captain Maltass's memorial, and showing him the firmans on which the prize rested its claim to the protection of the Ottoman Flag.

I did not enter into the evidence of the French papers thrown overboard from the prize, otherwise than by stating the existence of such papers; because those papers bearing *properly* upon the question of the prize being or not being French property, it appeared that to discuss their validity would be equivalent to discussing before the Turkish Ministers the question of the final condemnation or acquittal of the prize, and thereby acknowledging in them an actual power to that effect. It seemed sufficient that the Porte should be convinced by the firmans, on which alone turned the question subject to her interference, that the vessel captured under her colours had no right to any such protection, and was, therefore, unlawfully detained at Smyrna.

After a very long conversation the Reis Efendi declared that he understood the matter completely, and acknowledged —

1st. That the mere act of hoisting red colours was not in itself a sufficient proof of right to carry the Ottoman flag.

2dly. That if the firman, warranting a right to that flag, should be found upon examination to describe a vessel essentially different from the vessel captured, the said firman would be null and void with respect to the said vessel.

Your Excellency has thus obtained the immediate objects for which you sent me to the Porte, but without advancing a step towards the liberation of the sequestered vessel. This I am led to apprehend, not

only from the tone assumed by the Reis Efendi, and the general turn of the conversation, but particularly from several assertions made by him, as well in direct contradiction to fact as subversive of all maritime law.

1st. He asserted that a firman retained its validity notwithstanding lapse of time, or demise of Sultans, unless erased from the register in which it was entered.

2d. He asserted that the Capoudan Pasha and Tersan Emini* constituted a Court of Admiralty, and were therefore competent to the adjudication of captured vessels.

3d. He declared that the Porte resisted all right in the captor of a vessel under Turkish colours to carry the said vessel for adjudication to a court constituted by his own Government.

4th. He required the infliction of corporal punishment upon Captain Maltass, should he be found to have made an illegal capture.

It cannot be necessary to repeat to your Excellency what I urged in opposition to such pretensions. All that I could say was to no purpose, as the Reis Efendi thought proper to refer every thing to his own national customs and opinions, as if they were to be the laws of the universe. He complained of the little regard in general paid to the Ottoman flag by English cruisers, whose behaviour, he said, was such as to induce a belief that England, in her engagements with the Porte, did not look to the establishment of a permanent peace. He concluded by declaring that it was the determination of the Turkish Government to

* Minister of Marine.

examine this affair with the severest justice; and to that end he desired me to propose to your Excellency that the vessel in question should be brought up to Constantinople, and there, upon due consultation with your Excellency, submitted to the judgment of the Capoudan Pasha and the Tersan Emini.

I have the honour to be, &c.

No. XVII.

To Lord Wellesley.

Pera, June 8th, 1810.

MY LORD,

As it may perhaps be satisfactory to his Majesty's Government to have some evidence of the friendly line of conduct pursued by Ali Pasha during the present blockade of Corfu by his Majesty's forces, I take the liberty of transmitting to your Lordship the enclosed paper, which contains the substance of a written communication lately made to the Reis Efendi by the French Chargé d'Affaires at this Court.

I have the honour to be, &c.

No. XVIII.

To Lord Wellesley.

Pera, June 8th, 1810.

MY LORD,

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that a part of the gunpowder and other articles of ammuni-

tion, for which, as your Lordship will have learnt by my Despatch No. XII. to Earl Bathurst, I had applied to Major-General Oakes on account of the Turkish Government, was received here on the 13th ult.

It was immediately delivered to the proper officers of the Porte, from whom I have contented myself with taking a formal receipt, of which the enclosed is a translation, until I shall receive your Lordship's instructions in answer to what I recommended in my above-mentioned despatch to the consideration of his Majesty's Government.

I have the honour to be, &c.

No. XIX. By the Black Joke, lugger.

To Lord Wellesley.

Pera, June 10th, 1810.

MY LORD,

INFORMATION was received yesterday at the Porte that the Russians had crossed the Danube in force near Silistria, and, after defeating a corps of about 10,000 Turks, had attacked and taken that important fortress; that from thence they had advanced rapidly to the Grand Vizir's camp at Schiumla; and that the Grand Vizir was entrenching himself, having no force to oppose their progress.

This disastrous intelligence has determined the Ottoman Ministers to propose to the Sultan, as the only means of encouraging his subjects to come forward, to put himself at the head of his army and raise the standard of Mahommed.

I have the honour to be, &c.

Separate.

To Lord Wellesley.

Pera, June 16th, 1810.

MY LORD,

It having appeared to me of importance, in the probable situation to which the Ottoman Empire may be reduced even during the course of this year, to obtain some information which might be relied upon respecting the state of the islands, and the disposition of their inhabitants, in the Archipelago, I have the honour of informing your Lordship that in the month of March last I selected a person in every way qualified for making the proper inquiries, and despatched him on a maritime tour, comprehending the islands of Candia and Cyprus.

The person entrusted with this commission is a very intelligent man, of the name of Giovanni Mosco, formerly employed by Count Froberg in the recruiting service in this country, and much recommended to me by Mr. Pisani.

With a view also to those events to which I alluded in general terms in the concluding paragraph of my Despatch No. IV. to Earl Bathurst, I have thought it material that we should have a trusty person permanently resident at Candia, as well to transmit from time to time to the Commander-in-Chief of H. M.'s fleet in the Mediterranean accurate information of the military state of that island, and the disposition of its inhabitants, as to counteract the machinations of the enemy, who already annexes that important island to the Morea in his imaginary partition of the Ottoman territories.

In furtherance of this plan I have been soliciting for some time past from the Porte a Consular Barat for Candia. To obtain this was a work of great difficulty, as no Barat had ever before been granted for that station, and as the person for whom I solicited it is a Raya. At length, however, I have succeeded.

The person appointed by me provisionally to reside at this station is named George Reggio. He attended the British army in Egypt as interpreter to Lord Cavan; and I have seen the strongest testimonials in his favour, signed by Sir John Stuart, Lord Hutchinson, and Lord Cavan.*

I shall have the honour of personally delivering to your Lordship the instructions with which this agent is charged. He is directed to correspond solely with the head of H. M.'s Mission at Constantinople, with the Governor of Malta, and with the Commander-in-Chief of H. M.'s fleet in the Mediterranean. He has invented a very good cypher for this purpose.

I have the honour to be, &c.

No. XXII. Six Inclosures.

To Lord Wellesley.

Pera, July 3d, 1810.

MY LORD,

THE enclosed official note (A.), which I received on the 23d ult. from the Porte, has long been expected by me. The system of maritime regulation which it announces is the result of many conferences and mes-

* This man, notwithstanding his testimonials, proved to be very undeserving of the trust reposed in him.

sages between the Ottoman Ministers and myself, both before and subsequent to my illness. In hopes that they would desist from the extravagant pretensions announced in this note, I have hitherto abstained from transmitting to your Lordship a regular detail of the circumstances which have led to their renewal at the present moment; but since, in spite of all my efforts, the ministers appear seriously bent on bringing them into discussion, I can no longer omit troubling your Lordship with a statement of some of the transactions of our cruisers, which, although without any just foundation, have excited much discontent at the Porte.

In the month of January last H. M.'s hired armed ketch the *Gleaner* was sent out from Smyrna on a cruise, under the command of Lieutenant Branch, the first lieutenant of the *Pylades*. On the 16th she met a Greek polacre off the island Nacarea, and on proceeding to search her, resistance was made, a shot was fired, by which Lieutenant Branch lost his leg, and a seaman his arm; and it was not until the *Gleaner* had come close upon her, and threatened to send her to the bottom, that she surrendered. Finding her to be bound for Smyrna, and laden with corn, of which the inhabitants were then in the utmost want, Lieutenant Branch humanely brought her into that port, although by sending her to Malta he would have secured the condemnation of a very valuable ship and cargo. The officers of the Turkish Government at Smyrna, however, and indeed the inhabitants in general, instead of showing gratitude to Lieutenant Branch for not depriving them of an article of which they stood so much in need, broke forth into the loudest cries of indignation against him for capturing (as they chose to call it) their vessels in time of peace.

In this light the transaction was represented to the Porte by the Governor of Smyrna, and in this light it was considered by the Porte, notwithstanding repeated endeavours on my part to explain its true nature.

Another transaction, which, with as little substantial reason, has been made a ground of great complaint against our navy, is so fully explained in the enclosed copy of a letter (B.) from Captain Nourse, of H. M. S. Frederickstein (apparently addressed to Mr. Werry, from whom I received it), that I have nothing to add to his statement.

A third was the capture by the *St. George*, an English letter of marque, of a vessel under Ottoman colours, under the circumstances which the enclosed memorial (C.) of Captain Maltass, commander of the letter of marque, will, in part, explain to your Lordship. I say "in part," because the case on examination turns out to be very complicated, and it is not yet disposed of. The circumstances, however, appeared to Captain Maltass so clearly in favour of the capture that without hesitation he carried his prize into Smyrna. There she was stopped by the Governor, who instantly sent up a violent memorial to the Porte, signed by the chief inhabitants of the place, against the conduct of Captain Maltass in detaining the ship. The memorial was accompanied by the depositions of the pretended Greek owner, of the Greek captain, and of others interested in the vessel; and I am sorry to say that these depositions are, in the opinion of the Turkish Ministers, much countenanced by the fictitious consignment of the cargo to Mr. Prior, treasurer of the Levant Company, for the account of an English house, although Mr. Prior has, by affidavit, sworn himself ignorant of any such consignment.

The account of the two last occurrences arrived here during my illness, which at one time was too severe to admit of my attending to any business. When I began to recover, Mr. Pisani informed me that he found the Porte highly incensed by the various representations which had arrived lately from Smyrna, and that it was in agitation to adopt some very strong measure for the protection of its flag against — what the ministers were pleased to call — the vexations of the British cruisers. That with this view it was resolved to have recourse to a proceeding adopted by the Turkish Government in former wars, namely, that of drawing a line from the Morea to Egypt, and of prohibiting to all nations the right of search, and, in general, the exercise of all the rights of war, within that imaginary boundary; and that it was intended also to call upon me, by a formal note, for an explicit assent, in the name of my Government, to this pretension.

The information I here received was accompanied by some unpleasant symptoms of the personal dispositions of the Turkish Ministers. Their tone and manner were completely altered. My applications on matters of ordinary business were neglected. My chief dragoman was received with a marked coldness. This, at one period, was carried so far, that it was intimated to him that no intercourse could take place between the British embassy and the Porte until “satisfaction” had been given, as well for the affair of the Gleaner as for the pretended insult offered to their flag in the recent conduct of the *St. George*.

To explain this last business, and in explaining it to require on my side that the prize should be released, and suffered to proceed to Malta for adjudication, I

sent Mr. S. Canning to the Porte on the 30th of April. By his report, enclosed in my Despatch No. XVI., your Lordship is already in possession, as well of the unsatisfactory issue of my application as of the new and almost hostile language adopted by the ministers. Every thing seemed to denote that matters were taking a very serious turn — so serious, indeed, as to require the utmost circumspection to avoid committing the two governments. Under these impressions, as I was still in too infirm a state to go myself to the Porte, I instructed Mr. Pisani most emphatically to warn the ministers against precipitating measures which might eventually lead to a rupture. I reminded them of the many causes of complaint which I had to urge on my side, and of the pains I had taken on all occasions (particularly in consenting to treat the affair of the *Gleaner* as an accident) to find some middle mode by which our mutual rights and honour might be reconciled. In fine, I desired that, before proceeding any further in their new courses, a day might be fixed for a full and final explanation between us on all matters of mutual grievance, in order that I might have the satisfaction of concluding my embassy without leaving behind me any trace or germ of discontent between the two countries.

In answer to this message I received the strongest assurances, reiterated again and again, of the most pacific dispositions on the part of the Porte, accompanied, however, with a renewal of all its pretensions. I was informed that the exclusive sovereignty of the Porte over the Archipelago, and within the line of demarcation to be described, was no new claim; that in 1746, in 1780, and 1781, and again in 1793 and

1803, the Porte had asserted and acted upon it, and that at these different periods Great Britain herself had recognised it. The ministers readily named a day, however, for fully discussing this and other matters with me; and accordingly I attended a conference with them on the 7th ultimo.

It were needless to repeat to your Lordship the whole of what passed at this conference. My chief object in demanding it was to obtain, if possible, a renunciation on the part of the Porte of pretensions so injurious, in every sense, to Great Britain: if that should fail, to retard the issuing of any declaration in support of them until reference could be had to H. M.'s Government, and in the mean time to restore and replace on its former confidential footing the intercourse between the Porte and the British embassy. In the first of these points I failed; in the two last I was more successful.

In contesting the first point with the ministers, they repeatedly asserted that Great Britain, by the acts of her different ambassadors, had admitted the right now claimed by Turkey to the exclusive sovereignty of the seas described within the line of demarcation. It was in vain that I desired them to produce some official proof of this strange assertion. All they would allege in support of it was the delivery of notes assuming this right, and their acceptance by the different British ambassadors at the periods above mentioned; but, according to Turkish reasoning, the simple act of accepting these notes was a proof of the recognition of the principles contained in them. I had previously examined all that could be found of Sir Robert Ainslie's papers from the year 1770 to 1782. Nothing applicable to this subject

appears from them, except what is contained in the two documents (D. E.) which I have here the honour of enclosing to your Lordship. The one is an order in council, accompanying a despatch from Lord Weymouth, dated July 16th, 1779; the other is a despatch from Lord Hillsborough, dated March 14th, 1780. The above documents afford not the slightest shadow of proof in favour of the Turkish pretensions, although, on the other hand, it must be confessed, especially on considering the despatch of Lord Hillsborough, that they do not appear to have been so clearly denied, or so vigorously resisted, as to set the matter beyond dispute with a government disposed, like that of Turkey, always to construe silence into assent.

All I could obtain, therefore, from the ministers was an agreement that no steps should be taken towards giving effect to the measure in question until the sentiments of H. M.'s Government could be known upon it; and that in the mean time our intercourse should be re-established on its former footing of mutual confidence and cordiality. On my part I agreed to refer to H. M.'s Government the statement of their claims, which they were then preparing to deliver to me.

Such is the history of the note which I have now the honour of transmitting to your Lordship. Having been repeatedly pressed for an answer, I drew up and sent the enclosed; and in the mean time I have thought it not improper to recommend great moderation to our cruisers in the exercise of our maritime rights.

The difficulty of making Turks comprehend the principles of the right of search, especially such Turks

as those of whom the Ottoman Ministry consists, is beyond my power to surmount. I have found more success in adopting myself the tone of complaint, and particularly in reminding them of their forbearance whenever any act of irregularity on the part of the enemy was brought to their knowledge. I never fail on these occasions to recapitulate the substance of the several notes presented by me to the Porte when French privateers were actually fitting out and commissioning in the harbour of Constantinople, and to reproach the ministers with their timidity or partiality in having suffered their neutrality to be so grossly violated. Whenever, by the adoption of vigorous measures against French infractions, they will cause their neutrality to be properly respected, I assure them that they will find nothing to complain of on our side; but that they must not wonder if our sailors should not be of a temper to suffer the piracies of our enemy without exercising upon that enemy, wherever they find him, the just and lawful rights of war.

It now only remains for me to mention, that the subsequent conduct of the Porte has been in full conformity to the professions of friendship with which our conference closed. Our amicable intercourse is re-established. The unlucky affair of the Gleaner is settled as well as circumstances would admit; and not by my giving satisfaction to the Porte, but by the Porte ordering the captain of the polacre to give satisfaction to Lieut. Branch and to the wounded seaman.

Capt. Nourse has carried his prizes to Malta; and no more is said, or is likely to be said, on that subject.

The case of the capture made by the privateer is

really a complicated one, although rendered more so by the Turkish Ministers, whose shameless and insatiable avarice requires to be gratified, either by a compromise on the part of Capt. Maltass, or by a bribe on that of the owners of the captured vessel. I see no prospect of terminating this business before my departure; but as the agent for the owners of the privateer, impressed with a due sense of their imprudence in ordering their captain to carry any prize he might take into a Turkish port, has consented to negotiate the affair with the Capoudan Pasha, it is not likely to create any further embarrassment to the embassy.

Your Lordship will naturally wish to know what share the French party may have had in instigating the Porte to the present proceeding. I can answer confidently that they have had none. Their credit here is absolutely gone; and as the danger of an attack from Bonaparte is still at some distance, their power through the means of terror is not enough to procure the slightest demonstration of hostility, or even of coldness, from the Porte towards Great Britain. The measure in question is chiefly one of pride; and by humouring to a certain degree this feeling, I hope, and indeed I believe, that the Turkish Government may be diverted from pressing its claims to a serious issue.

I have the honour to be, &c.

Inclosure B in No. XXII.

*Captain Nourse to*H. M. S. Frederickstein, Smyrna,
May 13th, 1810.

SIR,

I BEG leave to state to you some circumstances which have occurred to me in the command of H. M. S. Frederickstein during my last cruise at sea, and leave you to judge, by the recital, of the extreme impropriety of conduct, not to say insult, offered to H. M.'s flag.

Having gained intelligence of a French privateer having made some captures, and carried them into the port of Coron in the Morea, I determined on ascertaining the fact by looking into the port, and on April 23d came to an anchor there, on perceiving the French privateer (a schooner) in the port. Soon after my arrival the master of an English merchant schooner came on board, and stated that his vessel had been captured by the said privateer, and had since her capture been completely armed and fitted in the port of Coron, and was on the point of sailing on a cruise; and that they had landed the cargoes of three captured vessels, and had sold part of them, and the French consul had made a prison of his house by keeping the English prisoners in it, locking them up at night.

Upon the receipt of this intelligence I went to the governor, and represented to him it was contrary to the good understanding between the two powers to allow such as had been carried on under the guns of his fortress, and desired that he would give orders that she might not be allowed to sail. He

acknowledged the weakness of his power by saying he could not prevent it if she chose.

I then informed him I should write to Villi Pasha, stating the subject, and inform him of my intention to take her out as soon as I received his answer. Finding it would take five days before the answer could be received, I got under weigh in the evening, with the intention of cruising off the port till that period. At 8 o'clock at night I boarded a ship under Greek colours, with a cargo of cotton, which I found had sailed from Coron a short time before us. As she had no papers of any description, and appeared in a very suspicious light from learning she had been in possession of a British cruiser, who, on being chased by a French vessel of superior force, had given directions to the people on board to make the best of their way to Malta.

The Greeks rose upon the men left on board, and again took possession of her. The people had been landed at some small port in the Gulf of Coron, and they had, as they said, put into the port of Coron for provisions, and were now on their way to Napolia di Romania. Under all these circumstances I felt myself fully authorised to take possession of her, more particularly as the master acknowledged his being bound to an enemy's port when first detained. On the following morning, the ship being a considerable distance from Coron, two Turkish officers came on board in an open boat, and informed me that the ship we had with us belonged to Villi Pasha. Upon which I represented to them that I had detained her under very suspicious circumstances, and that I should send her to Malta, there to be adjudged by the Admiralty Court; and that if she was really Villi Pasha's pro-

perty she would undoubtedly be restored to him. With this they appeared satisfied. Having come off a great distance, and appearing persons of some consequence, I determined on standing into Coron, and landing them from the ship, showing them every civility in my power. I came to an anchor, and they left the ship. I then sent for all the English prisoners captured by the privateer who were on shore, and with liberty to quit the place whenever they chose. On their coming on board I found the second lieutenant (the officer sent for them) was detained. I immediately sent after him, and was informed he was a prisoner in the custom-house.

Upon this extraordinary intelligence I immediately sent the first lieutenant to demand the reason of such conduct, and to insist upon his being immediately delivered up, or I should be under the necessity of firing upon them; and the guns of H. M. ship were prepared for that purpose. On perceiving the boat preparing to shove off without him, I immediately ordered a gun to be fired on the opposite side from the town, unshotted: this having no effect, I fired one, also unshotted, towards the town. I then perceived the officer getting into the boat; nor was it till he came on board that I knew the cause of his detention, which he informed me was on account of our detaining Villi Pasha's ship, as they termed it. Soon after my officer's coming on board I received a letter in French, signed with three seals, which, from the insolent manner in which it was written, and the officer's information that the French consul was suffered to enter and remain in the assembly, in the midst of which he was held a prisoner, I have no doubt was of his own framing.

Under all these circumstances, and the evident appearance of the prevailing influence of the French interest, I immediately determined on seizing what may be very justly termed the French pirate in the port. It was done in one minute, without any one being hurt; and I left the port. On board her was found the commission for the Indomptable, the other privateer — for so sudden was the capture, every one swimming on shore, that nothing was carried away, — which commission being found on board makes it evident she was intended to sail under a fictitious character: the two vessels so nearly resembling each other, the deception would not have been discovered had she been captured or her authority inquired into.

As I did not interfere with the privateer Indomptable or her three prizes, it will be evident to you, Sir, that I have not in what I have done suffered myself to be carried away by a hope of gain, but that I have acted solely from imperious necessity, and a firm determination to support his Majesty's and the national honour.

I am, &c. &c.,

(Signed) JOSEPH NOURSE.

P.S. On my leaving the port with the privateer two guns without shot were fired from the Castle, and a flag, red, white, blue, horizontal, displayed. What it meant I know not. No other flag was shown. The schooner I have sent to Malta.

Inclosure C in No. XXII.

To his Excellency Robert Adair, &c. &c. &c.

THE Memorial of Philip Maltass, Commander of the
British Letter of Marque St. George,

Humbly sheweth, —

That your memorialist, on the 17th inst., at 6 A.M., fell in with a vessel off Mitylene, at six or seven miles distance from Port Sigri, steering to the eastward, which vessel he hailed to show her colours, when she hoisted Ottoman colours.

That your memorialist, on approaching her, discovered papers in the water, evidently thrown from on board said ship, which he picked up, and in so doing the mate of your memorialist's ship saw a French ensign also thrown overboard from the said vessel, but which sank.

That the act of endeavouring to sink papers and a French flag naturally created a suspicion in the mind of your memorialist that the vessel and cargo were the property of the enemies of Great Britain; and upon perusing the papers so recovered, your memorialist had no doubt of her being so. He therefore captured her; and having instructions from his owners to take all prizes to the nearest port, he carried her into Smyrna.

Your memorialist begs leave to state to your Excellency the leading points which induce him to believe the vessel and cargo are French property: — 1st. The copy-book of letters of the French captain, in which there are letters addressed from Samos, where the vessel was loaded, to Mr. Escalon, of Smyrna, of a

recent date, stating that the ship belongs to Mr. Escalon; that the captain (Masclet) was fearful of the flag captain, with whom he sailed from Smyrna, being ready to betray him on his voyage in case he should meet with an enemy, and of his having changed the flag captain in consequence. The said letters also express the wish of the French captain to be informed whether any ships of war were at Tenedos; and his intention to hire a boat to send before him, for the purpose of giving him information, and which, in a subsequent letter, he informs Mr. Escalon of having done for 100 ps. The said letters also state that the ship was loaded at Samos by Mr. Bonfort; and from the tenor of all the letters it appears she was so loaded for account of Mr. Escalon. It is also evident that the vessel was bound to Odessa, as the captain states in his letters his intention of making arrangements on his arrival there.

That from the papers so found it appears the prize is called the brig "Le Bienfaisant."

That the Greek, or flag captain of the said prize delivered to your memorialist a packet directed to Mr. Prior, which your memorialist opened, and found a bill of lading, signed "Geo. Zingrilana," consigning the cargo to Mr. John Prior, of this city, for account of Messrs. Edward Hayes & Co.; and it is worthy of observation that the bill of lading states Zingrilana as the person who loaded the ship, although the captain's letters state that Mr. Bonfort, a Frenchman, of Samos, loaded her, and which also appears from various accounts found among the papers endeavoured to be sunk. That the said bill of lading pretends the vessel is called the "St. Nicolo."

That among the papers directed to Mr. Prior is an

invoice, stating the cargo to be for account of Messrs. Hayes & Co.; but what is most extraordinary, the said invoice is not signed. There is also a letter addressed to Mr. Prior from Messrs. Hayes, requesting him to dispose of the cargo at Constantinople, and by no means to send her to Odessa or Taganrock, as though it were possible for a merchant to send a vessel of his correspondents' to Odessa or Taganrock when he was ordered to sell her at Constantinople. In fact, it appears from the said packet addressed to Mr. Prior that it was only intended to cover the property of the enemies of Great Britain; and that if the said vessel had arrived in safety at Constantinople the packet would never have been delivered to Mr. Prior. That several Turkish papers were also produced to your memorialist, but which appear to be old firmans issued for another ship, therefore she has no title whatever to the Ottoman flag. That the crew of the said ship consists of three Frenchmen, two Genoese, five Dalmatians, and six Greeks. That there are various French passports and other papers, which are sufficient to condemn the ship, but which it is unnecessary to trouble your Excellency by reciting. That upon your memorialist's arrival at Smyrna he was informed by Mr. Consul Werry that the prize was detained by the Government, and that your memorialist must no longer hoist the English flag on board her. Your memorialist begs leave to observe that he presumes no neutral government has a right to prevent a prize made on the high seas from being carried to an admiralty court for adjudication; for if she is unlawfully detained, your memorialist's owners, who are respectable merchants at Malta, have given security for payment of all expenses and damages, and will do so.

Your memorialist therefore humbly prays that your Excellency will be pleased to take the case of the captors into consideration, and to obtain for them permission from the Porte to proceed with the vessel so detained to Malta, that she may be proceeded against in H. M.'s Court of Admiralty.

And your memorialist will ever pray, &c.

(Signed) PHILIP MALTASS.

Pera, April 27th, 1811.

Inclosure F in No. XXII.

Mr. Adair to the Reis Efendi.

THE undersigned, &c. has received the note which has been addressed to him by his Excellency the Reis Efendi, bearing date the 23d ult., and containing the notification of divers important regulations which the Sublime Porte proposes to adopt with regard to the navigation of the Archipelago, and other seas contiguous to its territories.

It having been understood, in the conference of the 7th ult., that until the undersigned could receive instructions from his Court, with regard to his conduct on an occasion of so much delicacy and importance, no definitive measures should be taken by the Sublime Porte with a view of giving effect to the above regulations, the undersigned forbears entering for the present into any extended discussion of their operation and tendency. He feels it to be his duty, however, to submit one observation to the Ministers of the Sublime Porte, and to entreat them most seriously to weigh and reflect upon it during the interval that must necessarily elapse between this present period

and the period at which the sentiments of the British Government can be made known.

The effect of the measure announced by the Sublime Porte, namely, the drawing a line of demarcation from the Morea to Egypt, within which all hostilities between the belligerent Powers, and in general the exercise of all the rights of maritime warfare, are prohibited, being to render the Archipelago and great part of the Mediterranean what is denominated "a close sea," the undersigned is bound to remark to his Excellency the Reis Efendi that by the public law of Europe *no state can claim an exclusive right to navigate, or to make laws for the navigation of, any seas contiguous to its territories, unless where such state shall be possessed, in full sovereignty, of the shores on either side of the said seas, in such manner as to be able to prevent by force the entrance into them of the ships of other nations.* It is in conformity with this principle that the right of the Porte to shut up the Black Sea has never been disputed by any of the ancient maritime powers of Europe. But the Ottoman Government will not fail to perceive that the principle above stated is in no respect applicable to the support of its present claims. The Archipelago and the Mediterranean are, in fact, open seas, and as such have been navigated and used by the maritime powers from century to century. The entrance into those seas is not capable of obstruction; and the imaginary line of demarcation, drawn from a point of the Morea to a point of Egypt by Candia, is incapable of that distinct specification which is necessary, as well for those who are to execute as for those who are to obey the orders of the Sublime Porte with regard to the due observation of its limits.

His Excellency the Reis Efendi, therefore, must not

be surprised if the demand now made upon England, to submit to the regulations announced in his official note of the 23d ult., should not be acceded to with that readiness with which his Majesty's Government has ever shown itself disposed to gratify the wishes, and to enter into the views, of the Sublime Porte; more especially as it nowhere appears, by any official document, or by any other evidence whatsoever, that Great Britain has ever acceded to the system marked out by the Sublime Porte in the notes stated to have been delivered to the British ambassadors in 1746, or in 1780 and 1781, or afterwards in 1793 and 1803.

At the same time, however, that the undersigned declares this to be his opinion, he willingly complies with the requisition of the Sublime Porte, and will submit the above note to the deliberate consideration of his Government. The undersigned is sensible that every attention is due even to the slightest wishes of a friendly state. He is firmly persuaded, that however injurious to Great Britain, and to Great Britain exclusively, must be the present claims of the Porte, if enforced, they are advanced by her with no hostile intention. He can have no hesitation, therefore, to promise, in the name of his government, that the utmost attention, the utmost respect, the utmost indulgence, will ever be shown to the Ottoman flag by the commanders of British ships. It is only towards those who usurp that flag, or who under its sanction carry on an illicit trade with her enemies; it is only towards those who, in open and daring violation of the neutrality of the Sublime Porte, carry the ships and the property captured from British subjects into Ottoman harbours, and there, without any form of trial, or condemnation, sell them as lawful prize; it is only

towards those who, equally in defiance of all neutral law, commission and fit out armed vessels in the same harbours, to capture and destroy the trade of his Majesty's subjects, that Great Britain has ever had recourse to stricter measures, and to a more rigorous assertion of those rights which belong to her as a maritime state, and which are essential to her security and independence.

The undersigned requests, &c. &c.

Pera, July 2d, 1810.

No. XXIII.

To Lord Wellesley.

Pera, July 5th, 1810.

MY LORD,

I HAVE the honour of informing your Lordship, that immediately after the disastrous events which, for want of time, I could but barely mention in my No. XIX., terms of peace were again offered by the Russian Commander-in-Chief, and again rejected by the Grand Vizir.

I was also informed by the Reis Efendi, that on that occasion the Grand Vizir had brought forward the proposal of which I gave your Lordship a detailed account in my No. VII. It was rejected by the Russian commander, partly as coming too late, and partly as unofficial.

The substance of the proposed terms of peace, as officially communicated to me, is as follows:—

1. The cession of Moldavia, Walachia, and Bessarabia.

2. The independence of Servia.
3. The cession of the territories occupied by the Russians on the side of Cuban.
4. The independence of Georgia.
5. An indemnity of 40,000 purses.* The Russians to retain the country they now occupy on the right of the Danube till after the payment.
6. To suspend the relations of friendship with England.

As soon as these harsh conditions were received at Constantinople the utmost indignation was manifested from every quarter. The Grand Signior immediately issued a Hatti-scheriff, which was read with great solemnity in the mosque of Sultan Mahomet. The purport of this Imperial edict is,—that terms of peace having been offered so dishonourable, that they could not be listened to without utterly sacrificing the independence and security of his empire, the Sultan had rejected them. His Highness then announces his determination to put himself at the head of his army, and calls upon his subjects, and particularly the Janisaries, to follow him to the field.

I am happy to inform your Lordship that the utmost unanimity and resolution have been manifested on this important occasion. The declaration of his Highness, that he will himself head the army, has been enthusiastically received by the people. It has been communicated in form to me, both by the Reis Efendi and the Caimacan. I have, of course, added mine to the general voice.

On the occasion of this communication, which was made personally to me by the Caimacan in presence

* About 1,000,000*l.* sterling.

of the Reis Efendi, I was again pressed, in an urgent but most amicable manner, on the subject of pecuniary succours. They by no means insinuated that without it they might find themselves under the necessity of sacrificing their engagements with Great Britain: they represented their wants simply, and, as I firmly believe, without exaggeration. Of men, they said, they had enough to overwhelm ten times the Russian force in a single campaign; but they had neither the means of calling these men together, nor of uniting them into an army for a sufficient length of time to gain any decisive advantages. They confessed that the necessity of putting the Sultan at the head of his army was now incontestable; but they said that even this measure, the last resource of the state, must lose the greater part of its effect by the expense inevitably attending it. The Sultan's presence would draw thousands to his standard who, after joining it, must be dismissed for the want of the means of paying and embodying them.

To this appeal, however powerfully urged, I could give no other answer than that which I have repeatedly made to similar applications; but I softened my refusal by every assurance calculated to impress on the minds of these ministers a due sense of his Majesty's prodigious exertions in other quarters, and of his unalterable friendship for the Porte.

After this the Caimacan entered much at large into the state of the war, the number and position of the enemy, and of the troops which could be opposed to them. The whole Russian force that had passed the Danube he estimated at 80,000 men. The different Turkish corps which he enumerated did not exceed 90,000; but he assured me that very large

bodies were in march from all quarters, which would soon enable the Grand Vizir to drive the Russians across the Danube, and to commence offensive operations for the recovery of the disputed provinces. He calculated that 30,000 Janissaries would march with the Sultan; that the Pasha of the Morea would supply 20,000; that Mouktar, the son of Ali Pasha, was by that time probably arrived at the camp with 10,000 more; and that, on the Sultan's putting himself in motion, Ali Pasha himself would join him with 30,000 of the best troops in the empire. From Asia he expected 80,000, of which 50,000 cavalry, by the end of the present month. All these corps were independent of the numbers who would voluntarily follow the standard of the Prophet, and whose amount he could not limit. On the whole, he spoke with the utmost confidence of the effect of the present exertions.

Not many days after this conference accounts of a favourable nature were received from the Grand Vizir. After their first successes in June the Russians pushed on a corps of about 8000 men to Varna; and with the main body of their army, consisting of about 40,000 men, under General Kamenskoi, advanced to attack the Grand Vizir in his camp at Schiumla. The first attack took place on the 23d ult., and the Russians were repulsed with considerable loss. They returned on the 25th, and on that and the following day they again attacked the Vizir with vigour and perseverance; but they were again defeated, and obliged at last completely to abandon the enterprise. The immediate effect of this success has been the relief of Varna; but the Grand Vizir has not judged proper to quit his entrenchments.

I seized this opportunity to exhort the leading

Ministers at the Porte by no means to relax in their exertions, but rather to represent to the Sultan that it was more than ever necessary that his Highness should put himself at the head of his army, in order to compel Russia to listen to a reasonable overture while the armies of France were embarrassed with the increasing difficulties of the Spanish war. I accompanied this counsel with a statement of the transactions in Spain up to the 1st of May, which Monsieur D'Havat had just received from his Government; and I had the satisfaction of learning that both the communications had been very graciously received and minutely attended to.

The departure of the Sultan is said to be fixed for the beginning of August.

The Capoudan Pasha has sailed for the Black Sea with ten sail of the line and five or six frigates. I fear that after throwing succours into Varna he has no ulterior object, except, perhaps, the bombardment of Odessa.

I have the honour to be, &c.

No. XXIV.

To Lord Wellesley.

Pera, July 6th, 1810.

MY LORD,

I HAVE this day received the enclosed memorial * from the Turkish Government, at whose special and earnest solicitation I herewith transmit it to your

* The Memorial prays the restitution of a Turkish vessel sent into Malta by a British cruiser.

Lordship. I should not have undertaken this office did I not conceive myself bound, at a moment in which Turkey is so hard pressed by her powerful enemy, to gratify the wishes of the Porte on every point not inconsistent with my duty. The writer of the memorial is a person highly respected and of great influence at the Porte; and such is the natural temper of this Government, that the smallest hesitation in complying with their requests is immediately construed into a wilful inclination to disoblige them. To avoid this imputation it has been my object on all occasions; and it is now the motive which leads me to forward the enclosed paper for your Lordship's consideration.

I have the honour to be, &c.

No. XV.

To Lord Wellesley.

Pera, July 8th, 1810.

[Transmitting a second Hatti-scheriff issued by the Sultan, calling on all his subjects to follow him to the field.]

No. XXVI.

To Lord Wellesley.

Pera, July 11th, 1810.

MY LORD,

ALTHOUGH I could return no other answer to the renewed application for pecuniary assistance made to

me, as I had the honour of informing your Lordship in my No. XXIII., by the Caimacan and the Reis Efendi, in our conversation on the 27th ult., I cannot but acknowledge the deep impression which the situation of this empire, and the danger to which it is exposed, have made on my mind. It is true that the successes of the army under the Grand Vizir have removed all immediate apprehension. I have also every reason to be persuaded that the Turks have not the most distant intention of agreeing to the Russian demand concerning a rupture with Great Britain. But, on the other hand, there is no knowing how soon they may be compelled to accept almost any conditions the conqueror may prescribe. I have myself little doubt, indeed, that the efforts now making, and, above all, the Sultan's resolution of coming forward at this crisis, will bring together so large a force as effectually to stop the progress of the Russians. Sixty, or even eighty thousand men, supposing their army to consist of that number, can never venture to cross Mount Hæmus unless they are masters of the Black Sea, and of nearly all the coast from the Danube to the Bosphorus. But these events may happen. The efforts now making may fail; the Grand Vizir may be beaten; and the Sultan, whose life, as he is the last of his race, is not to be exposed, may be obliged to return to his capital.

Your Lordship, under these circumstances, will excuse, I am sure, a very natural anxiety in me, now at the eve of my departure, to leave nothing unexecuted of the great public trust with which his Majesty has been graciously pleased to invest me; and your Lordship will consequently anticipate the deep and serious attention with which I have again and again

reflected upon the extent and the nature of my last instructions respecting the exchange of the Secret Article.

Strictly interpreting those instructions according to their letter, the case undoubtedly is neither such, nor likely to be such, as to authorise * * * * * France has neither offered her mediation, nor appears disposed to offer it, to bring about a peace between the Porte and Russia. So far, therefore, my instructions, according to their letter, are clear against the exchange of the Article. But, on the other hand, when I consider maturely their spirit, I cannot help entertaining a most serious doubt whether his Majesty's Government, in an emergency so pressing as that which may soon arrive, and at the distance at which I am placed from all means of receiving their directions, might not expect from me that I should give a wider interpretation to those instructions.

I should be inclined, I confess, to think that such would be the expectation of his Majesty's Government even if Russia, single handed, were on the point of forcing Turkey into a peace which, laying out of the question the demand to break her engagements with Great Britain, would destroy her independence as an European Power. But when I consider the terms of peace which have actually been proposed by Russia, and which include that demand, I am clearly of opinion that my instructions themselves would authorise my granting pecuniary succour, and that the only question would be as to the degree of the danger, and whether Turkey could or could not resist Russia without such succour.

Your Lordship will permit me, I trust, to enter briefly into the reasons on which I have formed this

conclusion, and into an examination of Earl Bathurst's instruction to me in his Despatch No. II.

Earl Bathurst, in that despatch, supposes the case of peace between Russia and the Porte negotiated under French mediation, in the course of which France "would endeavour to extort from the Porte concessions gratifying to the pretensions of Russia, and in furtherance of her own objects;" and his Lordship continues —

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* * * * * These words undoubtedly, in their strict sense, confine the exchange of the Secret Article to the actual interference of France "by prescribing conditions." But is there no case in which the hand of France may be so visible without her formal interference?—none in which the cause and interests of France, and of France alone, may be so essentially served by a peace between the Porte and Russia as that, upon a just view of the question, the advantages secured to her by such a peace may not be found equal to those she might derive through her own mediation? Is it not against such advantages that the imperative part of my instructions is intended to provide? And what has France, admitting her to be called in to mediate the Russian peace, to ask more of Turkey in point of advantage than the very concession now insisted upon by Russia, namely, the rupture of the relations between Great Britain and the Porte?

If, therefore, the letter of the above instructions would require my exchanging the Article in a case where France should interfere to obtain the exclusion

of Great Britain from the Porte, the spirit of it, I should humbly think, would justify my so doing in a case where the ally of France, with means not inferior of enforcing it, insists upon the same condition from Turkey as the *sine quâ non* of peace. I can see but little difference in point of argument, and none as a question of politics, between the interference of Russia to procure, by force of arms, certain advantages for France, and the interference of France, through mediation, to procure the same advantages for herself. If the demands of the two Powers be the same, and the pressure on Turkey from both be equal, the accident of their announcing those demands from Paris or from the Russian camp changes nothing in the essential part of the subject.

I am anxious to state these opinions to your Lordship, not with any view to the immediate exchange of the Article, for which I see no imminent necessity, but with a view to the possible events enumerated in the first paragraph of my present letter: and as those events are of a nature to require, when they occur, an immediate decision as to the mode of acting upon them, I have thought it expedient, before my own departure for England, and that of the Sultan and his Court for the army, to open myself further to the Turkish Government with regard to this question of assistance than hitherto it has appeared to me to be expedient.

In taking this step I had two motives, — the one, to animate and give confidence to Turkey, by showing her that she is not abandoned by Great Britain in her distress; the other, to secure for my successor the communication of any negotiations that may be renewed with Russia, and likewise the communication

of any attempt on the part of France, either to influence the terms of peace, or to stop the progress of the Turkish arms.

The latter of the above motives was the more urgent, as I am informed that the Sultan is not to be accompanied by the Foreign Ministers. A peace, therefore, if any great and sudden disaster should befall the Ottoman Power, may be signed in a moment of consternation, without the possibility of any interference on the part of the British Minister to prevent it. Were I to leave the ministers without hopes that in a case of emergency Great Britain would step forward to succour the Ottoman Empire, they would naturally leave the British Minister without information as to their own transactions at the camp; and under circumstances such as I have supposed, the mere fear of maritime war, unsustained by other modes of influencing their deliberations, would not prevail over the fear of seeing a Russian army at Constantinople.

This day, therefore, in my visit to take leave of the Reis Efendi, on his again adverting to the general state of affairs, and the urgent necessities of the Empire, I rather met than avoided the subject. We discussed at large the two Secret Articles of the Treaty of Peace, in which the interests of the Porte are chiefly concerned. On the first (Article 4.) he expressed an earnest hope that Great Britain, if by the successful employment of her fleets in the Baltic she should compel Russia to make peace, would not forget the interests of the Ottoman Empire. On this head I found no difficulty in convincing him, and the other ministers present, that his Majesty's Government would make every fair and reasonable effort to obtain

a peace for Turkey which should take the integrity of their Empire for its basis. I cautioned them at the same time against giving a too wide interpretation to this Article, or conceiving from the terms of it that we had bound ourselves to listen to no separate proposals. Turkey, on her side, was bound to no such agreement; yet such was the interest which Great Britain felt in the preservation of the Turkish Empire, that I could confidently say, that in the negotiation of any peace between her and Russia the interests of Turkey would, independently of the Article in question, form a material and a necessary part.

With regard to the Separate Article, nothing new in point of argument was adduced by the ministers, except an attempt to persuade me that Bonaparte, by his speech to the Senate, had committed such an act of aggression as to authorise its exchange. Rejecting absolutely this construction of an act of aggression, I took this opportunity of stating some of the cases which I should consider as such. I then assured the Reis Efendi that Great Britain would never suffer France to interpose by menace, or by any act of direct interference, in order to stop the progress of the Turkish arms; and I pressed him, whenever such attempts should be made, to communicate them to my successor, who, on a mature consideration of the circumstances, would, I made no doubt, decide upon them in a spirit of liberality such as became Great Britain in her proceedings towards a friendly government.

In respect to Russia, and the danger to be apprehended from her, I observed, that as yet no case of such imminent necessity had occurred as would justify my departing from the line which his Majesty's

Government had marked out for my conduct with regard to the exchange of the Article. But I equally assured him that, notwithstanding this restriction, it could never be the intention of Great Britain to stand by and see the ruin of the Ottoman Empire.

I declined, for obvious reasons, entering into any specification of the cases to which I considered this general assurance to be applicable, telling him that of these my successor would be the proper judge, if unhappily they should ever occur.

In effect, your Lordship will readily perceive how difficult it would be to state, or even to imagine, the precise contingency in which a demand for the exchange of the Article would be admissible. Accompanying events often change to so great a degree the nature of circumstances, which, considered beforehand, seem to afford a rule for our conduct, that the same act which at one moment would be highly judicious would at another become the extreme of rashness and imprudence. Nevertheless, as there will be always some general views of possible future emergencies which every man invested with a public trust will figure to himself as decisive with regard to his conduct in them, I have thought it right before my departure to confide fully to Mr. S. Canning the opinions which I entertain on this important and very delicate matter. I have thought, therefore, that, unless events should happen to vary their nature, circumstances something like the following would prove in the minds of his Majesty's Government a full justification to him for exchanging the Article:—

First. If Russia should continue to insist with Turkey on the rupture of her relations with Great Britain, and should be in such a situation, in point

of military advantage, as to make it evident that Turkey would be compelled to accede to the demand unless assisted by Great Britain.

The "situation of military advantage" I have chiefly in view in the present moment is that of the Russians having passed Mount Hæmus, after defeating the army of the Grand Vizir and taking Varna.

Secondly. If Russia, even without insisting on her offensive demand concerning Great Britain, should still appear able, by bringing a vast superiority of force into the field, to effect the immediate subversion of the Turkish Empire in Europe

Thirdly. If France should, by menace, remonstrance, or other serious demonstration, interpose to prevent Turkey from expelling the Russians from her territories on this side of the Danube.

Any one of these three cases I should hope that your Lordship would consider, as I confess to my judgment they all appear, to be such as would not merely excuse, but would even demand, the exchange of the Secret Article.

There are, however, two conditions which, in any case of the interference of Great Britain to assist the Porte against Russia, I should deem indispensably requisite to be first insisted upon. First, that the Sultan should, *bonâ fide*, march out with his Janisaries from Constantinople to join the army. If his march be merely to his country house at Daout Pasha (which I suspect to be meditated by the French party in the Divan, although they dare not oppose the public voice by dissuading him from taking the field), I should say that Turkey had not exerted her utmost efforts to oppose her enemy, and consequently that

her situation did not present such a case of necessity as would authorise her to have recourse to Great Britain.

Another condition, in my mind equally indispensable, would be, that Turkey should withdraw, at least as far as Great Britain is concerned, those extraordinary maritime pretensions which are stated in the note (marked A.), accompanying my No. XXII. This could easily be rendered consistent with Ottoman pride by a declaration that such pretensions do not apply to allies, and that Great Britain, in consideration of the aid afforded by her to Turkey against her enemies, is entitled to the advantages accorded to an allied power.

I have thought it necessary to discuss these points fully with Mr. Canning, to whose lot it may fall, even before the arrival of your Lordship's answer to the concluding paragraph of my Despatch No. IX. to Earl Bathurst, to decide upon the propriety of making a direct appeal to his Majesty's Government for assistance in the present emergency.

I have the honour to be, &c.

No. XXVII.

To Marquis Wellesley.

Pera, July 12th, 1810.

MY LORD,

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that on the 10th instant I was admitted to a final audience of the Sultan. It cannot be necessary to enter into

any details of the ceremony, which was conducted on this occasion in the usual forms ; but it may be right to let your Lordship know that no public audience of leave had ever before been granted at the Seraglio to an English ambassador.

In the speech which I addressed to the Sultan, according to established custom, I expressed in general terms the necessity of always preserving the friendship so happily subsisting between England and the Porte, and a persuasion that the presence of his Imperial Majesty at the head of his army would not fail of being attended with consequences the most favourable to the peace and security of the Ottoman Empire. The Sultan's reply was in conformity to these friendly sentiments on the part of his Majesty ; and before I left the presence chamber his Imperial Majesty delivered into my hands a letter for the King, which I hope to have the honour of presenting to his Majesty on my arrival in England.

I have now only to add that I have this day delivered to Mr. Stratford Canning, according to the instructions contained in Mr. Secretary Canning's Despatch No. VIII., of the 23d of July, 1809, the cyphers and official correspondence of his Majesty's embassy at this Court ; and I have at the same time committed to his care the Separate and Secret Article, hitherto unexchanged, of the Treaty of the Dardanelles.

I have the honour to be, &c.

No. XXVIII.

To the Marquis Wellesley.

Pera, July 15th, 1810.

MY LORD,

I HAVE much satisfaction in being able to transmit to your Lordship some information from Vienna which has reached me through my usual sources of intelligence from that quarter.

The first Article is a cyphered paragraph in a letter to Count Ludolf, his Sicilian Majesty's minister at this Court; and is as follows: —

“Vienne, 1. Juin, 1810.

“Je vous prie de communiquer à Monsieur Adair que son Correspondant d'ici lui fait savoir qu'il est toujours dans les mêmes rapports comme avant la guerre, et qu'il jouit de la confiance de ce Gouvernement. Celui-ci l'ayant informé des raisons qui ont motivé le mariage lui a donné les assurances les plus solennelles qu'il n'avoit pour objet que de s'assurer d'une tranquillité durable, pour la restauration nécessaires des finances, pour la réorganisation des armées et des affaires intérieures: que l'Autriche n'avoit point de vues d'aggrandissement ni contre la Porte Ottomane, ni contre la Russie, ou la Prusse; Elle est convaincue au contraire que ce seroit agir contre Elle-même si Elle vouloit faire la guerre contre aucune de ces Puissances: enfin que le système de l'Autriche resteroit invariablement ce qu'il étoit avant la guerre. La susdite personne a été chargé de faire parvenir cette assurance *là ou il convient*, et d'exprimer en

même tems le désir de maintenir les communications les plus amicales et les plus confidentielles," &c. &c.

I have also received through another channel, the details which follow relative to the present system of the Court of Vienna, and the state of the army and the finances of Austria : —

" Vienne, le 1 Juin, 1810.

" Depuis la Paix il n'y a que le mariage, l'état futur de l'armée, et des finances, qui soient des objets majeurs, car pour tout le reste l'Autriche est la même ; les mêmes partis, et les mêmes individus y appartenants — personne n'a changé *et non plus le Souverain*, que vous avez très bien jugé en disant '*that he acted from the best intentions.*' Une fois convaincu comme on l'étoit ici que les finances et la situation interne du pays ne permettoit pas de continuer la guerre, et nécessairement une tranquillité durable au moins pour un certain nombre d'années, l'on a cru devoir se soumettre à la dure loi de cette union de famille dans l'espoir — peut-être hasardé — qu'elle étoufferoit les plans ambitieux de Napoleon contre l'Autriche, et surtout pour empêcher qu'une alliance pareille, conclue avec la Russie, ne tournât à renverser entièrement la monarchie Autrichienne : il est possible qu'en même tems l'on se soit bercé de l'espoir d'obtenir quelques restitutions des pertes faites dans la guerre. Cet espoir-ci est, je crois, évanoui : * * * * par son voyage à Paris n'obtiendra tout au plus que quelques avantages pour le commerce par le Littoral autrefois Autrichien, et la levée des séquestres dans les états de la Confédération Rhenane. Quant à l'abri qu'on a cru créer contre l'ambition de Bonaparte, je crois que cette sureté momentanée est plutôt due à l'impossibilité

d'exécuter de nouveaux plans (impossibilité dans laquelle le mettent les affaires d'Espagne), qu'à la tendresse de son cœur pour sa nouvelle épouse et pour son beau-père. Le seul point sur lequel l'on ne s'est pas trompé c'est le danger imminent d'un mariage avec la Grande-Duchesse de Russie : il est avéré qu'il se seroit fait, et qu'Alexandre avoit, mais trop tard, même consenti au changement de religion de sa fille, et dans ce cas le ressentiment de Napoleon contre l'Autriche, et le désir de la Russie de s'aggrandir, auroient pu avoir des suites funestes pour la première. Soyez au reste sûr que l'Empereur n'a pas plus d'envie de baser sur cette alliance de famille une union politique dont le but seroit des vues d'aggrandissement contre ses voisins, que nous ne le désirons, et je crois également Metternich de bonne foi dans ses assurances du contraire ; tout ce que je pourrois craindre * *

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mais le moment du plus grand danger est, je crois, passé. Il existoit lorsque * * * * *

* * * * *
Mais la politique de Napoleon me rassure. Il ne donnera rien, et avec ce beau songe disparaîtra toute propensité, s'il en existoit, à s'unir plus étroitement à Bonaparte qu'il ne le faut pour s'assurer quelques années de tranquillité.

“ Il ne me reste plus qu'à vous dire quelques mots sur le militaire et les finances. L'armée s'est singulièrement rétablie depuis la guerre. Il est vrai que l'infanterie est diminuée de 14 régimens par la perte d'une partie de la Croatie, et de plusieurs cantons de recrutemens, mais la Landwehr qui a prouvé son utilité peut y suppléer ; la cavallerie est au sur-complét, et si à l'avenir l'on organise même l'insurrec-

tion Hongroise, celle-ci peut établir une plus juste proportion entre l'infanterie et la cavallerie qu'il n'a existé jusqu'ici, cette dernière ayant toujours été trop peu nombreuse.—Mais cette Hongrie ! Elle ne change pas ; Elle pourroit être d'une ressource inimaginable pour la monarchie—effectivement la seule, tant pour le militaire que pour les finances, et pourtant c'est toujours la même histoire—*status in statu*—par les mêmes raisons que vous connoissez * * *

* * * * * L'Empereur, et sous lui l'aide-de-camp-général, commande toujours encore l'armée, mais tout s'achemine à la rentrée de l'Archiduc Charles.

“Quant aux finances, l'on avoit au moins établi en dernier lieu un système qui quoique défectif pouvoit amener à un correctif par les bases sur lesquelles l'on avoit assis l'extinction du papier et de la dette publique—l'emploi des biens de l'église, et un fond d'amortissement alimenté par un impôt sur le capital des propriétés. Le Comte O'Donnell, alors ministre des finances, étoit l'auteur de ce plan qu'il avoit fait passer après une lutte terrible contre l'opposition, le clergé, et les Egoistes riches. Il étoit un homme fort sensé, et d'un caractère prononcé, qui auroit joué un rôle dans l'état. Un coup d'apoplexie vient de l'enlever à l'âge de 54 ans, et Dieu sait si les modifications que l'on tâchera de mettre à son plan ne finiront pas par le renverser en entier,” &c. &c.

Upon the whole of the above intelligence, I think we may fairly conclude, that for the present at least no change of system has taken place at Vienna beyond what is already apparent to Europe. There is nothing, however, in what has been communicated to

me to contradict the information I had the honour of transmitting to Y. L. in my No. XII.

It may be necessary for me here to apprise Y. L., that this correspondent, and the person alluded to in my No. XII., derive their information from different sources.

Although it should appear, therefore, on * * * return to Vienna, that the family alliance has not yet produced any further engagements between the parties to it, all that we can safely infer from that circumstance will be, that Bonaparte has found it necessary to suspend the projects in which he means that Austria shall engage with him both with regard to Poland and to Turkey.

I have further to inform Y. L. that the Austrian Cabinet expressed as much dissatisfaction as is consistent with a state of peace at the formal annexation of the Turkish provinces on the left of the Danube to the Russian empire. The Austrian agents at Bucharest and Jassy have not yet been permitted to resume their official functions; and I learn that the Internuncio has lately presented a note to this Government of which the following is the substance:—

“ La Cour a vu avec l'intérêt que lui inspirent ses sentimens d'amitié, la fermeté avec laquelle la Sublime Porte a rejeté les propositions d'une paix désavantageuse que la Cour de Petersbourg vient de lui faire.

“ Les Russes font publier en Moldavie et en Valachie qu'ils s'empressent d'évacuer Crajova puisque cette ville doit être occupée par les Autrichiens. Ce sont des nouvelles fausses que les Russes repandent à dessein, et pour mettre la Sublime Porte dans la confusion.

“ La Cour d’Autriche sera toujours l’ami de la Sublime Porte. Elle gardera la neutralité autant que la guerre existera entre l’Empire Ottoman et la Russie.

“ La Cour de Petersbourg se propose d’obliger la Sublime Porte par la voie des armes à faire sa paix, *puisque’elle a d’autres soupçons*. L’empire Ottoman a des ressources immenses dont il doit profiter.

“ Les chefs des Serviens ont écrit une autre fois à sa Majesté l’Empereur demandant sa *protection* pour se soumettre à sa Majesté. Cette proposition a été rejetée derechef, après quoi Cara Giorgi avoit envoyé une lettre à Carlstadt écrite le 5 Mai, en l’adressant au Maréchal Marmont pour l’expédier à l’Empereur Napoleon, par laquelle lettre il demanda la protection de sa Majesté. Le Maréchal Marmont a répondu à Cara Giorgi que l’Empereur Napoleon s’intéressera au sort des Serviens au tems de la paix *et qu’il falloit rester sur la défensive*.

“ L’agent Autrichien se rendant à Temeswar et de là à Bucharest, le Général Russe lui demanda des lettres de créance. L’agent répondit qu’il falloit écrire à sa Cour ; mais la Cour a répondu qu’elle ne pouvoit pas le faire, vû qu’elle ne pouvoit reconnoître les Russes que comme possesseurs des deux provinces.”

Such, my Lord, is the material part of what I have been able to learn respecting the proceedings of the Court of Vienna at the present moment.

I have the honour to be, &c.

Separate.

To Marquis Wellesley.

Malta, August 1st, 1810.

MY LORD,

I HAVE the honour of informing your Lordship, that on the evening previous to my embarkation at Constantinople, Prince Morousy, the dragoman of the Porte, sent to entreat a secret interview with me on a business stated by him to be of such extreme urgency and delicacy as to require its immediate communication, and likewise that every possible precaution should be taken in the arrangement of our meeting, so as to preclude all suspicion of it at Constantinople. On pressing to know the nature of this business, I could only learn that the Prince had on that day had an audience of the Sultan for more than three hours, unknown to any of the ministers, and that it was intended to make some communication to me, but whether privately from the Prince himself, or by order of the Sultan, the messenger could not say.

I appointed the interview, therefore, for the ensuing evening on board the *Salsette*.

Prince Morousy came accordingly as soon as it was dark, and read from a written paper the substance of a message which the Sultan, in the interview of the preceding day, had commanded him to deliver to me as from his own mouth. The message was to the following effect :—

That as I was about to depart for my native country, and had always appeared to have in view the interests of the Porte, and the improvement of its

connection with Great Britain, the Sultan expected from my friendship that I would convey directly to his Majesty the assurance of his unalterable resolution to maintain for ever the peace he had concluded with his Majesty. That the great events which had taken place of late years in Europe made it evident that Turkey and Great Britain had the strongest natural interest in each other's prosperity and preservation. That Great Britain had always appeared to him to be the only one of the great Powers that had nothing to covet which belonged to Turkey. That on his part he was confident that the King would be convinced of his sincerity, by his having rejected the late overtures from Russia immediately, and without discussion; and more especially when it should be made known to his Majesty that if he would have consented to break his engagements with Great Britain he could have obtained, and could even now obtain, a peace on terms infinitely more favourable than those specified in the Russian proposal. These dispositions on his part would, he was persuaded, induce his Majesty to step forward to his assistance in the present difficulties of his empire, and to make common cause with him against Russia, whether by strengthening his efforts to carry on the war, or by refusing to make peace with that Power except on terms which should include the interests of Turkey.

His Imperial Highness enjoined me to represent these matters to my sovereign, and to all the members of his government, in terms suitable to the emergency, as well as to his own friendly dispositions; in proof of which dispositions, and as a mark of his satisfaction personally towards myself, he desired my acceptance of a token — which at the same moment was

tendered to me by Prince Morousy — of his remembrance and particular regard.

As your Lordship will perceive that there is nothing in the above message, however flattering the circumstance of its being sent to me from the Sultan in person, which might not have been communicated in open day by the Reis Efendi or the Caimacan, it will (I should think) also appear to your Lordship, as I confess it did to me, that the main, if not the sole object of this visit from Prince Morousy was the delivery of the present with which he concluded it. Under this impression I replied to that part of the Sultan's message which related to his political interests, by assuring the Prince that his Imperial Highness did me but justice in relying upon my zeal for his service on all occasions: that immediately on my return to England I would not fail to represent to his Majesty's Government the whole of what had passed between us by his Highness' command; but that I must beg leave to decline accepting his Highness' present. That I was by no means unmindful of the intended honour, nor insensible to the flattering reflection of my having attracted the Sultan's notice to the friendly principles on which I had endeavoured to conduct my embassy; but that he must be aware that the circumstances under which this mark of the Sultan's favour was offered placed me under a necessity of refusing it. That although I made no pretensions to any particular distinction from his Imperial Highness after the unprecedented honour which he had granted to me of a public audience, still it was my feeling that such distinction as his Highness, in his extreme condescension, might intend me ought to be conferred in the most public manner. That nothing, therefore, short

of my Royal Master's commands would induce me to receive a present from which all mark of distinction appeared to be cautiously removed by its being tendered to me at night, and with a mystery totally unsuited to the dignity of the character I had recently filled at the Sultan's Court.

The Prince, in the most earnest terms, deprecated my sending this answer to the Sultan, particularly if accompanied by the return of his present. After much altercation, therefore, I consented to carry it to England, the seal remaining unbroken, on condition that he should faithfully report to the Sultan the very words in which I then again repeated my determination.

If it should appear to your Lordship that I have done wrong in complying with the Sultan's desire, even so far as to take charge of his intended present, I trust that your Lordship will consider the difficulty of the situation in which I found myself. Your Lordship, to whom Oriental customs are so familiar, will see that no choice was left me except between this expedient and an act directly and personally offensive to the Sultan. Next to returning the present, it was my wish to consign it to the custody of Mr. Canning until his Majesty's pleasure concerning its eventual disposal could be known; but to this was opposed my word of honour to Prince Morousy, to whom I had promised an absolute secrecy, and who repeatedly and warmly alleged that his situation, and very possibly his life itself, would be the forfeit if the circumstance of his visit were known to any human being at Constantinople.

All this leads me to fear that the chief motive in the Sultan's mind in sending me his favours by night

was to avoid offending France by conferring upon me any mark of distinction beyond that of my public audience in the Seraglio. Your Lordship, therefore, to whose liberal judgment on this occasion I submit my motives with perfect confidence, will allow me to express a most anxious hope that some expedient may be found to relieve me from the necessity of accepting a gift which in my sight could only be valuable by being offered in the most public manner, but which becomes burthensome when deprived of its publicity by a fear in the giver of offending the enemies of my country.

I have the honour to be, &c.

To Marquis Wellesley.

Cadiz, Sept. 11th, 1810.

MY LORD,

YOUR Lordship will be informed, by the accompanying despatch from Mr. Hill, of the sudden appearance of Lucien Bonaparte and his family in the Bay of Cagliari, on the 12th ultimo, in an American vessel. I conclude likewise that Mr. Hill will have detailed to your Lordship his correspondence both with him and with the Sardinian Government from that period until my arrival at Cagliari on the 14th, in his Majesty's ship the *Salsette*. It now devolves on me to acquaint your Lordship with what passed between Lucien and myself on that and the succeeding day, and with what induced me to have an interview with him.

Early in the morning of the 14th Captain Bathurst came to an anchor in Cagliari Bay. We found there, besides the American vessel, H. M. S. Pomone, Captain Barry. From Captain Barry, who immediately came on board the Salsette, I learned the principal facts already stated to your Lordship by Mr. Hill, also the difficulties which existed with regard to the disposal of Lucien's person. Captain Barry said that if he himself had met with him at sea he should have carried him back to the port from whence he had sailed, in pursuance of a special instruction to that effect issued by Lord Collingwood in 1808, which had neither been revoked nor altered; and that he now thought it his duty not to lose sight of the vessel of which he was on board. He added that Mr. Hill would probably consult with me respecting the best method of disposing of him, and that he should regulate his own conduct according to what might be agreed upon between us.

When I saw Mr. Hill he explained to me the embarrassment he was under in consequence of this unexpected step of Lucien, and his thus casting himself on the protection of the British Government. The first difficulty was with regard to the immediate disposal of his person. Mr. Hill here acquainted me with some facts of which I was ignorant, namely, that he had granted Lucien a passport for America in 1808, but that his Majesty's Government, having disapproved his conduct in so doing, had instructed him to revoke it, and at the same time had issued orders to Lord Collingwood to direct any British cruisers who might fall in with him at sea to take him back to the port from whence he had sailed. Mr. Hill, however, judging these orders to have pro-

ceeded solely from an anxiety on the part of his Majesty's Government to maintain the good faith of passports issued by its servants at foreign courts, thought that as Lucien had now come to Cagliari without one * the case was materially altered, and required a different mode of proceeding on his part. Possessed as he now was of the sentiments of his Majesty's Government, he conceived himself bound not only not to facilitate, but actively to prevent, the sailing of Lucien to the place of his destination. He doubted, therefore, whether he should be justified in sending him back to Civita-Vecchia, where he had embarked, and from whence, or from some other French port, he might easily put to sea again, and perhaps successfully prosecute his voyage.

Mr. Hill then told me that immediately on receiving Mr. Canning's despatch in 1808, annulling the passport, he wrote to Lucien to give him notice of it, but that by some mistake or mismanagement at Leghorn his letter had not reached its destination.

He further acquainted me that Lucien had brought with him some very strong recommendatory letters from the Pope to the King of Sardinia, and that on the authority of these letters he had asked leave to land at Cagliari; but that the Russian Minister, on hearing of this application, had most vehemently opposed it, declaring to the Sardinian Government that his being suffered to land on any pretext would be a personal affront to *Bonaparte*, and as such would be considered and resented by the Emperor Alexander, his master.

On all these accounts Mr. Hill was anxious that

* The time for the former passport had expired.

Lucien should be convinced that the embarrassments of his present situation were not created by any act of his Majesty's Government, or of its servants abroad, but that they had arisen partly from his not receiving timely notice of the revocation of the former passport, and partly from his venturing to come to Cagliari without having previously ascertained in what light his appearance there would be considered. Mr. Hill, too, as a consequence of this his anxiety, had the further wish that Lucien should be satisfied with the arrangements which might be made, and which at that moment were not finally resolved upon, respecting the immediate disposal of his person.

With regard to the main object of Lucien's solicitation, namely, for leave to go to America, or to be conducted to Plymouth, I found that Mr. Hill was then preparing a despatch to your Lordship for instructions how to proceed. He wished me to take charge of that despatch, and to explain verbally to your Lordship whatever he might omit in the hurry of writing, or not think prudent to trust to paper.

Owing to his public character at the Court of Cagliari, Mr. Hill had abstained from a personal interview with Lucien; but as the same objection was not applicable to me, I readily undertook to see him, with a view of enabling myself to state to your Lordship any circumstances connected with this event which my own observation might help me to verify, and which might appear useful for the public service. In anticipation, indeed, of the possibility of such an interview, I had declined the customary salute from the Salsette on coming ashore.

The slightest consideration of Lucien's request for permission to proceed to America was sufficient to

convince me of its utter inadmissibility. But I was by no means sure that the very reasons which rendered it so, particularly Bonaparte's declaration concerning the eventual independence of Spanish America, joined with the known republicanism of Lucien and his intimate connection with General Moreau, might not incline his Majesty's Government to think that a person of his description, and whom so many circumstances had contributed to render important, would be much more safely disposed of in England than in any other part of the world. His quarrel with his brother might be a mere pretence; at all events there was no reason to suppose it irreconcilable. There was no calculating the mischief, therefore, which such a man, leagued with one of the ablest of the French generals, might not effect in Spanish America, especially if the weakness of Ferdinand the Seventh should ever induce him to ally himself by marriage with the usurper of his European dominions.

On the other hand, admitting that this would be the opinion of his Majesty's Government, it was evident that the residence of Lucien in England, without any tie over him except the Alien Act, would be liable to many serious objections. It was not probable, indeed, that he would be allowed to remain there at all, except as a prisoner of war.

If Mr. Hill, therefore, should finally determine on detaining Lucien as a prisoner of war, it seemed but just, in communicating to him this resolution, to afford him at the same time the means of applying to his Majesty's Government for any alleviation which his circumstances might appear to claim.

Under these impressions I went to meet Lucien at the Quarantine Office. He began by explaining to

me the necessity he had been under of quitting the French territories, and of coming to Cagliari. He next mentioned his having obtained a passport, in 1808, to go to America; but he assured me that he had never received Mr. Hill's letter of the same year, giving him notice that it had been annulled by order of his Majesty's Government. This it was that had produced his present embarrassment; for at the time that he first applied to Mr. Hill he applied also to his brother Napoleon for passports, and when these last were sent him, which was not until this present year 1810, they were sent in the belief of his being already possessed of his English one. On receiving the passports from his brother, therefore, he wrote immediately to Mr. Hill to request a renewal of that which had been sent him in 1808; and it was by Mr. Hill's answer to this letter that he first learned that the grant of it at that period had been disapproved. He then again wrote to Mr. Hill for a passport to Cagliari; but before he could receive an answer a peremptory order from his brother Napoleon, which he could not disobey without danger to his person, compelled him to embark precipitately, and come to Cagliari at all hazards.

He then stated that the order sent him from Paris was in substance either to divorce himself from his wife, and accept the government of Rome, or instantly to quit the French territories.

He informed me further that the hostility of his brother towards him had been greatly aggravated by the refusal of his daughter to marry Ferdinand VII. She had been sent for to Paris (as I understood him) in the spring; and when she was made acquainted with the intention of marrying her to Ferdinand VII.

she positively refused to consent, and declared that she would follow her father's fortunes. On this she was sent back to Italy, and was then with him on board the American vessel.

He then acknowledged that after what had been communicated to him as the orders of his Majesty's Government he could expect no passport from Mr. Hill for the prosecution of his voyage to Philadelphia. All he now asked, therefore, was a passport for Plymouth. He seemed to think that if he could have an opportunity of explaining the above circumstances to his Majesty's Government he should be able to remove the objections to his being suffered to go on to America; or if not, that it might be allowed him to remain in England until the peace.

After hearing all he had to say on this point, I answered, that Mr. Hill could grant him no passport for Plymouth nor for any other place; that, as I was then on my way home, Mr. Hill intended to write fully by me to his Majesty's Government, and to apply for instructions as to his future proceedings in this case. I told him fairly, however, that there was no chance of his being allowed to go on to America; that even if his request to proceed to Plymouth were granted, I could not answer for his being suffered to remain on English ground except as a prisoner of war; and that at all events he must expect to be placed under the superintendence of a severe and vigilant police. I added, however, that I would not refuse to be the bearer of any representation which he might wish to make to his Majesty's Government respecting his situation.

He thanked me for this offer, and said that it would be indifferent to him under what restrictions he were

allowed to remain in England, since all he sought was an asylum for himself and his family from the persecution of his brother.

He then suggested, that as I was proceeding to England in a ship of war I might conduct him thither with his American vessel. But this I could not undertake.

We then came to the point of the disposal of himself and his family until the arrival of Mr. Hill's further instructions. His first request was to be allowed to remain in Sardinia. If that could not be granted, he asked to land for a few days for the recovery of one of his children, whom he represented to be in a dying state. If this should be refused him, he requested to be conducted back to Civita-Vecchia, where he would risk any consequences to himself from his brother's resentment rather than go to Malta.

He objected going to Malta, from an apprehension with regard to the mode of his treatment there. Aware of the trouble which a company so numerous, and so composed, was likely to give to General Oakes, I could not encourage him to expect a very cordial reception in that quarter, nor even that he would be allowed to land.

All these matters I repeated to Mr. Hill on my return from the Quarantine Office. To the two first of Lucien's requests he saw no objection, particularly to the second, which from motives of humanity he was very willing to promote. It was with this view that he suggested to me that if I would represent the case to the Chevalier Rossi, the King of Sardinia's Minister, it might be possible to obtain the indulgence required, although it had been previously refused. Mr. Hill,

however, felt all his embarrassments renewed by Lucien's desire to be sent back to Civita-Vecchia.

In the evening he carried me to the Chevalier Rossi, to whom, after excusing myself for not being able to pay my respects to his Sardinian Majesty, I stated the conversation I had had that day with Lucien, and the two requests which he had preferred to the Sardinian Government.

Monsieur Rossi answered by a detailed exposition of his Sardinian Majesty's objections to permitting the residence of a person so circumstanced in an island close to Corsica, where the French had a considerable force, and among a people by no means tranquil, and in whose minds some degree of ferment had already been excited by the mere fact of his arrival at Cagliari. He said that his Sardinian Majesty was very sorry to refuse any request which had the sanction and support of Mr. Hill, but that such was the temper of the inhabitants of Cagliari that his Majesty could not answer for the consequences if Lucien were suffered to land.

Reasons so cogent admitted of no answer, especially from me, who could know nothing of the internal state of the island, and in whom any further interference, after this expression of his Sardinian Majesty's sentiments, would have been extremely ill placed.

On the 15th, after conversing further with Mr. Hill, with whom I agreed perfectly in opinion as to the propriety of the measures he had resolved upon, I again saw Lucien, and communicated to him the absolute impossibility of complying with any of his three requests. With regard to the two first, I dwelt chiefly and very particularly on the opposition which

had been made to his landing by the *Russian* envoy, and the reasons which that minister had assigned for his conduct. With regard to the third, I informed him that such were the difficulties attending every other course of proceeding that no choice remained for Mr. Hill except that of sending him to Malta as a prisoner of war. That both Mr. Hill and Capt. Barry, who would conduct him thither, had assured me that there would be no difficulty in regard to his being suffered to land in that capacity; and that if so, I would on my part answer for his being treated with perfect humanity by General Oakes, and that his family would receive every assistance which their situation might require.

In answer to this communication he remarked with some asperity on the extreme harshness and injustice (as he called it) of not being suffered to land in Sardinia, when it must be evident, from all the circumstances attending his arrival at Cagliari, that he could have no other motive for desiring it than that which he had stated from the first. He remonstrated with equal warmth against the refusal to conduct him to Civita-Vecchia. It was clear, he observed, that if he had been met on his passage to America by an English cruiser, the captain of such cruiser, in obedience to his instructions of 1808, must have re-conducted him to the port from whence he had sailed. Why then, he asked, should his having renounced all intention of going to America without the consent of the British Government, and his having trusted himself to its generosity by coming straight to Cagliari, place him in a worse situation than he would have stood in if he had taken his chance of escaping to America in defiance of its orders? He protested against being

considered and treated as a prisoner of war at Malta, and implored me once more to speak to Mr. Hill, and endeavour to prevail on him to send him back to Civita-Vecchia, if he could neither send him on to Plymouth, nor obtain leave for him to wait in some part of Sardinia for the answer from his Majesty's Government respecting his future destination.

Having thought it right first to remark to him that the order of 1808 had been issued only on the supposition that he might have quitted Italy under the sanction of a passport from Mr. Hill, but that this order could not justly be extended to the case of his quitting it, by whatsoever circumstances compelled, without any passport at all, I told him that it would be useless to apply any further to Mr. Hill on the subject, and that he would do infinitely better to acquiesce in the proposed arrangement for conducting him to Malta. It was true that on the preceding day I had expressed a doubt respecting his being allowed to land at Malta, but that this doubt had arisen chiefly from my not having then known in what capacity Mr. Hill intended to send him thither.

For his more complete satisfaction, however, I went for a few moments into an adjoining room to Mr. Hill, who confirmed what I had advanced on this point, but who could not, as your Lordship will readily conclude, give way to Lucien's renewed request to be sent to Civita-Vecchia.

On this he started a new ground of objection, which your Lordship perhaps may think worth attending to, with a view to other considerations. First, he declared distinctly that he had no intention of taking a hostile part against his brother. Then he remarked that his consenting to become a prisoner

of war to England would infallibly be considered in that light; and that for this reason he could not set sail so long as the English frigate, by which it was evident that he must be taken within an hour of his quitting the Bay of Cagliari, remained at anchor there. He then said that he should make another effort with the Sardinian Government for leave to land; and that he should write to the Russian Minister, strongly protesting against his interference, and summoning him, as the representative of a power in alliance with France, to forward to the French Government a statement which he should draw up of all that had occurred to him since his embarkation. He observed, also, that it was in his power greatly to perplex the Sardinian Government by persisting to remain in the Bay of Cagliari until he should be driven out to sea by the batteries, in violation of the laws of all civilised states.

The reasons assigned by the Russian Minister for his interference not appearing to be such as to entitle him to any relief from the embarrassments in which he might become involved by it, I did not discourage this threatened appeal to him on the part of Lucien. With regard to the implied menace to the Sardinian Government, however, I told him that he would gain nothing by such a step; that, willingly or unwillingly, he must put to sea in a day or two; and that he had better do so at once, without starting any further difficulties.

Much more was said on these different topics than it is necessary for me to trouble your Lordship with. Lucien, to the very last, persisted in claiming to be sent back to Civita-Vecchia; but I constantly told him that this was impossible. I added, that if his object

in pressing this demand was to shorten the time of his remaining at sea, Mr. Hill's compliance with it would avail him but little ; for that even then Capt. Barry would think it his duty to conduct him first to the fleet off Toulon, in order to obtain the concurrence of the Commander-in-Chief. Whether this last reason satisfied him or not, I will not pretend to say ; but it silenced all further opposition. After entreating, therefore, my good offices with his Majesty's Government to obtain leave for him to come to England in any capacity, he acquiesced in the necessity of going to Malta as a prisoner of war ; still persisting, however, in his demand of an order first from the Sardinian Government to quit the Bay of Cagliari. He concluded by begging very earnestly, on account of his family, that he might not be removed from Malta before next spring.

On my return that evening to the Salsette, as we were getting under weigh, I received from him the two letters, which I have here the honour of transmitting to your Lordship. I declined, for obvious reasons, suggesting any alteration in the inclosure to your Lordship's address. I could not fail, however, to remark in it the caution with which he confines himself to a demand of passports for Philadelphia. This is a striking instance of his anxiety to avoid embroiling himself with his brother on any other subject except that which appears to have created the present quarrel between them ; and would prove beyond a doubt — if such a subject were worth a doubt — that very little dependence can be placed on their separation.

I have the honour to be, &c.

To Marquis Wellesley.

London, February, 1811.

MY LORD,

ON reconsidering the several topics touched upon in our conversation on Wednesday last, respecting the Constantinople embassy, I beg your Lordship's permission to add some few points which I omitted then to mention.

1st. The propriety of granting a special power to the Ambassador to grant his Majesty's protection to such Austrian subjects, natives of the districts ceded to France by the late treaty of peace with Austria, as may be inclined to avail themselves of the 8th Article of that treaty. It would be expedient, perhaps, that not only the Ambassador at Constantinople, but that the Governor of Malta likewise, should have this power. A considerable number of individuals, inhabitants of the ancient Littorale, and even of Croatia, possess no property except in shipping. Several of these, detesting the government to which they had been transferred, applied to me while I was at Constantinople to be received into the King's protection as British subjects, and desired to be admitted to take the oath of allegiance to his Majesty. Here I could give them no relief. All I could do was to grant them passports to go with their vessels from their own or from Turkish ports to Malta, accompanied by recommendations to the liberality of the commanding officers and governors on the different stations in the Mediterranean. Your Lordship may probably think that some more distinct power, some power of which the admiralty courts would be bound

to take cognizance, ought to be lodged with his Majesty's servants in that quarter, with a view of enabling them to extend the King's protection to such persons as may *bonâ fide* wish to withdraw themselves and their property from the power of France.

2d. Powers to the Ambassador to grant or refuse the arrears, and to regulate the division, of the pension intended for the late head dragoman, Mr. Dane, according to the recommendation contained in the enclosed letter to me from Mr. Pisani.

3d. Powers to attend to and adjust the claims of such English agents as may be able to make out a strong case, either of suffering by imprisonment or of pecuniary loss in consequence of services rendered by them to the British embassy, or the British fleet, at the breaking out of hostilities with Turkey.

4th. Powers to suspend consuls and dragomans, and in general all officers acting under the embassy, for misbehaviour, from the exercise of their functions.

I have the honour to be, &c.

*Instructions given to Mr. Giovanni Reggio, British Consul in Candia.**

AFTER your arrival in Candia you will use your best endeavours to collect and transmit correct information upon the following points, viz. : —

Civil Department.

1. State the present division of the island, as divided into different governments.

* This paper is referred to in Mr. Adair's despatch, marked "Separate and secret," of June 16th, 1811. It was drawn up by Mr. Meyer.

2. State the whole amount of the actual population of the island, specifying the number of the inhabitants of each nation, as Turks, Greeks, Armenians, Jews, Franks, &c.
3. State the actual population of the principal cities and towns.
4. State the number and the population of the villages, distinguishing Turkish from Greek villages.
5. Enumerate the principal Turkish and Greek families resident in Candia.
 - a. The sources and amount of their revenues.
 - b. The private divisions that may subsist among them.
 - c. Their views, sentiments, and dispositions, relative to their actual political condition.
 - d. Their dispositions, and that of the native inhabitants in general, towards foreign powers, and especially towards Great Britain and France.
6. Describe the character and condition of the peasantry.
7. State the number of the Greek priesthood, their revenues and character, their political dispositions and views.
8. State the actual public revenue of the island, and the different sources from which it arises.
9. Describe the administration of the present Government in Candia.

Commercial Department.

1. Describe the actual state of all the ports and harbours in the island.
2. Which of them afford the means of building ships, and to what burthen.

3. State the number of ships and vessels belonging to Candia.
4. State the number of Candiot inhabitants supposed to be employed in the purposes of navigation and commerce.
5. State the heads of the principal exports and imports, with their value in piastres Turkish.
6. State the channels of commerce mostly used by the Candiot merchants.
7. State the principal productions of the island.
8. You will make it a principal object of inquiry what kinds of timber the island produces for the building of ships of war, &c. ; whether trees for masts, &c. ; and to what quantity such timber may be procured.
9. State what supplies of bullocks, corn, and provisions generally, could be obtained annually for the use of his Majesty's service.

Military Department.

1. Describe the actual state of all the fortified places, castles, and forts in the island ; the number of guns mounted and dismounted, &c.
2. Whether there are founderies for casting of cannon, shot, &c. ; what number of manufactories for fire-arms, &c. ?
3. Describe the state of the military and naval magazines, and the quantity of stores in them.
4. Whether there are gunpowder-mills on the island ?
5. State the regular permanent forces of the island.
6. What is the actual distribution of the regular forces in the island ? State the number of troops usually stationed in the different garrisons.

7. State the greatest number of troops, and of armed men of all descriptions, which the Governor could assemble together to beat off an invading army.
8. Which are the best fortified points at present in the island ?
9. Which are the principal military passes in the island ?
10. Give an exact detail of the *roads* in Candia, marking those which admit of carriages, &c.
11. How are the mountains in the interior of Candia inhabited ?
 - a. What are the dispositions of the mountaineers ?
 - b. Of what origin are they ?
 - c. What communication do they hold with the great roads, the principal passes, and towns of the island ?
 - d. What are their usual habits of life ? Do they form a distinct body of the native inhabitants of Candia ?
12. Can cavalry act to advantage in the island ?
13. Could 2000 or 3000 men be easily furnished with horses on an emergency ?
14. What parts of the coasts are best adapted for the landing of an invading army.
15. Draw up the plan that may appear most eligible for invading and reducing the island.
16. What season of the year is the best for attacking Candia, and why ?

Political Department.

1. In all your intercourse and conversations with the civil and military authorities of the Government of Candia, as well as with the primates and inhabitants in general, you will confine your observations, as

- far as is practicable, to the *subject of commerce*; proving to them the very great advantages they must necessarily derive from cultivating more zealously their great commercial resources.
2. You will make it appear at all times that commerce is the only and sole object of your business and residence in the island.
 3. You will diligently watch the conduct of the French agents in Candia, and that of the French party there; stating the number, and character, and resources of that party.
 4. State what commerce the French carry on with the Island of Candia.
 - a. Whether under their own flag, or otherwise.
 - b. What commercial agents they have in the island; whether of their own nation or otherwise.
 5. State whether any commerce is carried on with Candia under the American flag.
 6. Whenever it is known in Candia that *any French ship or ships of war* are actually cruising near the island, or in the upper parts of the Levant seas, you will be careful to lose no time in transmitting advice of the fact to the nearest British officers with whom you can communicate at the time, viz., Cerigo, Smyrna, &c.
 7. You will maintain a regular correspondence with his Majesty's embassy at the Sublime Porte, with the Governor of Malta, and with the Commander-in-Chief of his Majesty's Fleet in the Mediterranean.

Pera, June, 1810.

PRIVATE LETTERS.

PRIVATE LETTERS.

Mr. Adair to Sir John Stuart.

H.M.S. Sea-Horse, Port Barbieri,
Nov. 18th, 1808.

DEAR SIR,

I THANK you for your letter from Messina of September 3d. Mr. Drummond will inform you of the progress made in the negociation with the Turks, and of the reasons which have prevented my doing more for the present; but what I am now about to acquaint you with is of much more importance.

Since my arrival here I have received a letter from Vienna, in answer to one I wrote from London on the 26th of June, by the permission of Mr. Canning. Its object was to renew our connections with Austria, if Spain could make a stand. The answer I have received to it is most satisfactory — so much so, indeed, that I may now safely say that the renewal of our connections with Austria is placed within the reach of our Government. A correspondence is already on foot to bring this about; and should it take place, Austria, we may fairly presume, will march an army into Italy. It is my intention, the moment I can find an opportunity of safely answering the letter to which I allude, to recommend that in that case their plan of campaign should be communicated to you, and that for this purpose they should send you some intelligent officer for whom I shall take care to provide a passage in one of our cruisers off Trieste.

The motives to secrecy upon this subject will so

readily occur to you that I will say nothing about it. I have not communicated the circumstance to Mr. Drummond.

I am, &c.

Mr. Adair to Mr. Canning.

H.M.S. Sea-Horse, Port Barbieri,
Nov. 18th, 1808.

SIR,

THE Austrian Internuncio at Constantinople has sent me, through the Reis Efendi, an answer to the letter I wrote from London on the 26th of June, and which I addressed to Vienna. Not having received my letter before the 31st of August, the writer did not know where to direct his answer. He admits the great importance to Austria of settling the peace between Russia and the Porte, and gives me to understand that the Court of Vienna had been endeavouring to bring it about, but that Russia would never evacuate the territory she was already possessed of, and that the Turks appeared equally determined never to cede it.

He states that they are still employed on this business at Petersburg, and that he will make use of my letter to the same effect.

With regard to Spain, and to what relates to Austria, he professes sentiments entirely corresponding with those I expressed to him. It would have been his wish, he says, to have had from me a more precise explanation of what I had said respecting the dispositions of the British Government towards Austria, and also with regard to the proofs which I had stated myself authorised to give of them: but having now

the means of a more direct communication with London, he informs me that he has already written to you upon the subject.

In my answer I shall of course leave all explanation on this point to his Majesty's Government, but I trust that you will approve my urging my correspondent, in the event of Austria coming forward, to concert immediately with Sir John Stuart the plan of campaign for Italy.

I have the honour to be, &c.

Mr. Adair to Mr. Canning.

H.M.S. Sea-Horse, Port Barbieri,
Dec. 1st, 1808.

DEAR SIR,

THE Success arrived here on the 28th ult., and brought me your despatches and private letters. I am most happy to find that the article respecting the ships was proposed to you by the Turkish Chargé d'Affaires, for to tell you the truth I suspected it to be a French article, and brought forward with the view of breaking off the negotiation. I sent Mr. Stratford Canning ashore to tell all the news to Vaahid Efendi, and I took care to let him know I was in possession of the correspondence which had taken place in London.

The *projet* I gave in will include all the material points; but you must excuse my not having been able to frame a better, as I have not had the assistance of any body but Mr. Pisani, who seems to me perfectly superannuated.

The question of guarantee has hitherto been avoided in our discussions. I had already taken the distinc-

tion between peace and alliance in my first conference about the proposed assistance.

You will see by my letter to the Reis Efendi, accompanying the notification of my arrival, that I made the best use I could of the general aspect of affairs; but these Turks are such strange people that one is really at a loss to know whether an argument calculated to prove to them that there is no danger in making peace with us may not have the effect of persuading them that there is no necessity for doing so just now, and thus lead them into contrivances for delay, even though delay be so evidently to their disadvantage. A few days must now determine the matter.

You will perceive, too, that I had forwarded to Vienna a duplicate of my letter the moment I arrived at Palermo. That duplicate was accompanied by a letter to Razamouffsky, and one to Hardenberg. To the first I said that if he perceived any change of councils in the cabinet of St. Petersburg, he might recommend it to the Emperor Alexander to make use of my being at Constantinople to bring on a mediation for peace with the Turks; and I authorised him to say that, on the official notification of a suspension of arms between Great Britain and Russia, I should be ready to take upon myself the character of mediator without waiting for further instructions from home. Of course, from my ignorance of what might be going on at the moment, I was obliged to leave it wholly to his discretion to communicate this overture or not.

In my letter to Hardenberg I desired him to send me a detailed account of the state of preparation of Austria.

The answers to these letters reached me at the same time with your despatches. They are dated the 25th of September. The first is very discouraging in respect to the disposition of the Court of St. Petersburg, and refers me to the details of the second for the means of judging whether it would be proper to take any step just at present at Constantinople which may benefit Russia. I observe, however, that this was written before the meeting at Erfurt.

The second may be called a joint letter, as it was written after much consultation with those at Vienna to whom I have often alluded in our conversations, and contains their common opinion and advice. The details are good as far as they go, except with regard to the finances, which, however, I do not pretend to understand thoroughly. The dispositions, however, are stated to be still temporising, and even to such a degree as to make those who write to me consider the having carried the question of preparation as a great victory over the French party. It seems, too, that Austria is not alarmed at the meeting at Erfurt, and it is believed that the Emperor Alexander has done something to tranquillise her on that head. My correspondents are not so easily satisfied; but at the time of writing to me (September 25th) felt so much alarm for Austria as to urge me rather to endeavour negotiating a triple alliance between Great Britain, Austria, and the Porte, as the only means of saving her, or indeed anything, from the public wreck.

When I reach Constantinople (if ever I do) it will be time enough to take my line on this part of the subject. The result of this meeting at Erfurt will then be known, and I shall soon find out, from the degree of confidence which the Austrian Minister

shows me, how we stand at that Court, and how they stand themselves with Russia. I had always intended proposing, in the event of Russia coming to her senses, and inviting me to assist them to make peace with the Turks, the renewal of the triple alliance (leaving out the clause of guarantee for the present), with an invitation to Austria to accede to it. I hope to hear of something which may still enable me to prosecute this plan. R. informs me that part of my letter to him from Palermo is gone to the Emperor Alexander *through another channel*, and that we shall soon see what will come of it. This channel you may guess when you read the names of those who were at Erfurt. All my letters fortunately arrived just in time to enable that person to be the bearer of them.

As I must not detain the Success, and have another vessel ready to convey other despatches, I must close my letter. But, indeed, I have said all.

I am, &c.

Mr. Adair to the Internuncio.

Port Barbieri, Dec. 22d, 1808.

MONSIEUR,

M. Wood, qui remettra cette lettre à V. E. vous informera de ma part de quelques circonstances intéressantes. Je vous prierai de les mander à la personne de la part de qui vous m'avez envoyé dernièrement une lettre. M. Wood a été attaché à notre armée en Egypte, et employé dans des affaires confidentielles. Ainsi V. E. pourroit s'entretenir avec lui en toute sûreté.

J'ai éprouvé les plus grandes difficultés dans mon

affaire, et des lenteurs qui ne finissent point. Dieu sait si elles sont encore vaincues, car je vois que sans quelque chose de signé on ne tient pas l'Osmanlis. Au reste tout semble être aplani dans cet instant hors l'affaire des vaisseaux, sur laquelle on insiste, et dont je ne veux point absolument entendre parler. Si les nouvelles que V. E. auroit reçues en dernier lieu de Vienne vous autorisent à faire aucune démarche pour favoriser ma négociation, je vous prierais, M. l'Internonce, de faire entendre à la Cour Ottomane combien cette demande est inadmissible par l'Angleterre et pour le principe et pour l'exemple. L'Angleterre ne cédera jamais sur ce point, et notre mésintelligence deviendra véritablement guerre, même guerre éternelle, dont les ennemis communs des deux Empires ne manqueront pas de profiter.

Au reste, je vois clairement que l'on cherche à me retenir ici pour donner du poids à leur négociation avec la Russie, et pour faire entrevoir à cette Puissance la possibilité d'une attaque combinée dans la Mer Noire. Je leur ai proposé dès le commencement d'intervenir directement dans cette négociation, et je l'aurois fait d'une manière très utile à la Porte, mais il paroît qu'on préfère les voies tortueuses, qui gâtent toujours les affaires. Elles gâteront les leurs, car je m'en irai positivement à moins de recevoir une réponse définitive au tems que j'ai fixé. Alors ils ne feront pas la paix avec la Russie.

Je ne sais rien de ce qui se passe à Constantinople, ni même en Europe (excepté en Espagne) depuis des siècles. C'est un très grand désavantage d'où je me tire comme je peux. Des lettres de Malte rapportent l'arrivée en Angleterre de deux courriers chargés de

propositions pacifiques. On a répondu que nous sommes prêts à traiter de la paix conjointement avec nos alliés, savoir, la Suède, le Roi des deux Siciles, le Portugal, et la Junte Suprême de Madrid. Ainsi voila l'affaire finie pour ce qui regarde la France. Qu'en dira la Russie ?

Je ne vous donne pas ceci pour officiel, mais j'y crois.

Votre Excellence excusera la manière franche et ouverte dont je m'adresse à Elle. C'est une suite de ce que mon séjour à Vienne m'a fait sentir envers tous les Ministres de S. M. I. et pour V. E. en particulier.

J'ai l'honneur d'être.

Mr. Adair to the Internuncio.

A bord du Vaisseau de S. M. le Sea-Horse,
Port Barbieri, ce 6 Janvier, 1809.

M. L'INTERNONCE,

J'ai l'honneur d'annoncer à V. E. que j'ai signé hier la paix entre l'Angleterre et la Porte.

Les dispositions de mon gouvernement envers la Cour de Vienne, étant connues de V. E., il me semble qu'une ouverture de ma part au sujet des négociations de paix actuellement entamées entre la Porte et la Russie ne seroit point déplacée dans ce moment.

La conclusion de cette paix, accompagnée surtout de l'éloignement des Russes des frontières Autrichiennes, étant un objet de la plus grande importance pour la Cour de Vienne, je m'offre à V. E. pour travailler avec Elle, ou de concert ou séparément, à son accomplissement.

.

L'effet qu'auroit produit sur l'Empereur Alexandre la réponse du Roi mon maître aux ouvertures pacifiques de ce monarque m'étant inconnu jusqu'à présent, j'ignore si l'offre de mes bonnes offices à la Russie, ou l'annonce de l'arrivée prochaine d'une Escadre Anglaise dans la Mer Noire, seroit le plus à propos. Je m'en rapporterai aux lumières de V. E. et je l'autorise à se servir de cet avis de la manière qu'Elle jugera convenable.

A mon arrivée à Constantinople qui sera encore retardée, à ce qu'il me semble, de quelques jours, j'espère avoir l'honneur de m'entretenir avec V. E. sur cet objet. C'est pour ne pas perdre un instant dans des circonstances peut-être très critiques que j'ai pris le parti maintenant de lui écrire.

Je prie V. E. d'envoyer copie de cette lettre à Vienne. Je prends aussi la liberté de lui envoyer les deux lettres incluses, et de les recommander à ses soins particuliers.

I'ai l'honneur d'être.

Mr. Adair to Lord Collingwood.

(*Extract.*)

H.M.S. Sea-Horse, Port Barbieri,
Jan. 6th, 1809.

MY LORD,

I HAVE the honour of acknowledging the receipt of your Lordship's letter of October 29th.

In addition to my despatch of this day's date*, in

* A circular, informing his Lordship of the signature of the Treaty of Peace.

which I have the honour of notifying to your Lordship the conclusion of the Turkish peace, I now inclose you the copy of a Secret Article, stipulating for eventual maritime assistance to the Porte in case of an attack or menace from the enemy.

The French Chargé d'Affaires at Constantinople, having announced his intention of quitting it the moment I arrive there, war between Turkey and France may be considered as almost certain.

In this case your Lordship will see that the Toulon squadron, if it should ever escape from port, may have other objects in view than Sicily or the coast of Spain.

And should France proceed to open hostilities, I beg leave to suggest to your Lordship the probability that the Porte may be induced to attack the French forces in Albania, Dalmatia, and the Cattaro, and consequently that it would be important to me to know your Lordship's opinion whether the co-operation of a squadron of frigates in the Adriatic to prevent them from receiving reinforcements would not be highly desirable.

To Sir Alexander Ball.

(*Extract.*)

Port Barbieri, January 6th, 1809.

* * * I ENCLOSE you two Secret Articles, to which I beg particularly to call your attention, and likewise to what I say upon the subject in my letter to Lord Collingwood.

The artillery, &c. for Ali Pasha, I should recommend by all means to be sent to him immediately, and indeed with some excuse for its delay, as he com-

plained heavily to Mr. Baker of our want of cordiality towards him.

You would also greatly oblige me if you could let me know what quantity of Ordnance stores you could spare the Porte on an emergency.

To his Highness the Vizir Ali Pasha, of Joannina.

H.M.S. Sea-Horse, Dardanelles,
Jan. 6th, 1809.

MOST HIGH, MAGNIFICENT, AND POWERFUL PRINCE,

I RECEIVED safely the letter your Highness did me the honour to write to me by my secretary Mr. Baker, who communicated to me the business with which you was pleased to charge him.

It is with the greatest satisfaction that I am now enabled to announce to your Highness that I yesterday signed a Treaty of Peace between the King my master and the Sublime Porte.

The time does not permit me to say more to your Highness at present than just to express to you my sincerest thanks for the friendly dispositions you have uniformly testified towards Great Britain, and for your powerful exertions at the Sublime Porte in bringing about the renewal of those happy relations of peace and friendship which had so long subsisted between our respective empires.

For other matters of high importance and secrecy which I shall have to communicate to your Highness I shall beg leave to refer you to Mr. Morier, jun., whom it is my intention to despatch to your Highness as soon as possible after I reach Constantinople.

I have the honour to be, &c.

To Sir Alexander Ball.

Port Barbieri, January 19th, 1809.

MY DEAR SIR,

I WROTE a few lines to your Excellency on the 13th inst., inclosing a letter for the Count de Cladan. Since then I have had an opportunity of reading a long memoir he sent me, dated November 7th, 1808. I find so much really important information in it, that I think it my duty to recommend this gentleman particularly to your Excellency's notice. After conversing with him about the state of Corfu, you will, without doubt, perceive the great importance of preventing the French garrison there from obtaining any succours by sea from the coast of Italy. On my part, I intend remonstrating in the strongest manner against Ali Pasha's furnishing them with any provisions from his dominions; and for this purpose I mean to send Mr. Morier to him the moment I reach Constantinople.

It is also my intention to remonstrate with the Ottoman Government against allowing any of its subjects to furnish the enemy with provisions in islands blockaded by his Majesty's forces. A prohibition to this effect would, I think, bring Ali Pasha's good intentions towards us fairly to the test.

I have the satisfaction of informing your Excellency that a firman is arrived with permission for the Sea-Horse to go up to Constantinople.

I am, &c.

To Count Stadion.

Pera, le 24 Février, 1809.

JE m'empresse d'avertir V. E. que je viens de recevoir des dépêches d'Angleterre en date du 3 Dec. qui m'annoncent qu'en peu de jours on alloit m'envoyer des pleins pouvoirs pour conclure un Traité de triple alliance entre l'Angleterre, l'Autriche, et la Porte.

Votre Excellence n'aura pas de difficulté à se représenter toute la satisfaction que j'aurai, à remplir ce devoir aussitôt que la Cour de Vienne jugera à propos de rétablir avec celle d'Angleterre ses relations amicales, interrompues à la suite des circonstances que V. E. m'a communiquées dans sa note officielle du 6 Février, 1808.

C'est pour ne pas perdre un tems précieux que j'ai prié M. l'Internonce d'expédier cet avis sans délai à votre Excellence. Elle jugera si Vienne ou Constantinople conviendrait le mieux pour les négociations qui pourroient s'en suivre.

J'ai l'honneur d'être.

*To his Highness the Vizir Ali Pasha of Joannina.**

Pera, March 1st, 1809.

I HASTEN to communicate to your Highness the great pleasure which I have received from two letters lately come to me from Sir Alexander Ball at Malta,

* This letter was written by Mr. David Morier.

particularly relating to your Highness. The first, of the 24th of January, mentions the arrival at that island of Capt. Leake from England, charged with an important commission from his Majesty to your Highness, and having under his care a vessel loaded with military stores of various descriptions, with which he was immediately to proceed to your coasts, and hold them at your disposal, as soon as he could return from Sicily, where he had gone upon business. Under the 27th of January, the day on which the news of the conclusion of the peace between our Governments were received, Sir A. Ball informs me that he had immediately sent an express to recall Capt. Leake from Sicily, that he might lose no time in proceeding with the stores to your Highness. I have no doubt that that officer has ere now had the honour of presenting his respects to you, and the satisfaction of confirming, by the full execution of his commission, your persuasion of the unalterable friendship of the British Government for your Highness.

There now no longer remains any obstacle to the full accomplishment of your Highness's plans, as stated in your letter to Mr. Foresti of the 2-14 December, in which I have observed with particular satisfaction your just determination to put into immediate execution all your designs against the enemy with all your strength. Having heard from a quarter which leaves me no room to doubt of the authenticity of the intelligence that the French have entered into negociation with your Highness, concerning the restoration of Parga, I only beg to put you on your guard against purchasing the possession of that place with too hard conditions, just at the moment when, with the supplies you have just received, and with the co-opera-

tion of Capt. Leake, Y. H. has it in your power to obtain it with little trouble and expense.

I have communicated to Suleyman Efendi, for your Highness's information, such intelligence concerning the war in Spain as seems to me most authentic; from which I think we have a right to hope for the most successful result. I hardly need caution Y. H. against the ridiculously exaggerated reports spread by the enemy to serve a momentary purpose, as they destroy themselves day after day.

I must here add, that the premature intelligence your Highness sent to Mr. Foresti under the 2d of December, concerning the conclusion of our peace, was the occasion of some mischief at the time, and might leave an impression on the minds of some unfavourable to the quarter whence it came. I give your Highness this caution as a sincere friend to your name and reputation; and profit by this opportunity to repeat my assurances of the perfect consideration and respect with which

I have the honour to be, &c.

To Lord Collingwood.

Pera, March 20th, 1809.

MY LORD,

By the time this letter will reach your Lordship, I shall most probably have received from England powers and instructions to conclude some Continental arrangements which may lead to a new epoch in this eventful war. I think it right to put your Lordship in possession of this information, as well from the

confidence due to you individually, as in order to enable your Lordship to make such disposition of the naval force under your command as may best assist this last effort for the recovery of the independence of Europe.

The state of things which I found on my arrival here in regard to the point of most importance to the Ottoman Empire,—namely, the Russian war,—was not the most consoling. From the Emperor of Russia's having sent a Plenipotentiary to treat for peace independently of the French mediation, the Turks had seriously persuaded themselves that he was ready to evacuate the provinces of Walachia and Moldavia. This strange infatuation prevailed to such a degree as at first to make them neglect taking any steps which looked towards the renewal of hostilities, although they had given the most positive instructions to their Plenipotentiaries not to cede one foot of territory to Russia. I have taken much pains, and have, I believe, succeeded at last in convincing them of their error and of their danger. They now know that, at the conferences at Erfurt, Bonaparte sacrificed them to Russia, on condition that Russia should keep Austria in check while he attacked Spain; and they also know that, after many explanations between Austria and Russia on the subject of the Turkish peace, the latter has uniformly insisted, as a *sine quâ non*, on having the Danube for her boundary.

An arrangement of this nature would be fatal to all my hopes of success in the great business I am about to enter upon. It is of the utmost consequence to Austria that the Turks should adhere resolutely to their determination, and either regain the provinces by force of arms or continue the war at all events. Austria

is now the last hope of Europe ; and she must be secure on her eastern frontier before she can make any vigorous effort to the west. Austria is afraid, and very justly, of the engagements *still* subsisting between the Emperor Alexander and Bonaparte, and of the undiminished influence of Bonaparte over his feeble and enervated mind. As long as that influence subsists, she can never be sure that Alexander will not take part with France in the impending war ; which he could do with so much advantage, either at the beginning of the contest or in any doubtful stage of it, by the possession of Servia and the fortress of Belgrade.

With regard to the continued existence of that influence, I lament to say that there is no reason *yet* to doubt it. Prince Swartzenberg, the new Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg, found it on his arrival there undiminished. All just observation, too, both at St. Petersburg and at Vienna, makes it clear that there is but one way of counteracting this influence, and that is by fear. This was the foundation of the Emperor of Russia's connection with France : an opposite fear can alone bring him to the right path ; and of all fears that of an alliance between Great Britain and Turkey, and of the direction which British councils, accompanied by British naval aid, may give to the native valour and ferocity of the Turks, is that which is, from all quarters, stated to me as likely to produce the most effect.

The system which I have adopted for my conduct at the Porte, therefore, is grounded on these considerations ; and (although my *direct* communications with the Court of Vienna are not yet established) has been fully concerted with the Austrian Minister at

the Porte. This system is partly that of menace and partly that of conciliation. I did not choose totally to exclude the latter in the possibility that Russia may soon be sick of the war against us and the Porte together, and may be glad of a fair opportunity of concluding a separate peace with his Majesty.

But in order that your Lordship may be thoroughly master of the principles by which my conduct will be guided, I beg leave to enclose the copies of three papers, of which two are notes addressed to the Porte, and one a letter to Prince Prosorowsky, the Russian Plenipotentiary at Jassy.

The first note to the Porte, and the letter to Prince Prosorowsky, are pacific; and by their date will appear to be written immediately after my arrival at Constantinople. The second note is hostile, and was written immediately after I had received a copy of H. M.'s declaration from Malta.

By these your Lordship will see that I am free to adopt either the peace or the war side of the question, exactly as it may suit that more extended plan in which Europe will soon be called upon to bear a part. But it is to the note of the 22d of February that I chiefly wish to call your Lordship's attention.

I have already said that it was the opinion of the Court of Vienna that the influence of France over the mind of the Emperor Alexander could only be counteracted by fear. But your Lordship will easily perceive how impossible it is for Austria, situated as she now is, to act upon this system of menace, or indeed to appear to have any communication with England which might show her to be privy to our proceedings in this respect. Bonaparte would instantly seize upon any opening which the suspicion of

such communication would afford him to make Russia quarrel outright with Austria, and attack her in Poland and Hungary, while he himself attacked her on the side of Germany and Italy. The business of menace, therefore, falls entirely to me on this occasion, although the interest of both countries in the effect of these menaces is the same.

But menaces, as your Lordship well knows, to be of any effect, must be supported. I have but little chance of concluding an alliance with Austria, unless Russia could be persuaded or forced to grant the Turks such a peace as we wish, or unless she could be embarrassed to such a degree on the side of the Crimea as to prevent her attacking Austria in Hungary. It is only by the junction of an English naval force with that of Turkey, or at least by the threat and show of a junction, that the diversion here suggested can be attended with any success.

When I had the honour of conferring with your Lordship at Cadiz upon that article of my instructions which had in view the possible case of naval aid to the Porte against Russia, you gave me I remember excellent and conclusive reasons against venturing a British fleet into the Black Sea; but at that period there was neither the prospect of such security for its return as the present aspect of affairs affords, nor the hope of such vast advantages to the world as it would now derive either by our forcing Russia to make peace upon reasonable terms with the Turks, or of occupying her, if she refuses it, at a distance from the Austrian frontier.

Under the great change of circumstances, therefore, which has taken place, and the still greater which may be expected, I could wish that your Lord-

ship would take into your most serious consideration what degree of naval aid you could spare on a sudden call from the Turks, and how far you could agree to its employment either in an expedition to attack Sebastopolis, or on any other active service against the Russian settlements in the Black Sea. I expect this call to be made on me (as your Lordship will learn from Captain Stewart, to whom I refer you for a variety of other important information) as soon as accounts arrive from Jassy of the determination of Russia to insist on the cession of the provinces.

With regard to the measure in question, it would ill become me to take the liberty of offering your Lordship any counsel; I will only say, that I do not hesitate in recommending, not only a general and active co-operation with the Ottoman Government, but particularly an expedition to the Black Sea, provided your Lordship could spare an adequate number of ships from other services.

I have the honour to be, &c.

To Lord Collingwood.

Pera, March 20th, 1809.

MY LORD,

SINCE my residence at Constantinople, information has reached me from a variety of quarters that the enemy, probably with a view of embroiling our affairs with the Porte, or foreseeing a rupture both with the Porte and with Austria, are fitting out a number of small vessels, carrying ten, twelve, and fourteen guns, in different islands of the Archipelago, with the intention of distressing the trade in the Arches.

It has been represented to me by Captain Stewart,

that their possession of the island of Cerigo will afford them great advantages in executing their designs, and in escaping with their prizes.

It is with great deference to your Lordship's better judgment in regard to the practicability of such an enterprise, that I presume to suggest to your Lordship the propriety of taking possession of the above island, where the French are in no force; where the few men they have cannot subsist without the aid of the inhabitants, of whom there is every reason to believe the great majority are disposed in our favour.

If your Lordship should approve of such an enterprise, I would also beg leave to suggest the propriety of sending the Count de Cladan to that island, with authority to assure the inhabitants of his Majesty's protection in the enjoyment of that constitution which was guaranteed to the Republic of the Seven Islands at the Peace of Amiens.

A declaration to this effect, carried out by a person of the Count de Cladan's description, would, I should think, be attended with the best consequences, not only at Cerigo, but generally throughout the Seven Islands, with a view to such future operations as the eventful times we live in may give rise to.

I have the honour to be, &c.

*To the Commandeur Ruffo.**

Pera, ce 25 Mars, 1809.

MON CHER COMMANDEUR,

NOTRE ami H. vous dira tout ce qui s'est passé ici au sujet de la demande formelle qu'a fait l'Empereur de Russie à la Porte de rompre de nouveau avec

* Neapolitan Envoy at Vienna.

l'Angleterre. Ne seroit-ce pas le cas de faire sentir à ce Prince la manière dont la France le joue en cette occasion ? Rien n'est plus sûr que c'est Caulincourt qui lui a suggéré cette démarche, car l'officier Russe porteur de la demande n'a dû, selon la date de la dépêche qui est du commencement de Mars, avoir quitté Pétersbourg que 15 jours pour le moins *après* que l'on y a sù la conclusion de la paix Anglaise. Or voici l'état de la chose : — L'Empéreur Alexandre, à la veille de conclure un traité avantageux avec les Turcs (auquel il ne paroît pas que j'ai mis obstacle), mais fidèle à ses engagements avec la France, de ne point souffrir de Ministre Anglois sur le Continent avant la paix générale, rompt sans balancer ses communications avec la Turquie, et recommence la guerre *uniquement* parcequ'on m'a reçu à Constantinople. Que fait le Chargé d'Affaires de France ? Il reste : encore plus, il *restera* ; car je sais qu'il n'attend pas du tout l'ordre de quitter par le retour du courrier qu'il a expédié le 14 Janvier à Paris. Il reste pour travailler les Turcs, et pour les encourager à s'opposer à l'exécution du système co-partageant, et aux engagements que son maître a pris à Erfurt avec l'Empéreur de Russie. En deux mots (car le tems ne me permet pas davantage), l'Empéreur de Russie fait cause commune avec la France pour l'expulsion des Ministres Anglois du Continent ; la France ne fait pas cause commune avec la Russie sur cet article (quoique Caulincourt à cette occasion ait poussé l'Empéreur Alexandre en avant), mais permet à son Ministre de rester à Constantinople avec un Plénipotentiaire Anglois, et même d'y jouer un rôle subalterne.

Faites usage, mon cher Commandeur, de cette communication si elle vous paroît en valoir la peine, et croyez moi, &c.

To Lord Collingwood.

Pera, March 26th, 1809.

MY LORD,

SINCE my letter of the 20th inst., a Russian officer has made his appearance here with a letter from Prince Prosorowsky to the Grand Vizir, written by the express command of the Emperor of Russia, by which a formal demand is made on the Turkish Government to break her engagements with England, and to order me to quit Constantinople. Two days are granted to the Porte to consider of this proposal, at the end of which hostilities are to recommence if the demand be refused, and no conferences will be suffered to take place between the Plenipotentiaries at Jassy.

Such are the contents of this truly impudent letter. I have the satisfaction, however, of informing your Lordship, that the demand contained it was instantly and indignantly rejected.

This event, while it too fully confirms the subjection of the Emperor Alexander to the influence of France, undoubtedly gives the Ottoman Government the most ample claims to our support and assistance against Russia.

The Porte, in my opinion very justly, considers it in the same light. At a conference with three of the principal Ministers, to which, by desire of the Sultan, Captain Stewart was summoned, offensive measures against Russia in the Black Sea were resolved upon, and the succour of an English squadron was required.

The amount of force, after much consultation, was

settled at four sail of the line, two frigates, and four bomb vessels; and the measure proposed was an attack on Sebastopolis.

I consider this measure as of the utmost consequence, not only as calculated directly to annoy the enemy, but as a most important diversion of the Russian forces from the territories of Austria; but as I am persuaded that the Turks will never undertake it without the co-operation of a British force, I most earnestly recommend it to your Lordship to comply immediately with their demand, if you should have received sufficient reinforcements to allow of your detaching such a force.

I have written in the same sense, and in the strongest manner, to his Majesty's Government. Of their approbation of the measure of sending a squadron to the Black Sea, I can have no doubt, from the tenor of even my first instructions; much less can I doubt it now, when I am authorised to conclude a triple alliance between Great Britain, Austria, and the Porte. I am in hourly expectation of the messenger with my full powers.

I have the honour to be, &c.

P. S. The four Russian line-of-battle ships in the Adriatic will naturally become objects of your Lordship's vigilance; but I should strongly advise any attack of them which might commit Austria with Russia.

To Captain Leake.

Pera, March 27th, 1809.

SIR,

I HAVE received your letters of the 2d and 3d inst. from Prevesa.

I had heard of your appointment time enough to prevent my sending Mr. D. Morier to his Highness Ali Pasha, and of course I have no longer that intention.

As Mr. Morier is not a military man, I confess I do not immediately see what service he could render the public by a residence at Scutari, especially considering that no English agent has yet been stationed there, and that the Greek language is not generally spoken in that Pashalic.

I do not rightly understand what Ali Pasha can mean by representing any conversation with his Efendi at this place as a recommendation not to commence operations against the French until he heard further from me. What passed at the interview with his Efendi is precisely as follows:— Having heard that many of his Highness' subjects were in garrison both at Corfu and at Parga, I observed that, as peace was restored between England and Turkey, the latter stood in the relation of a neutral power in the war between England and France; consequently that the subjects of his Highness could not remain in the French service without an infringement of the neutrality of the Porte.

In conversing upon ulterior measures, I recommended him to begin nothing except in concert with us.

This is the whole of what passed on the subject;

and I will thank you to explain it in this manner to his Highness, to whom I intend writing by the present opportunity, in order to say that your residence at Prevesa renders unnecessary the intended mission of Mr. D. Morier.

You will have learned most probably from other quarters how anxiously I have always looked forward to an expedition against the French in the Seven Islands, and how earnestly I have from the first recommended it to his Majesty's Government. Even if Corfu should be too strong at present to be attacked, I can see no reason why an attempt may not be made on the other islands. Ali Pacha's assistance in such a measure must (I should think) be very useful; and as there are other objects of importance to his own security, in which we might assist him, a ground for co-operation is laid on which it appears to me not very difficult to come to a right understanding as to principles, and to a thorough concert in measures.

I can add nothing to the clear and judicious instructions which you have received on this and on other heads.

It remains for me now to transmit to you the following information: —

On the 20th instant a Russian officer arrived here from the head-quarters of Field Marshal Prince Pro-sorowsky, with a letter to the Grand Vizir, written by the express orders of the Emperor of Russia, declaring the armistice on the Danube at an end, in consequence of the admission of an English Plenipotentiary at Constantinople.

The letter further announced the immediate resumption of hostilities, unless I were ordered away.

Forty-eight hours were granted to the Turkish

Government to determine what course it would follow. The negociations at Jassy were to be suspended until the return of the messenger.

It is with great satisfaction that I have to inform you that the Ottoman Government, faithful to its engagements with his Majesty, unanimously and indignantly rejected this imperious demand. The war, therefore, may now be considered as begun again on the Danube.

The French Minister openly countenanced this proceeding, and attended the Russian officer to his audience of the Caimacan. He has just expedited a messenger to Corfu, probably with a view of conveying information of what has passed to the Russian fleet at Trieste. It would be of great importance that our squadron in the Adriatic should have the first notice of it.

You will observe by the above communication that Russia has thus entirely thrown aside the thin disguise which hitherto veiled her intentions with regard to this Empire. As Great Britain and the Porte, therefore, have now a common enemy to contend with, our reciprocal relations are gradually growing more strict and intimate, and may at length assume the form of a direct alliance.

I have the honour to be, &c.

To Ali Pasha.

Pera, March 27th, 1809.

MOST HIGH, MAGNIFICENT, AND POWERFUL PRINCE,

HAVING received a letter from my Government announcing the appointment of Captain Leake, an officer

of great military knowledge, to reside near the person of your Highness, I no longer think it necessary to send Mr. D. Morier to Joannina.

For all confidential communications, therefore, which your Highness may have to transmit to the British Government, I beg leave to refer you to Capt. Leake, with whose abilities and zeal in the cause which unites every member of the Ottoman Empire with Great Britain your Highness has long been acquainted.

He will impart to you the intelligence I have sent him respecting the recent mission of a Russian officer to Constantinople, and that the effect of it has only been to confirm and increase the friendship which the two Empires have just sworn to each other.

I have the honour to be, &c.

To Sir Harford Jones.

Pera, March 29th, 1809.

DEAR SIR,

I HAVE received your letter of the 3d of January from Shiraz, and have forwarded a copy of it to England, together with the enclosures it contained.

The information which you sent me respecting the state of affairs in Persia is of great interest and importance. I am sorry, however, to say that not only I cannot confirm your hopes of a speedy accommodation between Russia and the Porte, but that I most earnestly recommend to you the adoption of a totally

opposite system of conduct with regard to that Power from that which, in contemplation of peace with her, you were very properly following.

The conduct of the Emperor Alexander on the occasion of my reception at Constantinople will best evince his dispositions, and his total subjection to the will of France. I transmit for your information the following brief account of this transaction :

Plenipotentiaries to settle the terms of peace between this Empire and Russia had been appointed in November last, at the express desire of the Emperor Alexander himself. The journey of these Plenipotentiaries was delayed some days by an insurrection of a very serious nature at Constantinople ; but early in December they set out to meet the Russian Plenipotentiaries at Jassy.

They arrived at Jassy on the 8th instant ; but two days before their arrival Prince Proskorsky, the Russian Commander-in-Chief in Moldavia, had, by order of the Emperor, despatched an officer to Constantinople with a letter to the following effect :—

That the Porte having thought proper to admit an English Plenipotentiary at Constantinople, he had it in command from the Emperor his master to signify that the armistice between the two armies was at an end ; that no negociations for peace would be entered upon ; but that hostilities would immediately recommence, unless I were sent away.

Forty-eight hours were granted to the Turkish Government to consider of this demand. I have the happiness of informing you that it was instantly and indignantly rejected.

I consider the war, therefore, as begun again on the Danube and in the Black Sea ; and that the

Porte has, by her energetic conduct, entitled herself to be treated by us as an ally.

Such has been the conduct of the Emperor of Russia with regard to England. In proof of the sentiments entertained by his Majesty's Government respecting him so early as December last, I send you a copy of his Majesty's declaration of the 15th of that month, on the close of a correspondence which had been set on foot under pretence of peace by the Emperor Alexander and Bonaparte, after their interview at Erfurt.

That interview took place at the solicitation of Bonaparte, who, finding it impossible to conquer Spain without employing his whole forces in the attempt, was anxious to secure himself on the side of Germany and Italy during his absence on that expedition.

At this meeting the final partition of the Ottoman territories was arranged, and the most hostile designs were discovered against the Austrian monarchy.

The Emperor Alexander did not immediately consent to make offensive war upon Austria; but I have reason to believe, nay, I am almost sure, that in the war between Austria and France (which, if not actually begun, may now be considered as certain,) he has engaged to take part with France.

Such, in few words, is the situation of the political relations of these Powers. It becomes my duty, therefore, to do all I can to divert the forces of Russia from the Austrian territories, by finding them employment on the Lower Danube, and if possible on their own frontiers.

The continuance of the war with the Porte becomes, in this point of view, of the utmost importance, and,

as part of the same system, the continuance of the war in Persia.

Do not suffer yourself therefore to be misled by the appearances of disunion and a division of interests between the French and Russians at the Court where you reside. The same division may be remarked, although in a smaller degree, at Constantinople, where the French mission remains, notwithstanding my being established here, and notwithstanding the failure of the Russian demand for my removal. The duplicity of French politics will afford a much surer principle on which this variance may be accounted for, than any speculation founded on returning sentiments of justice in the mind of the Emperor Alexander.

Spain is by no means conquered; and if Austria has any success, I entertain great hopes that the cause of Spain will finally triumph. I will keep you well informed of all important occurrences. I will thank you to forward a copy of this letter to Lord Minto.

I have the honour to be, &c.

To Captain Leake.

Pera, April 9th, 1809.

SIR,

I HAVE just received your letter of the 23d ultimo, and take this early opportunity of observing on two points in it which appear to me of importance.

I am astonished and hurt that his Highness Ali Pacha should so misunderstand my letter to him of the 3d of March as to imagine that it conveyed a reproof.

The premature intelligence of the peace at a time that my negociation was exposed to the greatest difficulties was, as I told his Highness, the source of some mischief. The precise nature of that mischief, as far as it might have affected the ultimate issue of the negociation, it is not necessary for me to reveal: but, as far as it concerned the credit of his Highness, I imagined myself to be doing him a service in the caution I took the liberty of recommending to him; since his Majesty's servants in the Mediterranean, after receiving my despatches of about the same date, could not have had a very favourable impression of the truth of those advices which stated the peace to be signed.

With regard to the foundation of the intelligence then conveyed by his Highness, I must first observe, that his Highness is not correct in his opinion respecting the supposed dispositions of Mustapha Bairactar.

Of the general intentions of the Porte to make peace after the destruction of Mustapha, his Highness was accurately informed, as well as myself; but either he was not informed of the conditions demanded, or he thought them such as I should accede to, or he thought them such as the Porte would abandon. In the two first of these cases, it was a hasty measure to send intelligence of the actual conclusion of peace; and in the third, his Highness would find it difficult to avoid the imputation against which he seems so anxious to guard, that of unfolding the secrets of his Government.

With regard to Parga, I am equally unconscious of any expression to which the term of reproof can be applied. I stated that the French had entered into negociation with his Highness on this subject, not

that his Highness had listened to their suggestions; and I stated it simply with the view I expressed, and with no other, namely, that of guarding his Highness against paying too high a price for the possession of it.

His Highness having communicated to you the letter I wrote him, these observations in part cannot have escaped you; nevertheless, as the case is of importance, I will thank you to repeat them to his Highness, assuring him at the same time of my most perfect consideration and respect.

I am, &c.

To Ali Pacha.

Pera, April 9th, 1809.

I HAVE received the communication which your Highness did me the honour of making to me through Suleyman Efendi, for which I return you my sincerest thanks.

I entreat your Highness to believe that nothing was further from my thoughts than to impute any but the best motives to your Highness, either in respect to the intelligence you communicated of the signature of the peace, or to the negotiations concerning Parga.

With regard to the first of these points, I imagined myself to be doing a service to your Highness in the caution I took the liberty of suggesting to you. At the period at which your Highness wrote to Mr. Foresti that the peace was actually signed, it was unhappily my duty to transmit information to his Majesty's servants of a totally opposite tendency. I

thought it necessary therefore, in my letter of the 1st of March, to give your Highness a friendly caution on this subject, as I feared that some impressions unfavourable to the general authenticity of your Highness's information might be produced on the minds of those who are the most anxious to co-operate with your Highness in all your views.

With regard to the second point, I alluded to propositions made by the French to your Highness, concerning Parga; but I never meant to insinuate that your Highness had listened to those propositions in a manner injurious to our common friendship. All I meant was, (as I said,) to guard your Highness against paying too large a price for Parga, at a time when you might obtain possession of it comparatively for nothing.

In other points, the sincerity of my attachment to your Highness will best be proved by the confidential nature of my communications with Suleyman Efendi, of which, no doubt, he will already have informed your Highness.

I have the honour to be, &c.

To Sir Alexander Ball.

Pera, April 20th, 1809.

SIR,

THE subject on which I have now to write to your Excellency, and to which I alluded distantly in my private letter of the 12th instant, is one of the most pressing importance to this Empire. I trust that

the examination of it may lead to the adoption of a system of measures highly advantageous to Great Britain.

The pecuniary distresses of this Government are increased to a degree truly alarming. Its dispositions are excellent; but the great want of money not only renders nugatory all the enthusiasm with which the people are animated, and which would lead them to find Russia full employment at home, but will even prevent, I fear, those vigorous defensive exertions which are necessary for their salvation. I heard much of this during the negotiations for peace. I hear much more now, when Turkey has acquired in some measure a right to apply to me for what assistance Great Britain can grant to her. The matter is, indeed, now come to a point, and I have been formally applied to for pecuniary aid.

What can Great Britain do? We cannot grant subsidies to Turkey; nor can we raise a loan for her. But can we do nothing else?

Could we not advance her a sum (say a million), bearing interest, and take it out in ship-timber, copper, hemp, and corn, in adequate proportions, and at stated periods? And might not this measure, arising from the present necessities of the Turkish Government, become the foundation of a permanent contract highly advantageous to the British Empire?

The ship-timber we might get from Albania and from Thasso; perhaps I might even manage, in due time, to obtain the cession of that island. I should think that securing such a supply would be of the greatest use to us, particularly since the interruption of our intercourse with Austria has put a stop to the supply from Croatia. Even the renewal

of our relations with Austria would not render the supply certain for any length of time.

The copper used in the arsenal here is equal to any used in our dockyards. The freight from Constantinople to Malta would be the only expense to add, for surely every ship ordered home to be coppered from the Mediterranean could easily take her own copper with her from Malta.

Hemp may be serviceable, if you cannot get it from Sicily or Trieste.

The use we may have for corn, especially if the war should break out in Italy, or continue in Spain, is already enough known to you. By the mode I suggest, any inconvenience respecting our supply of this article, which might arise from the shutting up the ports of the Black Sea, will be wholly removed.

The measure to which I here point is grounded, as your Excellency will observe, on the advance of a sum of money to the Turkish Government. But is there not a still shorter method of proceeding to get for them an immediate supply? It is for information on this head that I take the liberty of submitting to your Excellency the following queries:—

1st. Are you authorised at this present moment to become a purchaser on the part of Government for any of the articles above specified to an amount sufficiently considerable to make it the object of a convention?

2dly. At what prices could Government afford to buy them?

3dly. Would it be better that the articles, if agreed for, should be delivered at a Turkish port or at Malta?

4thly. And in the further supposition of your Excellency seeing a reasonable probability of making a

beneficial contract for his Majesty's service, could not you send up to Constantinople some intelligent person to assist in settling the details of it, such as the allowance to be made for freight and insurance; the proportions of each article; the periods at which they shall be ready for delivery; and other matters of this nature?

I have the honour to be, &c.

To Sir Alexander Ball.

Pera, April 12th, 1809.

SIR,

I HAVE the honour of transmitting to your Excellency, for the information of his Majesty's subjects who may be concerned in the commerce of the Black Sea, a copy of an official note which I have received from the Reis Efendi, prohibiting all intercourse with the Russian territories, both by land and by sea.

According to the present determination of the Ottoman Government, even the vessels which have already taken in their lading for the Black Sea will not be permitted to continue their voyage; but the vessels which may be actually on their way from the Russian ports will be admitted at Constantinople.

I have the honour to be, &c.

To Sir Alexander Ball.

Pera, April 23d, 1809.

SIR,

I GREATLY lament having been under the necessity of detaining the *Pylades* so long, after having received

from the Porte the notification which I had the honour of enclosing to your Excellency in my letter of the 12th instant; but the important nature of the despatches I now transmit to H. M. Government, as well as the events which have occurred on hoisting the Sept-insular flag in the harbour of Constantinople, will I trust fully justify the delay.

I can give your Excellency no better account of this circumstance than by sending to you a copy of my despatch to Mr. Canning on the same subject; also copies of the agreement signed by the Sept-insular Captains, and of the declaration I ordered to be made public in consequence of it.

On signing the above agreement, the flag of the Republic of the Seven Islands was hoisted on board five vessels now lying in this harbour, and the colours of France were hauled down.

Not feeling myself authorised to dispense with his Majesty's proclamation of November, 1807, directing the capture of Sept-insular vessels, I find myself awkwardly situated with regard to granting passports even to the meritorious individuals who have so manfully come forward on the present occasion. I have therefore to request that your Excellency will either send me some passports in blank for such vessels bearing the Sept-insular flag, as I may send from this port or the port of Smyrna to Malta; or, if that be unnecessary, that you will give orders to the captains of such of H. M's. ships of war as may be appointed to convoy the trade from the Archipelago to take under their protection all vessels of the above description having my passport.

As the patents under which these ships were navigated are deposited in the French Chancery at this

place, and as the proprietors of them, after the step they have taken, can expect no favour from that quarter, I beg leave to suggest to your Excellency the expediency of consulting Dr. Sewell with regard to granting them fresh patents, or such other documents as may be found practicable for their security.

I have the honour to be, &c.

To Captain Leake.

Pera, April 23d, 1809.

[Giving an account of the measures taken with regard to the Septinsular Republic and Mr. Dendrino, and recommending Captain Leake to communicate them to Ali Pasha, and to circulate the knowledge of them amongst the Islands.]

To Lord Collingwood.

Pera, April 26th, 1809.

MY LORD,

WITH my last despatches from England, dated December 24., I received intimation that a contract for the purchase of 50,000 stand of arms for H. M's. service was entering into in the Austrian States. These arms, if the purchase can be agreed for, are to be shipped at Trieste for Gibraltar. I am ordered to make your Lordship acquainted with this circumstance, and to apply to your Lordship, or to the Com-

mander of the nearest detachment of the fleet under your command, for a ship to take the arms on board, and convey them to the place of their destination.

I have the honour to be, &c.

Secret.

To Captain Campbell, H. M. S. Unité.

Pera, April 26th, 1809.

SIR,

I HAVE the honour of enclosing you the copy of a letter which, in obedience to my instructions, I have this day written to Lord Collingwood, and which I forward to you, in order that no time may be lost in executing the service it alludes to, if an opportunity should offer.

I am, &c.

To General Drummond, Gibraltar.

Pera, April 26th, 1809.

SIR,

It being intended to purchase a quantity of muskets for his Majesty's service, and to ship them if possible at the port of Trieste for Gibraltar, I beg to inform you that instructions will be sent you from England with regard to their distribution.

I have the honour to be, &c.

To Lord Collingwood.

Pera, April 27th, 1809.

MY LORD,

By despatches which I have this day received from Vienna, it appears certain that, on the day on which I date this letter, war must be actually commenced between Austria and France.

Austria being now to be considered as the ally of England, and as co-operating with her on a very extended scale, it is scarcely necessary for me to point out to your Lordship the vast importance of providing for the naval defence of the ports of Trieste and Fuime, and the security of the communications between Malta, Sicily, and the Austrian dominions.

I should not indeed have thought it necessary to call your Lordship's attention to this object, if I had not been particularly requested so to do by Count Stadion, who is not aware of the confidential communications I have already made to your Lordship on the state of our relations with the Austrian Government.

I have also to acquaint your Lordship that an attack on the French in Dalmatia, and particularly at Ragusa and Cattaro, will most probably be made before long, either by the Turks or the Austrians. It appears therefore that a greater proportion of naval force will be wanted for the Adriatic than has hitherto been required for that service.

I have the honour to be, &c.

To Sir Harford Jones.

Pera, April 28th, 1809.

MY DEAR SIR,

I HAVE this day to communicate to you intelligence of the renewal of the war between Austria and France.

The official account of hostilities is not yet arrived from Vienna, but I can take upon me to assure you that they were to commence between the 10th and 15th of this month.

Have the goodness to communicate this information to Lord Minto, and to tell his Lordship that I do not write myself to him, having no cipher.

Russia will certainly take part with France, unless occupied on every part of her own territories.

I am, dear Sir, &c.

To Captain Leake.

Pera, April 29th, 1809.

DEAR SIR,

BEFORE this can reach you, hostilities will have commenced between Austria and France. A large army will enter Italy; and if the French mean to make head against it, they must evacuate, or nearly evacuate, the Neapolitan dominions. This will afford such an opportunity to H. H. Ali Pacha to act, that I cannot think he will suffer it to pass him, if indeed he have not already begun hostilities. The measure I have adopted respecting the Seven Islands, and the

effects which I every day expect will result from it at this place, will give the French such employment at Corfu, that they will be able to attend to nothing else on that side.

To you, who so thoroughly understand the subject, I need not point out the importance of getting the French out of Dalmatia and Cattaro; also of re-establishing, if possible, the Republic of Ragusa. This is stated to me from Vienna to enter materially into the plan of the Italian campaign which has already been communicated to Sir J. Stuart at Messina. Could Ali Pasha give us any assistance on that side? or could you do anything with the Pasha of Bosnia? or stir up again the Montenegrins? You would render an essential service to the common cause if you could direct any efforts of the enemies of France in your neighbourhood to this point. The commanders of our squadrons in the Adriatic can surely prevent reinforcements arriving, or even the enemy withdrawing his troops, if he should be obliged to concentrate himself in Italy.

I am, &c.

To Captain Leake.

Pera, May 8th, 1809.

DEAR SIR,

I HAVE received your letter of the 20th ultimo. I am extremely concerned to find that there are so little hopes of his Highness coming forward without pecuniary assistance to so large an amount as he demands, as, from all I know of the extent of the claims upon us from other quarters, I do not see how it will be

possible to comply with those of H. H. I certainly have no powers to that effect, and therefore can give him no encouragement upon the subject.

The Porte having placed itself nearly on the footing of an ally of Great Britain, and having to support a war against Russia, which bears very heavily on her finances, I must be directed in the application of the very limited means which I possess of relieving them, by the pressing exigencies of the capital of the Empire, of which Ali Pasha must himself be thoroughly informed.

I lament to say that the intelligence from the Danube is extremely unfavourable. Nothing, in my opinion, can save this country but the Grand Signor himself taking the field at the head of his subjects.

With regard to naval assistance, I have written in the most pressing manner to Lord Collingwood to send up a squadron this way, where it might be employed in such a manner as to give a turn to the affairs of Europe. God knows whether he will, or whether he can, comply with my solicitation. I am totally uninformed of the extent of the force under his command; whether he expects reinforcements, or whether there is any intention of sending him any from England.

With the ratifications, which I expect in about a fortnight from hence, I shall most probably have some information on this head, and I will take care to give you early notice of it.

To Sir Alexander Ball.

Pera, May 8th, 1809.

MY DEAR SIR,

I HAVE but a moment to thank you for your letter and despatches by the Spider, as the Janissary who delivered them to me yesterday returns this night to Smyrna.

I send you a copy of my despatch about the affair of Dendrino. The Porte are still afraid of a rupture with France; but I have at least prevailed in making them put such an affront upon the French Mission as will not easily be wiped out. If the Chargé d'Affaires stays after this, he is disgraced; if he goes, it is all I want.

The great point about the independency of the islands, however, will be a case of more difficulty; and I must be very cautious in my proceedings, otherwise I see that I shall involve myself with the Porte. I am now endeavouring to get leave for the five vessels *that have actually hoisted* the Sept-insular flag to sail with it *flying*. This will be enough for the present. The other vessels of that Republic which are here, and which may wish to put themselves under British protection, I shall call English, under the plea of their having surrendered themselves to his Majesty. This will be enough for the Turks, although Dr. Sewell would, I dare say, entertain doubts how far such surrender can be made in a neutral port without a breach of neutrality in the Power permitting it. Luckily the Turks know nothing of these points.

I am expecting the ratifications with the utmost impatience and anxiety.

I am, &c.

To Captain Leake.

Pera, May 25th, 1809.

SIR,

I HAVE received your letter of the 25th of April, and likewise your two private letters of the 10th and 11th of May.

Affairs at this place are still so backward as to render it very difficult to procure the intimation to which you point as necessary to render Captain Brisbane's instructions available.

You are already acquainted with the Porte's having broken off all communication with the French mission in consequence of Mr. Dendrino's arrest. This proceeding, however, has not induced the Chargé d'Affaires of France to withdraw from Constantinople; and I must probably await the arrival of the ratifications of the Peace, or some event in Germany decisive of the present campaign, before I can induce the Porte to take any more effectual step in the business.

With regard, therefore, to operations in your quarter, if they are absolutely dependent on the two contingencies you mention in your letter of the 10th instant, I am much afraid they may remain suspended for some weeks longer.

If, indeed, his Highness could be induced to assist in an attempt on Parga, or on any of the French possessions on the Continent, without the intimation to which you point, such a determination on his part would be a most desirable circumstance. The Porte

to, sooner or later, follow the example of Austria; every event which could accelerate its decision could, in my opinion, be greatly to its advantage.

In the opinion you express respecting the expediency of allowing a larger discretion to the commanding officer of the squadron stationed at Corfu, I most perfectly coincide ; and I am likewise ready to take upon myself the responsibility of advising him on the present occasion to give to his instructions all the latitude of interpretation necessary to his co-operating with his Highness in the reduction of Parga.

The question of employing Albanians for the reduction, whether of Corfu or of any other of the *islands* constituting the Sept-insular Republic, is of a very different nature. Your observations as applied to Corfu are conclusive ; and after the measures which I have taken at this place, and which I am still pursuing, to re-establish the Republic, I think it inexpedient to employ Albanians even against Santa Maura. In order to induce the inhabitants of the Ionian Islands to act, some distinct principle of action must be held out to them ; and the only principle, consistent with justice, seems to me that of re-establishing their Republic entire. How far this principle may be departed from in the instance of Parga, and those dependencies (if dependencies they may be called) of the Republic situated on the Albanian continent, will necessarily be the subject of arrangement at a general peace ; and until that epoch I think it may be so far deviated from as to admit Ali Pasha to remain in possession of all he can take on the Continent in his own neighbourhood.

I am, &c.

To Sir Alexander Ball.

(Extract.)

Pera, May 25th, 1809.

MY DEAR SIR,

I RECEIVED your letters of April 26., and the despatches accompanying them from Captain Leake. I send you these few lines through the same channel.

It is greatly to be regretted that nothing appears likely to be done at Cephalaria. But I am not without hopes that the measures I have taken here, and those which I am still pursuing for the re-establishment of the Republic of the Seven Islands, will obviate some of those objections to an attempt, an opportunity for which the internal state of that island now presents. If we cannot spare British troops, I feel very much inclined to propose an expedition on a large scale to Austria. What would Lord Collingwood think of this? Would he refuse the necessary naval assistance?

A plan of such a nature must of course depend upon the successes of Austria on the Danube and in Italy. God forbid they should send a man on any distant expedition while there is a doubt as to the safety of the main army.

But if nothing can be done at Zante or Cephalaria, surely we could root out with ease the nest of pirates at Cerigo. The mischief they are doing is incalculable. This is a part of a regular system of piracy carried on under my eyes at this place, and which, as long as the French continue at Cerigo, I shall never be able to counteract. There is a society here, composed of seven or eight French and Genoese adven-

turers, who purchase vessels under pretence of finding a freight for them at the different islands, and who, by their extensive connections, are enabled to fit them out as privateers, partly at one island, partly at another, partly at a third; and thus a little fleet of pirates has already made its appearance in the Archipelago, nobody knowing whence or how they came there. These cruisers take every thing they meet with coming from Malta or going thither. They carry their prizes into Cerigo, and dispose of them by a private sale (sometimes to the owners themselves) at Pera. Captain Stewart will have told you the pains I took to stop the equipment of one of these ships, one Costa commander. Since then another has started, under the command of one Pozza, a most bitter enemy of ours, who boasts of having made several successful voyages to Malta. He certainly returned from thence not long ago, bearing the English flag, and went direct to the French palace with all the disastrous intelligence about General Moore. After this he proceeded to the Black Sea, from whence he returned about a week ago, changed his ship, and has now sailed for Cerigo. These are only two out of many other instances of similar doings. The Turks are too slow and careless to mind them; but I think we ought no longer to suffer such depredations with impunity.

In addition to the benefit to our trade of rooting out this nest of pirates, it would be of infinite service to my plans if we could have a spot, no matter how small, where the Sept-insular flag might be erected.

To Don John Havat.

Constantinople, le 6 Juin, 1809.

MONSIEUR,

J'AI reçu par M. Salas la lettre que V. E. m'a fait l'honneur de m'écrire de Tenedos le 29 Mai.

Sans perdre un instant je me suis adressé à la Porte pour obtenir en premier lieu les firmans nécessaires pour faciliter le voyage de V. E. à Constantinople.

Pour ce qui regarde l'entrée de la frégate de S. M. le Roi d'Espagne, j'en ai fait la demande avec les plus vives instances, sans cependant m'attendre à ce qu'elle me fut accordée. Effectivement je n'ai pû avoir que les firmans qui regardent le voyage et le traitement dû à la personne de V. E.

Je me remets au moment de l'arrivée de V. E. à Constantinople pour vous entretenir des affaires qui intéressent le plus l'objet de la mission dont vous êtes chargé. En attendant j'ai l'honneur d'avertir V. E. qu'en ma qualité de Ministre d'une Puissance alliée de l'Espagne, j'avois déjà fait des démarches auprès de la Porte Ottomane pour le rétablissement de ses relations avec S. M. Ferdinand VII., Roi légitime des Espagnes.

La base de ces demandes se trouvera dans la note ci-incluse que j'ai fait présenter à la Porte le 17 Avril. Après quelques retards, amenés par des circonstances purement étrangères, elle a heureusement eu pour suite la réception de la visite de M. de Rodrigo, qui a remis au Reis Efendi la lettre adressée au Grand Visir par la Suprême Junta.

Je dois rendre justice à la Porte ; Elle s'intéresse vivement au succès de la bonne cause en Espagne, et

sans la crainte qui la retient encore, nous l'aurions bientôt pour alliée.

Je prie V. E. de disposer de moi en toutes choses. Ce n'est pas le sentiment seul de mon devoir qui me dicte cet offre ; c'est mon cœur, profondément pénétré des efforts de votre noble nation contre la plus abominable tyrannie dont le monde ait jamais fourni d'exemple.

J'ai l'honneur d'être, &c.

To Sir Alexander Ball.

Pera, June 10th, 1809.

MY DEAR SIR,

I RECEIVED your letter of May 10., brought me by an officer from the Spanish frigate which reached Tenedos on the 29th.

I have got a firman from the Porte for permission to Don John Havat to come with his suite to Constantinople ; but I could not succeed for the frigate, and indeed I did not expect it.

Whether he will be suffered to present his credentials, and to assume a diplomatic character, is more than I can yet say. I had already made great advances towards the reception of a person in his character, by procuring the admission of an ancient Chargé d'Affaires of Spain, Don Rodrigo, to the Reis Efendi, with a letter from the Supreme Junta to the Grand Vizir ; but the impression recently made upon the minds of these people by accounts which reach us from all quarters (although hitherto not official) of

the dreadful successes of Bonaparte will not facilitate the measures I propose taking in favour of Don John Havat.

Lord Collingwood has written me the most discouraging letter possible about the force I asked for the Black Sea. He is quite deceived about Russia, and so I have taken the liberty to let his Lordship understand. Russia is now making an effectual diversion in favour of France, by bringing great part of the forces which were in Walachia to the Austrian frontiers. This she would not have dared to do if a *British and Turkish squadron were in the Black Sea*. I represented this consequence to his Lordship most clearly in my letter of March 20, but it seems that he thinks his own information better than mine, and persists in considering Russia as well inclined. Now how his Lordship can make this out, when Austria is actually obliged to keep 70,000 men on her frontiers to prevent Russia from occupying her provinces, I am too dull to comprehend. He tells me, indeed, that he has no force to spare; and this is the most distressing part of the subject; for if he had, I think facts are now too plain to allow him to hesitate about Russia.

As to Cerigo, he will not even assist in rooting out the French from this little rock, where the mischief they are doing to British, Austrian, and Turkish commerce is incalculable. I never wanted Cerigo as a settlement for us; but most important indeed would it be as a settlement for the Sept-insulars, whose Republic I have been endeavouring to set up.

In short, my dear Sir, I can assure you that unless something be done *speedily* to show the Turks that they will reap some benefit from the peace with England beyond the arrival of their trade into their

ports, I shall not be able to keep up the influence which the British name has again acquired. I dare not communicate Lord Collingwood's refusal of assistance; I am obliged to give them hopes that his Lordship will receive reinforcements, and that *with the ratifications* instructions will probably be sent out to co-operate.

The delay of these ratifications is another most distressing circumstance. The French have made wonderful use of it. They have insinuated that we are carrying on underhand negotiations with Russia. If they knew what Lord Collingwood had written to me about Russia, they would make it very difficult for me to keep my ground.

Should the ratifications, in short, be delayed until the news arrives of the French being at Vienna, *I will not answer for their being exchanged.*

Forgive the gloomy style of this letter, my dear Sir, but be assured there is enough to make it still worse.

I am, &c.

To Lord Collingwood.

Pera, June 12th, 1809.

MY LORD,

I HAVE received the honour of your Lordship's letter of April 25. from Minorca.

The force under your Lordship's command not being sufficient to enable your Lordship to detach a squadron for the service which I took the liberty of proposing to you in the Black Sea, I can only express my great sorrow on hearing that fact. All I can hope

for now is, that ^{her}Majesty's Ministers will have sent out such re-enforcements to the Mediterranean as may induce your Lordship to reconsider my letters of the 20th and 26th of March.

I can add nothing to the arguments contained in that of the 20th, except the alarming fact, just come to my knowledge, that the Russians are withdrawing part of their forces from Walachia, and occupying stations on the frontiers of Hungary and Poland.

That these movements are with a view of assisting France, there is not the most distant doubt at Vienna; and that the calamity which has already befallen Austria is owing to the necessity she was under of dividing her forces, and employing so large a portion of them to defend herself against a probable attack from Russia, is a fact I know officially. Your Lordship may also be assured that I should not have stated my own apprehensions on the subject of Russia, or have so strongly pointed to the necessity of keeping her fully employed on her own frontiers, had I not had the best information of her designs.

With regard to the occupation of Cerigo, I consider it to be chiefly useful at the present moment as a place where the flag of the Sept-insular Republic could be hoisted again, and where we might collect a body of men from the other islands, and from that place, to attack Cephalonia or Zante. On the other hand, Cerigo, in the occupation of the enemy, is a receptacle for pirates, of whose daily depredations on British and Austrian commerce I receive the most distressing accounts.

I have the honour to be, &c.

To Lord Collingwood.

Pera, June 14th, 1809.

MY LORD,

It is with the greatest pain that I now inform your Lordship that, by an express just received by the French minister, Bonaparte entered Vienna on the 14th of May. I have no reason to doubt the authenticity of this fatal intelligence.

I have at the same time to announce another piece of bad news, for which the uniform tenor of my letters must have prepared your Lordship, viz., that the Emperor of Russia has ordered the Austrian Ambassador at Petersburg to quit his dominions, and has recalled his Chargé d'Affaires from the Austrian Court.

Under these circumstances I can only add that our credit at the Porte, perhaps the stability of the peace I have concluded, together with the preservation of the Austrian and the Ottoman Empires, may depend upon the speedy arrival of a British fleet at Constantinople.

I have the honour to be, &c.

To Captain Leake.

Pera, June 20th, 1809.

DEAR SIR,

I HAVE just received your letters of the 22d ultimo, and the 4th instant, with its enclosures.

The reverses of Austria on the Danube will, I am afraid, oblige the Archduke John to retreat from

Italy. Indeed the general aspect of affairs scarcely leaves a hope that Austria has at this moment a disposable force for Corfu or the other islands.

The entry of the French into Vienna has disconcerted all the measures I was taking to induce this Government to declare against France ; and notwithstanding the less unfavourable prospect which our despatches from Buda present (as you will observe by the accompanying bulletin), I have much indeed to overcome before I can hope for success.

The long delay in the arrival of the ratifications has also produced the worst effects. Doubts begin to be entertained respecting the dispositions of Great Britain towards Turkey, and also whether this Empire is likely to reap from the peace those advantages to which it looked forward on concluding it.

I have likewise received the most disheartening despatch from Lord Collingwood respecting the island of Cerigo, the possession of which by the French is attended with the most destructive effects to our commerce.

Against all these untoward circumstances I can only place in the other scale the success of my first steps to procure the recognition of Ferdinand VII.

The minister from the Supreme Junta arrived at the Dardanelles on the 29th of May ; I procured a firman for his coming to Constantinople. On his arrival I obtained a guard of honour for his person ; and he is to have an audience of the Reis Efendi to-morrow.

These steps, however, are still far from decisive of this great question, which now, with every other object of superior interest, must wait the decision of events.

I am, &c.

To Captain Leake.

Pera, June 24th, 1809.

SIR,

IN consequence of an irruption which it appears that the French have, through their agents, induced some chiefs on the borders of Bosnia to make into the Austrian territories, I have thought it my duty, in conjunction with the Austrian Internuncio, to remonstrate in the strongest terms against so flagrant and so unprovoked a violation of neutrality.

Immediate satisfaction has been promised to the Internuncio by this Government; and I am assured that not only the French Agent at Traunick is ordered to quit the Ottoman territories, but that instructions are sent to the Pasha of Bosnia to advance a body of troops towards Dalmatia, with a view of counteracting any further movements which the French may have in contemplation on that side.

I took this opportunity to press upon the attention of the Ottoman Government the necessity of authorising his Highness Ali Pasha to make such demonstrations on his side as should keep the enemy fully occupied on his own frontier.

I am happy to acquaint you that this suggestion has been approved, and that instructions analogous to it are sent to his Highness the Vizir, by the Tartar who is the bearer of this letter.

I am, Sir, &c. &c.

To Sir Harford Jones.

Pera, July 20th, 1809. .

SIR,

I HAVE the honour of informing you that the ratification of the Treaty of Peace between Great Britain and the Porte arrived at Constantinople on the 5th inst.

On this occasion his Majesty has been graciously pleased to nominate me his Ambassador Extraordinary at the Sublime Porte.

Mr. Morier arrived here on the 16th inst. ; and I received with the greatest satisfaction the news of the peace you have so happily concluded with his Majesty the King of Persia.

The terms of that peace are so beneficial to both parties, and so well calculated to establish on an unalterable basis the friendship between his Majesty and the King of Persia, that I entertain the fullest persuasion that it will be ratified without delay by his Majesty's Government, and that you will receive some signal mark of his Majesty's favour for having negotiated it.

I have the honour to be, &c.

To Sir Harford Jones.

(*Extract.*)

Pera, July 20th, 1809.

DEAR SIR,

MR. MORIER is just arrived, and has delivered to me your despatches to Government. They will be for-

warded as soon as possible. Those which you were so good as to leave under a flying seal for my perusal, I have read with the greatest interest and attention; and indeed, I do not flatter you when I say, that it is impossible for me to do justice to the abilities you have displayed in bringing to so happy a conclusion the important business with which you were charged.

I observe with the greatest concern a difference between the Governor General* and yourself, on the subject of your proceeding up to Tehran.

In my ignorance of the form of your commission, or the terms in which it is worded, I cannot of course take upon myself to give any opinion with regard to the degree of dependence in which it left you on the Supreme Council of Calcutta; but I have no hesitation in declaring that the peace you have signed, and the measures to which you have prepared the way by its signature, are most eminently useful to that great cause for which Europe is now making a last and a most doubtful struggle. Indeed, from all I know personally of Lord Minto, and particularly from those enlarged principles on which he has ever taken his view of public affairs, I cannot help thinking, that when he learns the success of your negociation, the expulsion of the French from Persia, and, above all, the absolute necessity, for the sake of Austria, of finding full employment for the Russian arms on every part of her own frontiers, his Lordship will overlook any deviation from the precise line of your instructions which you may have hazarded in favour of the great good which has resulted from it.

* Of India.

In effect, and with grief I say it, I see nothing to prevent Russia from taking possession of the whole of Austrian Poland, except the diversions which we may be able respectively to operate on the side of Moldavia, the Crimea, and Georgia, added to what Government at home may do in the Baltic. The Emperor Alexander is more infatuated than ever in favour of the French system; and nothing can more strongly evince the utility of raising up every sort of difficulty in his way than a message which I am credibly informed he has just sent to Bonaparte's Camp, apologising for the tardiness of his motions, and declaring that his troops were *not yet ready* to enter into the Austrian territories. * * *

To Sir Alexander Ball.

Pera, August 2d, 1809.

SIR,

I HAVE the honour to inform your Excellency that Sir Harford Jones's private secretary, Mr. James Morier, is arrived here from Persia, charged with despatches of the highest importance to his Majesty's Government, and accompanied by a Minister from the King of Persia to the British Court.

As it is of great consequence that the least possible delay should occur in their proceeding in safety to England, I now beg to request of your Excellency that should no ship of war be actually on its way to the Dardanelles, in which it may be practicable for these gentlemen to procure a passage to Malta, you would have the goodness to spare the first ship you

can for the purpose. The Persian Minister's suite is composed of about ten persons, exclusive of Mr. Morier and his servant.

I have the honour to be, &c.

One Inclosure.

To Lord Collingwood.

Pera, August 4th, 1809.

MY LORD,

I THINK it my duty to forward to your Lordship the original of an official communication which has been made to me by the Austrian Minister at this place, on a subject on which I have already had the honour of writing to you.

I have to add to it the very distressing information that a Russian army has entered Galicia, and that Austria is so hardly pressed by France as to render it impossible that she can defend the province against this new enemy.

Your Lordship will see confirmed, by the express testimony of the Austrian Government, the opinion I endeavoured so strongly to impress on your Lordship's mind, that a most essential service would have been rendered to Austria by occupying the forces of Russia on her own frontiers.

Every letter I receive from Buda not only confirms this opinion, but reiterates the earnest entreaties of the Austrian Government that some diversion may be undertaken in the Black Sea. I can also add from

authority, that the terror excited at St. Petersburg, by the mere report that a British naval force was coming to assist Turkey in attacking the Crimea, was so great, as in one respect to have actually created a diversion for a short time, and suspended for nearly two months the march of the troops destined to attack Galicia.

I mention these facts only by way of inducing your Lordship to reconsider the opinion you did me the honour to express in your letter of the 25th of April, namely, that under all the circumstances *it appeared to your Lordship inexpedient to adopt any measures which might irritate Russia at the present moment.* The want of an adequate force for the services more immediately within your Lordship's view, was undoubtedly a sufficient answer to the representations which I did myself the honour to submit to your consideration ; but if it should so happen that your Lordship has received such reinforcements during the summer as to change this from a question of means, to a question of prudence in the employment of those means, I should not do my duty were I to hesitate in conveying to your Lordship, although at the risk of passing for importunate, the entreaties, I may almost say prayers, of our ally ; and in supporting them by a recommendation as earnest as I can venture without offence to address to a person of your Lordship's acknowledged judgment, and to one who stands in so high and so responsible a situation.

I may be allowed also to observe to your Lordship, that the unfortunate turn which affairs have taken in Austria materially affects the interests of Great Britain, and the situation of her Ambassador at Constantinople. The French are so far advanced in

Hungary, as (according to our just apprehensions) to be shortly in a situation to assist the insurgents in Servia. This gives them such means of intimidating the Porte, that, unless on my side I can hold out some prospect of assisting her against Russia, I shall scarcely be able to keep her steady in the great moment of trial which is at hand.

Nor will I disguise from your Lordship that it has been remarked to me by the Turkish Ministers that we are temporising with Russia. The mischief which this opinion produces is in every respect most serious; but I cannot refrain from particularly pointing out to your Lordship its extreme bad effect on the negotiations I am actually carrying on at the Porte.

France is using her utmost endeavours to effect a peace, or at least a truce, between the Porte and Russia, in order to enable the latter to turn all her forces against Austria. I have reason to think that the most favourable terms will be offered. On my side, I am exerting every nerve to prevent this peace; but with what face can I propose to Turkey to reject such terms, (the restoration, for instance, of Walachia and Moldavia,) and urge her to continue the war, when I have neither a ship nor a guinea to offer her by way of inducement? Already the Turks think that Great Britain is more inclined to Russia than to them; and consequently that the advice I am now offering is not that of a friendly Power sincerely interested for their preservation.

With regard to the question of operations, I can only say that at this hour there are not ten regiments in the Crimea and Bessarabia; but the Turks will attempt nothing seriously without us. For the

complete success of any enterprise, even with British co-operation, I could not undertake to answer ; but I will most readily answer for its efficacy in drawing a large Russian force to those points, and in thus enabling Austria to make one more effort to save herself.

I have the honour to be, &c.

Inclosure in the preceding Letter.

The Internuncio to Mr. Adair.

Buyukdéré, ce 30 Juillet, 1809.

MONSIEUR L'AMBASSADEUR,

AYANT rendu un compte exact et fidèle à M. le Comte de Stadion de la co-opération non moins zélée que loyale que j'ai éprouvé de la part de V. E. pour la réussite de divers ordres dont j'ai été chargé à la suite de la guerre éclatée entre l'Autriche et la France, je viens de recevoir l'agréable commission de lui en exprimer au nom de ma Cour la plus vive reconnaissance. Je m'en acquitte avec d'autant plus de véritable satisfaction qu'Elle n'a cessé depuis de me donner de nouvelles preuves multipliées des mêmes excellentes dispositions de sa part, et que j'y compte avec confiance aussi pour l'avenir.

" Il est sur " (comme l'observe M. le Comte de Stadion, dans sa dépêche,) " que si Lord Collingwood avoit pu suivre plutôt les conseils bien intentionnés de V. E., et détacher quelques frégates dans l'Adriatique, le Général Marmont auroit été dans l'impossibilité de tirer d'Ancone et du Royaume de Naples les

secours qui l'ont mis à même d'inonder momentanément le littoral Autrichien, et de mettre à contribution les ports de Zeng, Fiume, et Trieste; mais si M. l'Amiral (continue la dépêche) a détaché dans l'entretems une partie de son escadre dans la Mer Noire pour y attirer l'attention des Russes, il nous aura toujours rendu par une telle diversion le grand service de paralyser l'armée qui menace d'envahir la Galicie."

J'ignore si, et quand, nous verrons comparoître ici ces forces navales auxiliaires tant désirées par la Porte, et dont l'apparition seule aux Dardanelles, ne fut-ce même que de deux ou trois vaisseaux Anglois, auroit probablement suffi pour abattre ce qui reste du parti François parmi les Membres du Divan, et pour déterminer le Ministère Ottoman à des résolutions de vigueur capables à augmenter les embarras de nos ennemis, et auxquelles on ne se pretera que difficilement, où jamais, sans un tel secours effectif de l'Angleterre. Mais ce qui n'échappera certainement pas à l'esprit clairvoyant de V. E. et d'un Amiral de la haute réputation de Lord Collingwood, c'est que ce n'est que des efforts les plus énergiques et simultanés des Puissances Alliées qu'on pourra attendre des résultats décisifs, tandis que des entreprises isolées où tardives ne donneroient, comme dans les guerres passées, à l'ennemi que la faculté de faire manquer l'une après l'autre. Voila pourquoi ma Cour attache le plus grand intérêt tant à cette diversion qu'à celles que votre Gouvernement a fait espérer de voir se réaliser incessamment du côté de Sicile, et au nord de l'Allemagne, et je suis chargé expressément par M. le Comte de Stadion d'engager de mon mieux V. E. à

contribuer de son côté pour presser et accélérer autant que possible l'exécution, nommément de l'expédition combinée et organisée en Sicile, et de la diversion projetée dans la Mer Noire.

Quant aux côtes de l'Adriatique, l'Autriche a déjà repris l'offensive, en faisant entrer tout récemment un détachement de nos troupes sous le commandement du Général Knesevich en Dalmatie; il y est appuyé du côté de la mer par la flotille Autrichienne sous les ordres de M. l'Epine, et tout fait présumer que cette entreprise sera couronnée de succès, le peuple de la Dalmatie étant las du joug François.

Je finis par témoigner à V. E. la part bien sincère que ma Cour a prise à sa nomination pour l'Ambassade Britannique près la Porte; Elle s'en félicite comme d'un nouveau gage du bien que vous pourrez faire, et de l'avantage qui en résultera pour la cause commune.

J'ai l'honneur d'être, &c.
(Signé) STÜRMER.

To Captain Leake.

Pera, August 10th, 1809.

DEAR SIR,

I CANNOT say that I was astonished, although I was vexed, at hearing that instead of sending an instruction to Ali Pasha, such as I mentioned in my letter of the 24th of June, Ghalib Efendi had written to his Highness in the terms which he stated to you.

All I can say is, that he promised me most faithfully, and as a sort of satisfaction for some disagreeable things which had been going on (particularly the entry of the Bosniacks into Croatia), to write to his Highness, recommending him to make a hostile demonstration towards Albania. I see the necessity of not openly complaining of this breach of faith; but I promise you that it is safely treasured up in my mind, with two or three other matters which the Turks shall hear of, when the time comes.

I have confined myself therefore to a request, according to what you recommend in your letter of July 4th, that his Highness should be relieved from the burthen of furnishing his contingent of 8000 men to the Grand Vizir's army. It has been answered, that this request must be transmitted to the Vizir at the Camp; and I am informed that it has actually been so transmitted. If his Highness should find out that this is not the fact, he must attribute it to Vaahid Efendi, who acts as Reis Efendi in the absence of Ghalib, and who is one of the most difficult men I ever had to deal with in my life.

I need hardly tell you, after this, that things are going on here in a manner to dissatisfy me extremely. The successes of the French, their advance into Hungary, to no great distance from the frontiers of Servia, added to the disappointment of this Government at receiving no British succours to act against Russia in the Black Sea, have operated of late extremely against my gaining any of the points for which I am exerting myself. Common sense, it is true, would tell them, that after the ample discovery they have made of the views of France, the nearer

the danger approaches the more they ought to cling to Great Britain; but there is no persuading them of this palpable truth. In short, I have no hope of effecting any great object while the French remain at Vienna.

Our last advices from Buda are of the 12th of July. You may guess how unfavourable I must think them, when they mention Bonaparte's having crossed the Danube on the 2d of July with 150,000 men, that on the 5th the great battle began, that it lasted until the 8th, but that they knew nothing of the result beyond the 6th, when the Austrian left wing had been turned, and that the Archduke's head-quarters had been transferred from Walkersdorff to Znaym. While things are so, I have no bulletins to publish, especially after having been betrayed into printing the Internuncio's official news from Odessa of Bonaparte's successive defeats from the 26th to the 29th of May.

I have nothing from Malta since the 14th of June.

I am, &c.

To Sir Harford Jones.

Pera, August 13th, 1809.

DEAR SIR,

I RECEIVED, and read with the greatest interest, your letters and despatches dated from the Royal Camp at Chemen Onjoun; and as his Majesty the King of Persia's Envoy has this day had his audience at the Porte, I lose no time in sending you a Tartar with the information.

England. He is accompanied by Mr. James Morier, who carries with him the Treaty of Peace and Alliance signed between the two Powers on the 12th of March.

I beg that you will communicate this event to his Highness Ali Pasha, and inform him also, that by despatches from Sir Harford Jones, dated the 17th of July, from the Royal Camp at Chemen Onjoun (in the vicinity of Tabreze), I have the satisfaction of learning that the King of Persia has taken the field, and that the force of the three armies, under the respective command of his Majesty and his two sons, Abbas Meerza and Mohammed Ali Meerza, amounts to 120,000 effective men.

The Tartar who brought me these despatches brought also a letter from the Persian Minister to the Grand Vizir, communicating to him the intended operations against Russia, together with the King's determination to prosecute the war with the utmost degree of vigour.

The Persian Minister's instructions are to desire the co-operation of the Porte, in conjunction with Great Britain, in order to drive the common enemy from their respective territories. With this view his Persian Majesty proposes to send an army under the command of one of his sons to join a Turkish force on the frontiers, and even to assist the Porte with money if wanted. His Persian Majesty further proposes to the Porte reciprocally not to lay down their arms until they shall have compelled Russia to make peace on terms consistent with the mutual security of the two Empires.

My despatch from Sir H. Jones mentions at the

I am sorry that I cannot send you any favourable accounts of the operations of the grand armies. Our last intelligence from Buda is of the 12th of July. Bonaparte had passed the Danube on the 2d, and from that day until the 8th the fighting had been incessant. The result was not known at Buda later than the 6th, when the French had gained some advantage. These accounts were received a fortnight ago.

The Russians have entered Galicia in a hostile manner, and have occupied the most considerable part of that province. I find every where disseminated the belief that they are secretly on good terms with England. Nothing can be more distant from the truth: every day affords fresh proof of the devotion of the Emperor Alexander to Bonaparte.

In the mean time all the disposable Russian troops are marching to the Austrian frontiers. They have even withdrawn ten regiments from Siberia, which had been there ever since the year 1790. Now, therefore, is the moment for Persia to recover her frontiers, and dictate to Russia almost what terms she pleases.

I am, &c.

To Captain Leake.

Pera, August 16th, 1809.

SIR,

AN Envoy from the King of Persia to his Majesty is lately arrived at Constantinople, in his way to

England. He is accompanied by Mr. James Morier, who carries with him the Treaty of Peace and Alliance signed between the two Powers on the 12th of March.

I beg that you will communicate this event to his Highness Ali Pasha, and inform him also, that by despatches from Sir Harford Jones, dated the 17th of July, from the Royal Camp at Chemen Onjoun (in the vicinity of Tabreze), I have the satisfaction of learning that the King of Persia has taken the field, and that the force of the three armies, under the respective command of his Majesty and his two sons, Abbas Meerza and Mohammed Ali Meerza, amounts to 120,000 effective men.

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My despatch from Sir H. Jones mentions at the

same time that overtures of peace on very favourable terms have been made to the Persian Court by that of St. Petersburg; and that the King would not be averse from listening to those terms, were he not restrained by his wish to follow in all things the impulse he may receive from the British Government.

When his Highness shall be informed of these facts he will not fail to remark — first, the importance to the Ottoman Empire of this diversion already operated on the side of Persia; and, secondly, the obvious policy on the part of Turkey of acting cordially with the British Government.

I most sincerely hope that his Highness will take an early opportunity of enforcing these truths, with all the authority due to his wisdom and great experience, and to his power and consideration in the Ottoman State, on the mind of his Highness the Grand Vizir; and particularly that he will point out to his Highness that it is not by the system of deference and submission which the Turkish Ministers have lately adopted towards France that they will gain that co-operation, and, more than all, that cordial good will, which I came on the part of his Majesty to establish with the Sublime Porte.

You will here have the goodness to observe to his Highness, that as the Ottoman Government owes me some thanks for having contributed to produce this powerful diversion, so must it be indebted to me and to the advice I may give to Sir H. Jones for its duration. On this necessary point I now proceed to explain myself to his Highness with a frankness which the Ministers of the Porte are incapable of comprehending.

The principle which Sir H. Jones imparted to me, in a letter dated the 3d of January last, as that which he meant to adopt for the rule of his conduct at the Persian Court, was that of assisting in the re-establishment of her peace with Russia. The moment I learnt this intention, I sent to recommend to him in the strongest manner a total change of system. I urged him to use his utmost efforts to retard the conclusion of any peace separate from Turkey, and to increase as much as possible the embarrassments of an enemy who was collecting all his forces to attack the Turkish fortresses on the Danube. My despatch arrived in good time: all idea of negotiating with Russia was abandoned; the war has consequently recommenced, and the King of Persia has taken the field in person with the forces which I have enumerated, and with the views which I have explained to you.

It has pleased the Ottoman Ministers, particularly Vaahid Efendi, (who, unfortunately for me, occupies the post of Reis Efendi during the absence of Ghalib,) to depreciate the merit of this service, and to decline the concert offered on the part of his Persian Majesty. If this be merely an attempt on the part of Vaahid Efendi to undervalue the friendship of Great Britain, as this is his constant aim, I should regard it with indifference; but if the Ottoman Government shall adopt the same opinions, and act upon the same system of unfriendly reserve, I can attribute it to nothing less than a secret intention of making a separate peace with Russia.

In this case I see no reason why an English Minister at Constantinople should gratuitously widen the breach between Great Britain and Russia, especially

if Russia should discover in her conduct towards Austria any returning sentiments of justice or good neighbourhood.

The step I should necessarily take, therefore, would be that of recommending to Sir H. Jones no longer to oppose, but rather to promote, through his mediation, a favourable arrangement between Persia and Russia.

This will be the first consequence of the system of disunion and mistrust on which the Porte is now acting. I see many more evils to which it may lead; among others (coupled with the conduct of the Porte in the affair of Dendrino), to the possible re-establishment of the Russian power in the Seven Islands.

I entreat his Highness Ali Pasha to consider deeply the matters I here so unreservedly communicate. His Highness is the only man in the Empire who can appreciate their importance, or give effect to the measures to which they point. Let his Highness be assured that such is the present state of the Ottoman councils, that it is only by the interposition of some powerful mind like his own that the Empire can be saved from the mischief which awaits it, or can regain that prosperity, that security, and that high consideration, which is once more within its reach.

I am, &c.

To Sir Harford Jones.

Pera, August 18th, 1809.

DEAR SIR,

It is with grief that I inform you, that after several days' severe fighting in Moravia, the Archduke Charles has thought it necessary to sign an armistice with Bonaparte for thirty days. The conditions of this armistice have not reached me; but it appears certain that Presburg and Brunn, on the left of the Danube, and Gratz and Raab, on the right, are surrendered to the French as conditions.

I am in daily expectation of hearing of the signature of preliminaries of peace. You may guess what sort of a peace it will be.

Yours, &c.

[A copy of the above letter was sent to Lord Minto.]

To Sir Alexander Ball.

Pera, August 22d, 1809.

SIR,

I HAVE the honour of informing your Excellency that an Envoy from the King of Persia to his Majesty is arrived at Constantinople on his way to England.

The mission with which he is charged being one of the first importance, I have taken the liberty of requesting Captain Ascough, of the *Success*, to give him a passage, if possible, to England, or at least as far as Malta.

If Captain Ascough should not be able to carry him to England, I request most earnestly that your Excellency would endeavour to procure him a passage thither with the least possible delay.

He is accompanied by Mr. James Morier, private secretary to Sir Harford Jones, by whose skill and perseverance a Treaty of Peace and Alliance was concluded between England and Persia on the 12th of March. Mr. Morier is the bearer of the Treaty.

I have the honour to be, &c.

To Sir James Pulteney, Secretary at War.

Pera, August 28th 1809.

SIR,

I HAVE the honour of acknowledging the receipt of your letter of the 17th May.

I have desired my private secretary, Mr. Baker, who will probably be in England at the time of your receiving this letter, to examine carefully all the papers I brought with me from Vienna, and which, by an accident which he will have the honour of explaining to you, I have not seen since my departure from that place, in order to find out the names of the Condéan officers in whose favour I drew for the sum of 726*l.* 18*s.* 2*d.* on the Lords Commissioners of the Treasury.

Mr. Baker will also have the honour of laying before you all the written documents in my possession respecting the provision made by me for the Condéan pensioners previous to my leaving Vienna. To the best of my recollection, those documents are four in number: 1. A letter from the Bishop of Nancy, requesting me not to leave Vienna without making some provision for the regular payment of the pensions of these unfortunate gentlemen. 2. The agreement with Arnstein. 3. The circular letter written

to the principal emigrants directing them (in the event of their approving the plan) how to draw for their allowances ; and, 4. My despatch to his Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, acquainting him with the transaction.

The written documents were as few as possible, from the necessity of observing the strictest secrecy with regard to the existence of a deposit in the hands of Arnstein of a sum of money belonging to his Majesty's Government. Even at that time I conceived the situation of Austria to be so critical as to make it incumbent upon me to provide against the possible arrival of the French again at Vienna.

For the same reasons I limited the communication of the transaction to the Bishop of Nancy and to Baron Arnstein. Mr. Baker consequently can give you no verbal information by which to supply what you may think still defective after perusing the written documents.

The transaction, as a bargain, I am afraid could not be in all respects so advantageous to the gentlemen in whose behalf it was concluded, as I most anxiously wished to render it. The circumstances above mentioned precluded me from making comparisons between different modes of arrangement, and from instituting competitions for the supply of the money. This will probably account for the bills which you mention still to be in the course of drawing on Mr. Noguier by several of the Condéan pensioners. The plan being solely for their benefit, they were left at liberty either to come into it, or to continue drawing in the usual mode. I understand, indeed, that the emigrants residing at Gratz have preferred taking their chance

of the communication remaining open through Trieste to get a more favourable exchange.

I have, according to your desire, prepared a letter for Baron Arnstein, directing him to furnish a statement of the payments already made by virtue of this arrangement, and to continue the same every quarter. I have also called for a list of those gentlemen who receive their pensions under this arrangement, and of those who continue drawing under the old one; but the Austrian capital continuing still in the hands of the enemy, and the hazard of correspondence being very great, I have not yet found an opportunity of forwarding my letter to him.

I beg leave to return you my thanks for the sense you are pleased to express of my endeavours while at Vienna to provide for the regular payment of the allowances to these meritorious officers. The melancholy circumstances of Europe will, I am afraid, preclude the possibility of adopting any other course except that which shall have for its principle a deposit in the hands of some Continental banker of integrity and liberality.

I have the honour to be, &c.

To Sir James Pulteney.

Pera, August 28th, 1809.

DEAR SIR,

If any plan should be in agitation with his Majesty's Government to secure to the meritorious officers of the Condéan army the regular payment of their pensions, may I take the liberty of recommending to you the case and situation of the Bishop of Nancy,

one of the most zealous and most devoted servants of the Royal Family of France among those who have survived the catastrophe which has befallen it. To his ability and indefatigable industry I was indebted for all that is good in the plan now under your consideration, and I should hope that, notwithstanding the laudable intentions of his Majesty's Government to diminish as much as possible the public burthens, and the principle particularly adopted with regard to foreign pensions, the case of this truly respectable prelate (who has also, on many occasions, proved himself highly useful to the British Mission at Vienna,) might be excepted from the common lot.

Were it necessary to procure a sanction to his claims by the testimony of those whom he has so long and so faithfully served, I could confidently appeal to those august personages themselves, who are at present in England, and most particularly to his Royal Master, Louis XVIII., for whom he has acted as Minister at the Court of Vienna I believe ever since the Revolution.

I have the honour to be, &c.

To John Lewis Mallet, Esq., Secretary to the Commissioners for auditing the Public Accounts.

Pera, August 28th, 1809.

SIR,

I HAVE received your letter of 13th of June, and, according to the course which you recommend, have directed Messrs. Bidwell and Warren, my agents at the Foreign Office, to apply to his Majesty's Secretary

of State for Foreign Affairs for permission to produce the vouchers necessary to make up the account you require of the 12,699*l.* 15*s.* 6*d.* drawn by me on the Lords Commissioners of his Majesty's Treasury. *

I thank you for your obliging offer of information and assistance, should my agents find it necessary to apply to your Board for it, and have the honour to be, &c.

To Sir Harford Jones.

Pera, August 30th, 1809.

DEAR SIR,

ACCORDING to my promise of the 13th instant, I send Mr. David Morier to you with the enclosed Letter to his Persian Majesty, together with a Turkish Copy, which you will deliver or not as you may think most expedient.

Mr. D. Morier is thoroughly acquainted with all that has passed between the Turkish Government and myself, from the moment of my arrival at the Dardanelles to this day; and, considering the increased importance of our Asiatic relations, of which Turkey forms so essential a part, I think it more advisable to send you a person with whom you may confer, than a letter, which, under the peculiar circumstances of the present moment, must be defective in many particulars.

He will inform you of the situation in which I stand with the Turkish Government; of the expectations they had formed of assistance from England; of

* From Vienna, February, 1808.—Vide Memoir, p. 309.

the little satisfaction it has hitherto been in my power to afford them on this essential point; of the imminent danger which threatens them from Russia and France; and, as a consequence from all this, of the difficulties I expect to encounter in keeping my ground at Constantinople.

He will inform you of the efforts I made, during the first moments of our returning credit and popularity, to get rid of the French Mission, and of the success with which those efforts were attended, until the reverses of Austria changed the whole aspect of affairs, and restored to our enemies all the influence they can derive from terror.

With regard to the Persian Envoy, he will acquaint you with the duplicity of the Reis Efendi; with his endeavours to obtain from Meerza Abdul Hassan a communication of the Treaty with England, and with the artifices employed (whether with or without the consent of the other Ministers, I cannot say,) to delay, and even to prevent, his voyage.

In my letter to the King, you will observe that I have totally omitted the mention of the affair of embassies, confining myself entirely to the statement of my endeavours to establish a concert between his Majesty and the Ottoman Government for the prosecution of the war against Russia.

My motive for declining to enter upon the question of embassies in my letter to the King, may easily be referred, in any conversation you may have with him, to the consideration of what I felt due to his dignity, as well as to that of our Sovereign, on the rejection of my overture for a concert.

You may tell him that, after the rejection of that overture, I judged it inexpedient, on a matter of so

high and delicate a nature as that of the establishment of embassies, to make any advances which, by subjecting me to a repulse, might lower the consideration due, on every account, to the power, the splendour, and the dignity of the Persian throne. You may add also (if you should judge expedient), that I thought it due to his Majesty, as the friend and the ally of the King my master, to abstain from any act which might strengthen the Porte in the opinion of its own supremacy among the Powers of Asia, — an opinion which I perceive plainly they are endeavouring to impress upon my mind.

But my real reasons (which I state with the utmost frankness, inviting you at the same time to give me your opinion of their value), are grounded in my doubts of the policy of teaching these two Powers the strength and importance they may derive from a permanent union between them. If Europe had continued what it was when you left it, great as was even then the power of France, we had the means of exercising a sufficient control over Turkey to relieve us from the apprehension of her co-operating with our enemy in an attack upon our Eastern possessions. But now, when there exists no Power in Europe by whose interposition the march of a French army to Constantinople can be delayed for a single day, knowing what I know of the councils of the Porte, I see little reason to doubt her compliance with almost any terms which France, supported in all points by Russia, may dictate. If Bonaparte, therefore, preferring for a moment persuasion to open violence, and with a view of depriving Turkey, in her expiring moments, of the succour of Great Britain, should once more hold out to her the temptation of a peace with

Russia, I am persuaded that, however precarious that peace must be, the Turkish Ministers now at the head of affairs would sacrifice to it the friendship of Great Britain. On my side, I possess no means either to persuade or to threaten; and if the speculation I here hazard should prove correct, it appears to me that we might eventually find ourselves serious losers by having established too close a connection between the Ottoman and Persian Powers. The ascendancy of France once more recognised at Constantinople, she would avail herself of the influence of Turkey again to find her way into Persia, to resume all those gigantic plans which you have recently with so much labour, and with so much ability, defeated.

It strikes me, also, that the chief utility of establishing embassies between the two Courts, would be to keep up that sort of mutual good understanding which might prevent either from concluding a separate peace with Russia.

As far as the force of reason and the influence of other motives can operate upon either Turks or Persians, I think we may ourselves prevent this misfortune more efficaciously, in the present state of the relations of the two Courts, than if our proceedings were to be watched and commented upon by envoys respectively residing at Constantinople and Tehran.

It *may* also happen, in the vicissitude of human affairs, that I shall have to recommend it to you to support a separate peace between Persia and Russia, as strenuously as in my first letter I ventured to advise your pursuing a policy directly the reverse. You would then find yourself greatly embarrassed by the presence of a Turkish embassy directed by the vigilant energy of a French party.

These were my motives for declining to press the proposal in question upon the Turkish Government. I submit them to your candid and serious examination.

I daily expect to receive accounts of the final destruction of Austria by a peace which can be no other than the sacrifice of her last hope of independence. This event will necessarily be attended by the further development of the views of France and Russia against the Ottoman Empire. I have already alluded to the course which Bonaparte will probably pursue; but if he should prefer violence, and, in conjunction with Russia, insist on terms too hard to be endured, this Government may be driven to seek the alliance which they now reject with his Persian Majesty.

I will despatch a Tartar to you the moment I receive any account of this fatal peace which may be depended upon.

I am, &c.

To the King of Persia.

MOST HIGH, MOST POWERFUL, AND MOST ILLUSTRIOUS MONARCH!

HEAVEN alone knows the joy which filled my heart when I learned the happy tidings of the conclusion of peace between your Majesty and the King of England, my gracious Sovereign and Master.

That joy was soon augmented by the arrival at Scutari of your Majesty's vakeel, the Most Excellent Meerza Abdul Hassan, bringing with him letters of amity from your Majesty to the King, and commis-

sioned by your Majesty to reside at the Court of England, there to entertain and to consolidate those ties which henceforward and for ever are to bind together two powerful monarchies, equally interested in each other's happiness and preservation.

I procured a passage for his Excellency Meerza Abdul Hassan on board the first English ship of war which came into a Turkish port after his arrival at Scutari. He will reach England (God willing) in the month of October; and unless the accidents of the sea should retard my despatches from thence, I shall have the supreme happiness of forwarding to your Majesty's august Court, in the month of December, the particulars of the cordial reception which awaits him at the Court of London, together with the ratification of the Treaty of Peace and Alliance so happily concluded between our two Empires.

The most faithful and enlightened among the Envoys of his Majesty, Sir Harford Jones, who resides near your Majesty's august person, having signified to me that it was your Majesty's wish that the Most Powerful Ottoman Emperor should unite his forces with those of your Majesty, and that he should also enter into measures of general concert with your Majesty to repel the aggression of Russia on your respective territories, I held a conference upon the subject with his Excellency the Reis Efendi, in which I proposed this measure to him with all the zeal with which I am animated for the advancement of your Majesty's service, and for the common benefit and prosperity of the Persian and Ottoman Empires.

I regret to say that my endeavours for the present have failed. The Reis Efendi, indeed, in the name of the Sultan his master, as well as in that of the

whole Ottoman Government, expressed the highest affection towards your Majesty's person, and the most ardent wishes for the success of your arms in a cause which they regard as their own ; but it seemed to be their opinion, after mature deliberation, that no formal agreement for union or concert was necessary between two Powers already so closely united by religion and by a common interest ; but that the most effectual method of carrying on the war would be by acting separately, each on his own frontier, and each Power bringing into the field its whole strength against the common enemy.

Having rendered this account to your Majesty of the manner in which I have endeavoured to execute what I learned to be your Majesty's wishes, and assuring your Majesty that no diligence shall ever be wanting on my part to obey all your commands, it is with the profoundest respect for your Majesty's person, and admiration of those high qualities in your Majesty, the fame of which fills the world, that I have now the honour of subscribing myself.

Your Majesty's most devoted
and most faithful servant.

Constantinople, 30th August, 1809.

To Sir Harford Jones.

Pera, August 30th, 1809.

SIR,

I ENCLOSE you three letters for their Excellencies Meerza Sheffee, Hagi Mohammed Kossein Khan, and

Meerza Buyurk, in answer to those which I had the honour of receiving from them with your despatches of the 17th of July.

I have the honour to be, &c.

To Mr. David Morier.

Pera, August 30th, 1809.

SIR,

THE situation of affairs in this country, the degree to which the late calamitous events in Moravia may affect our relations with the Porte, added to what has lately passed between the Ottoman Ministers and myself, on the arrival of the Persian Vakeel, Meerza Abdul Hassan, in his way to England, make me judge it expedient to send to Sir Harford Jones, his Majesty's Envoy at the Court of Persia, a person fully acquainted with the particulars of all my principal transactions with the Ottoman Government since my arrival at the Dardanelles until the present period.

I authorise and instruct you, therefore, to proceed without delay to the Persian Camp, or to such place as you may learn to be the present residence of Sir Harford Jones, and to remain there as long as he shall judge necessary for the public service.

I am, &c.

To Don John Havat.

Pera, le 30 Août, 1809.

MONSIEUR,

VOTRE Excellence m'ayant témoigné dans sa lettre du 24 courant le desir très naturel de voir cesser

l'esclavage et l'extirpation, les Turcs voleront audevant d'Elle pour lui demander son appui et ses conseils. L'Espagne deviendra ainsi, par le fait, l'alliée de la Turquie, et l'unité du sort et du sentiment sera pour V. E. une lettre de créance mille fois plus efficace que tous les pleins pouvoirs que la diplomatie peut inventer pour l'en revêtir.

Voilà ce que je crois devoir soumettre aux réflexions de V. E. Je la remercie infiniment de la nouvelle preuve de sa confiance qu'Elle vient de me fournir en me consultant sur une affaire si délicate, et je la prie d'agréer l'assurance de ma considération très distinguée, et de mon amitié sincère.

To C. J. Rich, Esq., Bagdad.

Pera, Sept. 9th, 1809.

DEAR SIR,

I SEND you a *firman* from the Porte to the Pasha of Bagdad, together with a letter to him from the Caimacan. I am assured that this measure of sending a firman, and of putting it into your hands, will fully answer the purpose of procuring you all the respect and attention due to your rank. If it should not succeed, I am promised another, worded more precisely according to the note which I gave in, and which was nearly copied from your paper.

It strikes me that it may be insinuated to this Pasha, who I foresee will be very troublesome to you, that I have adopted the course of moderation with regard to him in my first application to the Porte, but that if I am forced to go further, I shall apply to a higher quarter, and demand his deposition.

I am, &c.

défavorable pour forcer la Porte à un acte quelconque qui peut affecter les droits de sa Majesté Ferdinand VII. La Porte, dans les circonstances actuelles, desire ne point reconnoître aucun Roi d'Espagne, et toute démarche tendant à lui arracher la reconnaissance du Roi légitime n'aurait, à mon avis, d'autre effet que celui de nuire à la bonne cause. Qu'Elle garde encore quelque tems le silence. C'est tout ce que nous pouvons espérer de mieux. Si on la pousse — si on veut absolument qu'Elle se déclare, sa déclaration sera, à ne pas en douter, dans la négative. Et qu'en résulterait-il ? Que V. E., après l'avoir reçu, quitterait probablement Constantinople. Quel triomphe pour la faction Française ! Et dans quel coin de l'Europe ne ferait-elle pas accroire que la Porte, par égard pour l'Usurpateur Joseph, avait signifié à V. E. de ne plus prolonger son séjour dans ses Etats !

Il me semble que V. E. ferait beaucoup mieux d'attendre que la Porte prenne elle-même son parti. Il se peut bien que la paix entre l'Autriche et la France ne se fera pas de sitôt. Il se peut aussi que cette paix se fera à des conditions assez favorables pour laisser toujours à la Turquie une barrière entre Elle et la France dans les Etats Autrichiens. Dans ces deux cas également nous pouvons espérer d'Elle une conduite qui répond à ses inclinations, et qui serait sans risque pour son indépendance.

De l'autre côté, il est plus que probable que l'Empereur Alexandre et Bonaparte, après la signature de la paix avec l'Autriche, s'occuperont de l'exécution du projet si longtems arrêté de partager entre eux la Turquie Européenne. Alors, comme de raison, la Porte changera bien vite de système, et V. E. n'aura plus de peine à se faire reconnoître. Placés entre

l'esclavage et l'extirpation, les Turcs voleront audevant d'Elle pour lui demander son appui et ses conseils. L'Espagne deviendra ainsi, par le fait, l'alliée de la Turquie, et l'unité du sort et du sentiment sera pour V. E. une lettre de créance mille fois plus efficace que tous les pleins pouvoirs que la diplomatie peut inventer pour l'en revêtir.

Voilà ce que je crois devoir soumettre aux réflexions de V. E. Je la remercie infiniment de la nouvelle preuve de sa confiance qu'Elle vient de me fournir en me consultant sur une affaire si délicate, et je la prie d'agréer l'assurance de ma considération très distinguée, et de mon amitié sincère.

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It strikes me that it may be insinuated to this Pasha, who I foresee will be very troublesome to you, that I have adopted the course of moderation with regard to him in my first application to the Porte, but that if I am forced to go further, I shall apply to a higher quarter, and demand his deposition.

I am, &c.

To Sir Alexander Ball.

Pera, Sept. 9th, 1809.

MY DEAR SIR,

I HAVE received your Excellency's letter of the 10th August, and having no despatches ready, will not detain the clipper at Smyrna.

The armistice is, it is true, most disastrous; but you may rely upon it that the Emperor is no ways to blame. What I am now about to impart to you is strictly confidential, and may be relied upon, as I have seen the despatches from Buda to the Internuncio. The armistice was signed on the 12th, at a moment when the whole army was in expectation of the signal for battle, and without any communication whatever with the Emperor. His Majesty was then at Comorn, organizing the Hungarian insurrection, at the head of which he was about to put himself, in order to commence offensive operations on the right of the Danube. He was thunderstruck on the receipt of the news, *which was concealed from him until the 16th*, and would have refused to ratify the armistice if Bonaparte had not put himself in motion to attack him.

* * * * *

Vague reports have reached us of a misunderstanding between the Emperor Alexander and Bonaparte; but I do not give the slightest credit to its being such as to lead to any good result. It is true that Bonaparte complained heavily at the beginning of the campaign of the tardiness of Russia; but I know positively that this tardiness was occasioned by the fear of an attack on Odessa and in the Crimea, which my language and conduct at Constantinople had rendered universally prevalent in the Russian dominions

contiguous to Turkey, and which the Duc de Richelieu, the Governor of Odessa, actually gave as his reason for not detaching any part of the force he had with him, and for demanding fresh succours of all kinds. If any coolness, therefore, should have arisen between these two confederates in mischief, depend upon its being appeased during the negotiations actually going on. Bonaparte may threaten to set up again the kingdom of Poland; but this threat will only be made with a view to sell the renunciation of the measure at a high price, and to draw the weak Emperor still deeper into his snares. I fear the peace is certain. Russia must now be called in by Austria to save her from total destruction; and Austria, after such a step, cannot refuse whatever conditions it may please Russia to dictate. The Turks expect the storm to fall on their heads, and I strongly participate in their fears. I can do nothing to help them.

I expect every day the Resistance, from England, with the presents, &c. &c. By that time I hope to be able to see a little more clearly my way. I will not avail myself of the King's permission to quit Constantinople, unless my successor should arrive with the frigate. A difficult crisis is approaching, and that is not a moment to think of a retreat. * * *

Believe me, dear Sir, &c.

To Sir Alexander Ball.

Pera, Sept. 20th, 1809.

DEAR SIR,

I RECEIVED your Excellency's letters of the 3d and 7th inst. respectively, by the Wizard and the Entre-

prenante. Those by the latter conveyance reached me first.

Intending to re-despatch the Entreprenante as soon as possible, I send you nothing by the return of the Wizard except the accompanying private letter to Mr. Canning.

From Cuesta's report it was evident to me that he was scarcely engaged in the battle of Talavera. Nothing, I am afraid, can be done with these regular Spanish generals. The Cortez must meet; the people must be roused, at the risk, perhaps, of doing what their governors may not like, but also as the last resource to save their country.

I tremble for Austria. Your inclosure from Mr. Jackson was news to me, having heard nothing from Buda since the 28th of July. I firmly believe the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs will not suffer Mr. Bathurst or *my other correspondents* to write to me, for fear I should receive a true account of what is going on just now.

* * * * *

Cerigo still continues to give me infinite distress. Within these few days two more Austrian prizes to the pirates Costa and Pozza came into this port, and it will be as much as I can do if I can prevent their cargoes being disposed of by public sale. I am kept in perpetual and most angry discussion with the Ottoman Government on this subject, which at the present anxious moment I would willingly avoid.

Now that you have got this Costa, pray keep him secure; and I recommend the same attention to Mr. Pozza, if our cruisers should be so lucky as to meet with him.

Expecting so soon to write to your Excellency again,

I will only add, that we have good news from the army under the Grand Vizir. A part of it has crossed the Danube at Georgeova, and totally defeated a corps of 10,000 Russians. With the assistance of a British squadron next spring (if the war should continue so long without any change in the relations of Russia towards France) I could make Turkey a formidable ally to Austria. If my hands are tied on this important point, there will be no use in my remaining at Constantinople, and I shall consequently avail myself of H. M.'s permission to retire. I say this, however, only in the case of the continuation of the war between Austria and France; for if these Powers make peace, Turkey will infallibly be attacked, and then my duty will keep me here as long as the Turks can keep themselves in Europe.

I am, &c.

To Sir A. Ball.

Pera, Sept. 28th, 1809.

DEAR SIR,

I SEND Basilico with despatches for England as far as Malta in the Spanish frigate, and will thank your Excellency to forward him to England the first opportunity that offers, as his despatches are of consequence. I again solicit co-operation with the Turks next spring in the Black Sea.

Not a word from Buda since the 28th of July! I have the worst opinion of this silence. The French Minister, in a conference yesterday at the Porte, asked the curious question — Whether Turkey would not like the French better than the Russians as neigh-

bours in Poland? adding, that Bonaparte was making great changes in Poland. We understand here that there has been some talk of setting up that kingdom again in favour of Jerome Bonaparte. I know you will exclaim, — Can Russia suffer this? I think she will, and a great deal more.

Another very valuable prize, the Madonna Caligata, is just taken and carried into Scio. As she was taken under the guns of the fort, I applied for a firman for her restoration; and in order to prevent her being carried into Cerigo, I this day took upon myself to despatch Captain Williams of the *Entreprenante* to Scio, with a recommendation to lay alongside the prize until the Porte's order, either for her restoration or her sequestration, should be carried into execution.

Pray have the goodness to acquaint Mr. Frazer that I have received despatches from home respecting a plan I proposed in April last to this Government for supplying us permanently with naval stores. These despatches encourage me to go on with it, and refer me to Mr. Frazer in case I should be able to get the consent of the Turkish Government to furnish an immediate supply of oak timber and hemp. With regard to the first of these articles, I am afraid there is none ready for delivery, but inquiries are now on foot to find out the most convenient spot for embarking a quantity, if we should come to a permanent agreement. I think the island of Thasso would be best for *every* reason. As to the hemp, I shall have a sample in a few days, which I will send immediately to Mr. Frazer. As he may approve it, I think it would not be amiss to be prepared to send up some person here to make the contract, and settle the payments; and remark that the payments must be *im-*

mediate, as it is the great and pressing necessity of the Turkish Government which alone induces it to consent to a proposal so much out of its way.

Mr. Mair is here, but I am trying to get him to the Black Sea.

If you could get me a copy of the Convention entered into three years ago with the Austrian Government for oak timber from Croatia, it would greatly assist me. If not, I will thank Mr. Frazer to send me his ideas as to what would be the most convenient contract for the British Government to enter into in regard to this article of timber; and particularly as to quantity, and periods of delivery. Would it not also be good to contract for a certain quantity actually growing? These details are quite out of my way, otherwise I would not trouble him.

I have the honour to be, &c.

To Sir Harford Jones.

Pera, Oct. 1st, 1809.

MY DEAR SIR,

At a conference demanded by the French Minister a few days ago, he informed the Porte, after a great deal of boasting about his master's great power, and of his having destroyed the Austrian monarchy, and so forth, that Bonaparte had resolved upon re-establishing the kingdom of Poland; and he desired to know whether it would not be more agreeable to the Porte to have France for a neighbour than Russia?

I send you this intelligence without loss of time, as it may be connected with some reports of a mis-

understanding between France and Russia, which are in general circulation.

The truth or the falsehood of these reports I am labouring to ascertain. I shall send a Tartar to you the first moment I can discover any thing certain.

In the mean time, I cannot give sufficient credit to them to recommend to you any change of system at the Court of Persia. Let us first find out whether these changes in Poland are to be effected with the consent of Russia or not. I expect a messenger every day from Buda, by whom I shall probably be able to ascertain this important fact.

What I principally send you this Tartar for is, because I have just learned that the French Minister has sent one off to the Persian camp. There can be no doubt but that he will have exaggerated in the most extravagant degree the forces of his master, the distress of Austria, and the loss of our influence at this Court.

Nothing of this is true. Bonaparte's force at Vienna is far inferior to that of the Austrians ; and, if the discovery of his views on Poland should really have indisposed Russia towards him, all may be recovered yet.

Our influence at this Court remains unshaken, notwithstanding all the late disastrous events. In proof of this I have only to mention, that on the French Minister hinting, the other day, in his conference, the propriety of the Porte's changing its system with regard to England now that Bonaparte was becoming so near a neighbour to them, the Ministers silenced him at a word, and told him that the Porte had irrevocably taken its line ; "*that they*

would be friends with their friends, and enemies with their enemies."

In further proof of their good dispositions, I have to tell you that the Tartar I send you now is despatched at the suggestion, and by the advice, of this Government, in order to counteract the effects of the despatches of which the French Tartar sent to the Persian camp is the bearer.

My news from Spain are most favourable. In the packet which accompanies this letter you will find an account of a glorious victory obtained by Sir A. Wellesley over General Victor at Talavera. The enemy retreated after the action to Madrid, which it was supposed they would evacuate.

My last despatches from England of the 30th of July inform me officially of the sailing, the day before, of a powerful armament, consisting of little less than 40,000 effective men, to attack Flushing, take possession of the island of Walcheren, and burn the ships at Antwerp. I am in hourly expectation of receiving intelligence of the complete success of this expedition.

I send you also a curious document—no less than the falsification and forgery of the King's speech on closing the session, by the French Government. When the Persian Ministers read this, they will know what faith to put in the accounts which the French Chargé d'Affaires has just transmitted to the Persian camp.

To Captain Leake.

Pera, Oct. 11th, 1809.

SIR,

It was not until the 8th instant that I received your letters of the 4th and 5th ultimo.

Agreeably to your desire, I inclose you a letter for his Highness the Vizir, written in English and in Greek, of which, for your better information, I also subjoin a copy.

Its delivery or not to his Highness, I must leave absolutely to your discretion. I am fully sensible of the very embarrassing circumstances in which you must find yourself personally after the menace thrown out to you by his Highness; but I cannot take upon myself to put an end to a mission so important as yours, and to which you were nominated expressly by his Majesty.

I must infer, indeed, from a part of your letter, which mentions that you have long looked forward to some such menace, that it cannot be long before you receive specific instructions from his Majesty's Government, with regard to your conduct in so difficult a situation.

With regard, however, to the motive which seems to have influenced his Highness in his intimation to you, that in the event of the crisis apprehended by him — by which I understand him to mean the departure of his Majesty's Ambassador from Constantinople, and his being himself abandoned by England, and left to contend single-handed against France — he will not suffer you to leave Jannina, I have not the slightest hesitation in declaring that there exists no foundation whatever for any appre-

hension on either of these heads. Although it be true that, in the affair of Dendrino's arrest, I have had to complain greatly of the Ottoman Ministers, and although, since the late successes of France, they have, generally speaking, shown a degree of deference towards that Power to which she is in no respect entitled; I must in justice acknowledge, that so far from testifying any disposition to infringe the peace with England, they have given me repeated proofs of their determination resolutely to maintain it; and, in particular, that at a conference with the Chargé d'Affaires of France, held on the 26th of September, in which that Minister announced Bonaparte's intention of restoring the kingdom of Poland, and in which he again urged them to a change of system towards Great Britain, the Ministers distinctly informed him that their line was firmly taken, and that the Porte was determined, *at all events*, to adhere to the late peace.

I have reason to believe these to be the personal dispositions of the Sultan himself.

It is material that you should have this information, which, as far as it goes, will convince you, and enable you likewise to convince his Highness, that my present situation at the Porte is not a subject of the most trifling alarm to me. What may be the case hereafter, if peace be made between Austria and France, and if the speculations connected with that event be but in part realised, I will not pretend to anticipate. I can but promise to keep you accurately informed of facts, and to communicate to you the first symptoms of danger.

The apprehension of being abandoned by Great Britain in the hour of his necessities, cannot, I trust,

be seriously entertained by his Highness. Sure I am that he will find no justification for such apprehension in any part of the transactions between himself and his Majesty's Government.

I have the honour to be, &c.

To Ali Pacha.

Pera, Oct. 11th, 1809.

MOST HIGH, MOST POWERFUL, AND MOST ILLUSTRIOUS PRINCE,

AFTER inquiring after your invaluable health, the purpose of this friendly letter is as follows:—

In consequence of secret advices, which I have just received from the Emperor's Court at Buda, it is become necessary that I should, as soon as possible, have a personal interview with Captain Leake, in order to give him some instructions which I am directed by his Majesty's Government to convey to him by word of mouth alone, as they are of a nature not to be committed to paper. This letter, therefore, is to request that your Highness will be pleased to permit Captain Leake to repair, without loss of time, to Constantinople. He will explain fully to your Highness, on his return, the business in question.

I have the honour to be, &c.

To Captain Leake.

Pera, Oct. 11th, 1809.

SIR,

I HAVE read with infinite concern that part of your despatch of the 5th of September, in which you inform me that his Highness Ali Pacha is inclined to suspect that I have given advice to his Majesty's Ministers unfavourable to the proposal mentioned in your letter to me of April 20th, and which I conclude to be the same transmitted by you to his Majesty's Government.

I request you will have the goodness to assure his Highness that his suspicions are without a shadow of foundation. In my correspondence with his Majesty's Ministers, there is not a syllable which can by any possibility be construed into an endeavour to obstruct the success of any representation, or proposal, at any time submitted by you to their consideration.

At the same time I have not the slightest hesitation in declaring frankly to his Highness, as I have often been under the necessity of declaring to the Porte, that such is my knowledge of the pecuniary difficulties under which Great Britain is labouring, that I should not think it consistent with my duty to recommend the granting of subsidies on any remote or speculative contingency, or for any purpose except that of employing them directly against his Majesty's enemies.

With regard to the prevalence of the French influence in the Divan at Constantinople, its source lies in the reverses sustained by Austria, and in the considerations arising out of those reverses alone. But

this is no justification for those who govern at the Porte. They know that the Ottoman Empire is marked out for destruction by Bonaparte, and that all their submissions to him will not retard the division of their provinces one single hour. Yet, notwithstanding the proofs I have seen of these dispositions in the Ottoman Government to humble itself before Bonaparte, you may assure his Highness, from me, that I have not the remotest fear of not being able to keep my ground at Constantinople.

The reports which his Highness has heard that I was preparing for my departure have no other foundation than the wishes of his Majesty's enemies, and their indefatigable endeavours to render my situation insupportable. It is true that I early obtained his Majesty's gracious leave to retire from Constantinople whenever I might judge proper. It is likewise true, that the conduct of the Porte towards me in the affair of Dendrino, and its flagrant breach of faith in that instance, have inspired me with a degree of disgust which I am above being at the pains to conceal, and which, under any other circumstances, would have determined me to avail myself of my permission to quit so irksome a situation. But these are considerations which have no connection with the reports alluded to by his Highness, and which I find have been circulated very generally throughout the Ottoman dominions.*

I beg of you to express my most sincere thanks to his Highness for his ready attention to my wishes in writing to the Grand Vizir. Assure him that I re-

* They were chiefly circulated by what are called *English merchants*, residing at the different scales, and who are traders on French capital, or any capital with which they can connect themselves.

ceive it as a fresh proof of his friendship towards Great Britain, and that I feel it as a fresh inducement on my part to co-operate in all measures for the security and consolidation of his power.

I have the honour to be, &c.

To John Prior, Esq., Treasurer to the Levant Company.

Pera, Oct. 13th, 1809.

SIR,

HIS MAJESTY having been graciously pleased to order that the salaries of the dragomans and students attached to the English Embassy at Constantinople shall be increased, I herewith enclose for your information a statement which has been transmitted to me from the Foreign Office of the sums proposed to be granted to the several dragomans, students, and the Capi Oglan respectively, and of which his Majesty has signified his approbation.

The despatch containing the above statement, however, being accompanied by no instructions respecting the time or mode in which these salaries are to be paid, and the dragomans and others interested having signified to me their present necessities, likewise the distress they must experience unless some provision be made for the regular issue of their allowances, I have to desire you, Sir, as the person charged with the payments to the dragomans upon the former establishment, to continue advancing them upon the footing of the present arrangement, until I receive ulterior directions from England as to his Majesty's pleasure upon this subject.

I am, &c.

To Nicolas Strane, Esq., H. M.'s Consul at Patrass.

Pera, Oct. 15th, 1809.

SIR,

I HAVE to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 26th of September, together with the despatches forwarded by the Spider.

I shall always be happy to receive any information respecting the Seven Islands which it may be in your power to transmit to me; being thoroughly convinced that the re-establishment of the Ionian Republic under the exclusive protection of Great Britain is of the greatest, if not of absolute, importance to the preservation of our influence in the countries bordering on the Mediterranean and Archipelago.

As a beginning must be made somewhere, I should hope that my representations may at length induce Lord Collingwood to give his countenance to the occupation of Cerigo. Any information tending to facilitate an attempt on that post (now become a post of serious annoyance to the British, Austrian, and Turkish commerce) which you may be able to obtain, will be highly acceptable to Sir A. Ball, to whom I beg you at all times to transmit copies of your correspondence with me on this subject.

I am, &c.

To N. Strane, Esq.

Pera, Oct. 20th, 1809.

SIR,

I AM extremely obliged to you for your timely and important information of the surrender of Zante to

his Majesty's arms. Of course, when you wrote to me it was impossible for you to know whether the island had been taken possession of in the name of the Republican Government, or whether a provisional administration had been established there. I will thank you to give me all the information you can on this subject.

In the mean time I entreat you not to lose a moment in writing to the Commander of the Forces at Zante, with whom I suppose the chief authority to reside for the present, to acquaint him that I am preparing to write to him officially on the subject of Mr. Dendrino, the person who exercised the office of Chancellor to the Ionian Republic at the Porte before the French got possession of the Islands.

I have no time at present to enter into a circumstantial detail of Dendrino's case, but shall only mention, that having found occasion to make use of his services at this place with a view to the re-establishment of the Ionian Republic, I set him up again as Chancellor; and that this produced his arrest and imprisonment by the French Minister, followed by a decree confiscating his property at Corfu as a rebel to France. Independently of the gross injustice of this proceeding, the example will be sure of striking terror into the inhabitants of the other Islands, unless done away by some signal and speedy example of British justice. It is with this view that I mean to recommend that the French property at Zante, or in any other of the Islands which may fall into his Majesty's possession, shall be rendered liable to answer for all acts of violence committed against the property of the friends of the lawful Government.

I am, &c.

To Captain Leake.

Pera, Oct. 24th, 1809.

DEAR SIR,

I HAVE this moment received your letters of the 11th and 14th instant, and am extremely obliged to you for their contents. Mr. Strane had informed me of the surrender of Zante, but he omitted in his letter the important particular of the re-establishment of the Ionian Republic.

This event having necessarily renewed the question of Dendrino between me and the French and Turkish Ministers, I shall now make another effort for his being given up to me, and I think I shall succeed in it. But what appears to me of the greatest consequence to our interests in the Seven Islands is, the conduct we may hold with regard to the arbitrary confiscations by the French of the property of our friends there. The decree against Dendrino, for instance, for having resumed his functions of Ionian Chancellor under my directions, is of a nature to require not only the most marked reprobation, but the strictest reprisals. It is with this view that I take the liberty of addressing the enclosed letter to Brigadier-General Oswald, which I will thank you to forward to him wherever he may be.

Having received intelligence that the French Minister had presented a very pressing note to the Porte, requiring that orders should be sent to his Highness Ali Pacha to furnish the French garrison at Corfu with provisions, I, of course, spoke in the most serious manner against the commission of such a breach of neutrality. I received every

sort of promise that it should not be complied with ; nevertheless, as I know the feebleness, and, of course, the ill faith of the Ottoman Government, I rely more on your vigilance, and that of our squadrons off Corfu, to prevent it, than upon any thing they say to me. It is of particular importance that you should be informed of this fact, likewise of the urgent necessity the French are under for a supply at Corfu, since they have even gone so far as to threaten the Porte with the vengeance of Bonaparte, if they refuse provisioning that island.

This matter appears to me to be of so much importance that I have written a letter to his Highness himself upon it, which I enclose, and will thank you to deliver. I add the copy of it for your information.

I am, &c.

To Ali Pacha.

MOST HIGH, MOST POWERFUL, AND MOST ILLUSTRIOUS PRINCE,

THE object for which I now address this friendly and most confidential letter to your Highness is to inform you, that I have discovered that the French Minister at this Court has not long ago presented an official note, the purport of which is to induce the Ottoman Government to direct your Highness to furnish the garrison of Corfu with provisions.

This intelligence has been confirmed to me by his Excellency the Reis Efendi himself, who, nevertheless, assured me that it was not the intention of the

Ottoman Government to comply with the French Minister's demand.

I have the utmost personal respect for the Reis Efendi; but after the repeated marks of an undue partiality towards France which I have had occasion to observe in the late conduct of this Government, especially in all that concerns the Ionian Islands, I have no scruple in declaring to your Highness that I rely more on the firm and constant friendship testified by your Highness towards Great Britain than upon any assurances I may receive from the present Ministers of the Sultan.

It is in the name of that friendship, therefore, which, by the re-establishment of the Ionian Republic under the protection of Great Britain, is about to receive fresh strength and solidity, that I now take the liberty of writing to your Highness, entreating you most earnestly to issue the strictest commands to your subjects, to abstain from affording directly or indirectly any assistance of provisions to the garrison of Corfu; the speedy surrender of which island without such assistance is confessed by the French Minister at this Court to be inevitable.

I have the honour to be, &c.

*To Lord Collingwood.**

Pera, Oct. 25th, 1809.

MY LORD,

HAVING received information from Captain Leake that his Majesty's forces had taken possession of

* Similar letters were sent to Sir Alexander Ball, Sir John Stuart, Brigadier-General Oswald, and the commanding officer at Zante.

Zante and Cephalonia, and that the Republican Government, as settled at the peace of Amiens, had been restored in those islands, I take the liberty of recommending to your Lordship's most serious consideration the case of such Ionian subjects whose property has been confiscated by the French for their attachment to the interests of Great Britain.

On the present occasion I more particularly advert to the case of Mr. Giovanni Dendrino, the late Chancellor of the Sept-insular Republic.

In the course of my correspondence with your Lordship I have had occasion to advert to some measures which my situation at the Porte had given me an opportunity of setting on foot with a view of directing the hopes and expectations of the inhabitants of the Seven Islands to the moment when a British force should present itself for their deliverance from French oppression.

One of those measures was the granting his Majesty's protection to the captains of several Ionian vessels then under French colours, lying in the harbour of Constantinople, and giving them liberty to hoist the Sept-insular flag, on condition of their sailing direct from Constantinople to Smyrna, where they were to put themselves under the orders of the first King's ship going with convoy for Malta, and on their arrival there, to surrender themselves to Sir Alexander Ball, to be disposed of according to his Excellency's judgment. I take this opportunity, in passing, to recommend these Ionian captains to your Lordship's particular protection for their meritorious and patriotic conduct under the most trying circumstances.

Another part of my plan was the re-establishment of the Ionian Chancery at Pera. One important

effect of this measure, the success of which was only impeded by the rapid successes of the French against Austria, would have been that of engaging in his Majesty's service the most considerable part of the Ionian shipping now locked up at Constantinople.

The Sept-insular Republic having had, before the occupation of its territory by the French, a regular Chancery at Pera, I took under my protection Mr. Giovanni Dendrino, the Ionian Chancellor originally appointed, and whom the Porte had duly recognised, and with the consent of all the Ionians attached to their constitution re-instated him in his office.

On the day on which I received Mr. Dendrino as Chancellor, he was arrested by order of the French Chargé d'Affaires, and violently dragged to prison, where he remained upwards of three months, to the great injury of his health, and the total ruin of his fortune.

Your Lordship is, I believe, acquainted with the steps I took for his liberation. It were needless to recapitulate them at the present moment, or to dwell further upon this part of the subject than is necessary to bring distinctly under your Lordship's view the object of my present letter.

Not content with imprisoning this unfortunate gentleman, and depriving him and his family of all means of subsistence, a decree has been pronounced against him by the French Government at Corfu, by virtue of which all his property is declared to be confiscated and his person outlawed. I enclose your Lordship an authentic copy of this most iniquitous sentence.

Your Lordship will, I trust, agree with me that, under the circumstances above stated, Mr. Dendrino

is entitled to some signal reparation, and even reward from his Majesty's Government.

That reparation can come from no juster source than from the French, the authors of his misfortune; and, as the French Government has not hesitated in this instance to confiscate the property of a person who by no legal title whatever could be considered as under its allegiance, justice and policy require that reprisals should be instantly made upon the private property of any French subjects found in the Ionian Islands in his Majesty's possession, should the public funds taken from the enemy not be adequate for that purpose.

Some measure of this nature is not only necessary for the credit of his Majesty's Government, the affair of Dendrino having now become a national question, in which I am happy to say that my conduct has met with the full approbation of his Majesty, but cannot fail of becoming highly useful to the success of his Majesty's arms in the reduction of Corfu.

Your Lordship, therefore, will, I trust, excuse the earnestness with which I have recommended to your consideration a case which I cannot but regard as most intimately connected with the future stability of the British influence in the Seven Islands.

I have the honour to be, &c.

P. S. I submit, with great deference to your Lordship, the enclosed as the draft of a Proclamation concerning the affair of Dendrino.

To Sir Harford Jones.

Pera, Nov. 10th, 1809.

DEAR SIR,

I LOSE no time in informing you that a treaty of peace between Austria and France was signed on the 14th of October. Of the conditions I can say nothing, the intelligence of the event alone having reached Pera; but of the fact there is no reason to doubt. One condition talked of, and which I believe to be certain, is that Galicia is ceded, part to be annexed to the Duchy of Warsaw, and *part to Russia!* You will judge from this of the truth of the Russian stories concerning the good terms they are on with us.

I have nothing of a consolatory nature to add to this distressing intelligence either with regard to our expedition to Antwerp, or to the general aspect of our affairs in Spain. The Turks, indeed, have obtained two great and really important victories over the Russians near Silistria, but they have lost Ismael by famine.

Pray send this intelligence to Lord Minto. My task being at an end, I shall now very soon be on my departure for England.

I am, &c.

To Brigadier-General Oswald and Captain Spranger.

Pera, Nov. 11th, 1809.

SIR,

I HAVE the honour of acknowledging the receipt of a joint despatch from yourself and Captain Spranger, of H.M.S. Warrior, conveying to me the pleasing and

highly important information of the surrender of Zante, Cephalonia, and Ithaca, to his Majesty's arms.

I am concerting measures with the Ottoman Government for the effectual protection of the Sept-insulars, and shall not fail to communicate the result to all his Majesty's consuls resident in the Turkish dominions. For the present, the inhabitants of such islands as are occupied by a British force are considered to be under British protection.

Measures are also in my contemplation respecting the admission of the Sept-insular flag into the Ottoman Ports. But this, I fear, will be attended with difficulty until Corfu also shall be in our possession. Until then, it would be more advisable that the Ionian vessels should navigate under British colours.*

I have the honour to be, &c.

To Sir Harford Jones.

Pera, Nov. 26th, 1809.

DEAR SIR,

I RECEIVED, on the 23d instant, your letters and despatches to Government up to the 25th of October.

I will readily enforce, to the utmost of my power, the arguments you allege in justification of your intention to advance a further six months of the subsidy to the Persian Court. To the propriety, under certain circumstances, of acting upon a treaty before it is ratified, I can have no hesitation in assenting. The object of many treaties would be disappointed unless acted upon immediately after their signature by the Plenipotentiaries, and among the number of

* A similar letter was sent on the 14th to the commanding officer at Cerigo.

such treaties, that which you have signed with the Court of Tæhran must undoubtedly be reckoned.

I am also very much inclined to think that, under the circumstances you state in your letter of the 25th of October (a copy of which I will not fail to transmit to the Secretary of State with my first despatches), I should have acted as you have done in engaging for a further advance of the subsidy. But you will allow me to add to this opinion one very obvious reserve, namely, that you have good reason for believing that the money so advanced is to be employed in effecting the purposes of the treaty. Now as to this point, a great deal will depend upon the circumstances under which the armistice* was concluded, and upon the degree of good faith observed towards you in the transactions which preceded it. Of this, you are, of necessity, the only competent judge.

On the present occasion, unless I much deceive myself, the sincerity of the Persian ministers will soon be brought to the test. According to the report of your Tartar, Mr. Joannin was met on this side of Erzeroom by a courier from the French Chargé d'Affaires at this Court, in consequence of which, he immediately returned to Erzeroom. This can only be with the intention of renewing his attempts to re-establish the French mission at Tæhran; and, indeed, it is publicly given out here that such will be the effect of his return.

I must not omit to notice, that in an interview I had yesterday with the Persian ambassador, he said that you had been consulted on the armistice. You know best how far this is true.

I am unable to express how much I feel obliged to

* With Russia.

you by the letter you have sent me from the King of Persia for the Sultan ; and I shall attend most scrupulously to what you mention in your cipher. For the present, there is no necessity for making use of it. The first impression made by the Austrian peace is over, and I have no fear of keeping my ground, unless either great temptations should be held out to the Turks, or such disasters should happen, as to force them absolutely to beg peace on their knees. In short, I feel that our peace is so safe, that I may with a safe conscience avail myself of his Majesty's gracious permission to return to England, which I have now determined upon as soon as a frigate can come from Malta for my conveyance.

With regard to the Austrian peace, I am still without information sufficient to enable me to state the conditions of it. What I learn for the present (and this but loosely) is, that *all* the littorale is surrendered to France ; that this, together with Styria, Carinthia, Carniola, and a great part of Croatia *as far as the Saave*, is to form a new kingdom, to be called *le Royaume d'Illyrie* ; that the Elector of Bavaria is to have as far as the Emms ; that the Emperor of Russia and the Elector of Saxony are to divide between them two thirds of Galicia ; that immense contributions are exacted from the Austrian provinces ; and that the relations between Great Britain and Austria are again broken off.

The information I here send you will confirm in the strongest manner all my former statements of the radical, and I am afraid incurable, hostility of Russia towards Great Britain. We must now, therefore, **look seriously** to ourselves ; we must cultivate both **and Turkey**, even at the risk of being deceived

by both, and gain these Powers at almost any price short of our honour, and of that consideration which arises from a sense in them that we can neither be deceived nor offended with impunity.

After stating to you these facts, I anticipate the difficulty you will have in applying them to the circumstances under which you stand at the Persian Court. Unless I greatly mistake, the question you will be continually revolving is—whether you ought to assist or to retard the peace between Persia and Russia.

To a decision in favour of the first of these alternatives, you will be led by the reflection that, for all the general purposes of the war, a diversion on the side of Persia is no longer an object. And, under the impression of this reasoning, you will naturally enough conclude, that the influence accruing to the situation of a person who shall assist in the accomplishment of an object so desirable for Persia, as a peace that will obtain Georgia for her, is too important to be thrown away, and that, therefore, you can do nothing better than become a sort of indirect mediator of such a peace.

On the other hand, you will have this master principle to oppose to all the seductive arguments in favour of peace, namely, that in the present state of the relations between Russia and France, peace with the one is peace with the other.

Which of these two courses it would be most advisable for you to follow, it would be great presumption in me to say. I can only lay before you the fact. Local considerations will direct your decision with far more certainty than my speculations.

I have nothing further to add, than that, although

I do not believe that *at this moment* any actual negotiation for peace is commenced between the Porte and Russia, I am not without some grounds of apprehension that the French have lately made a proposal to this effect, to which they have received an encouraging answer, and that a French agent has been despatched with it to St. Petersburg.

I am, &c.

P. S.—I have seen, and am very well satisfied with, the Persian ambassador. He is preparing to set out for the Turkish camp.

He has not told me the motive of his journey, but I believe it to be, first, to find out whether any negotiations are going on with Russia, and if so, secondly, to connect them with the Persian negotiation.

To Captain Ferguson, H. M. S. Pylades.

Pera, Dec. 2d, 1809.

SIR,

I HAVE received your letter of Nov. 23d, and beg leave to return you my thanks for its contents.

The subject of the recognition of the Republic of the Seven Islands has been a matter in dispute between myself and the Turkish Government ever since the month of April last. The French, on their parts, insist that the Turks, having already acknowledged the Ionian Islands to belong to them, shall not recede from this concession. To avoid offending me on the one hand, and the French on the other, this Government has taken a middle course, and adopts the principle of *possession* as the rule to decide the ques-

tion of the independence of the Islands. In consequence of this, they consider Zante, Cephalonia, Ithaca, and Cerigo, as belonging to England; and Corfu, and the others not yet taken, as belonging to France. Now Corfu being the seat of Government, they say that they cannot admit the Republican flag until that Island also shall fall into our possession; but the moment it does so fall, they will consider the Republican Government as restored under our protection.

It would be tedious and useless to attempt an explanation of all the nonsense which the Turkish ministers have talked to me upon this subject. It will be enough to say that no Firmans can for the present be obtained for any ships carrying the Sept-insular flag. The best thing to be done, therefore, until we can get Corfu, will be to grant the British flag to the Ionians belonging to those Islands actually in our possession.

I wrote both to Brigadier-General Oswald and to Captain Spranger upon this subject on the 11th ult., and enclose you a copy of my letter to General Oswald, which is word for word the same as that which I wrote to Captain Spranger. I also enclose you a copy of the letter I wrote to the commanding officer at Cerigo, the moment I heard of the surrender of that Island to his Majesty's arms.

I have the honour to be, &c.

To Sir Harford Jones.

(Ostensible.)

Pera, Dec. 4th, 1809.

DEAR SIR,

IT is with infinite concern that I find myself under the necessity of laying before his Persian Majesty, through your channel, a formal complaint against the Ambassador whom his Majesty has just sent to this Court.

My last letter will have informed you that I had seen this Ambassador, and that I was pleased with him. On his part, he expressed towards me the highest satisfaction at the visit I made him on his arrival, and the liveliest gratitude for the frank and friendly manner in which I conversed with him on the state of public affairs.

If he has fairly stated the substance of our interview to his Court, he will have acknowledged that I opened myself most unreservedly to him on all matters connected with our common interests; that I gave him much valuable private information for his guidance at a Court which he did not know, and among men to whom he was an utter stranger; that I treated him with the sincerity of a friend, and that I exposed my whole heart to him without artifice or disguise.

Having come from my country house on purpose to see him, and the English palace at Pera not being yet ready for the reception of visits of ceremony, I dispensed with his returning mine, which was, indeed, only a private visit, occasioned by my eagerness to show attention to the representative of a monarch

who, besides possessing every title to my personal respect, was the friend and the ally of the King my master.

Another motive for my relieving him from the trouble of coming to Pera, was his telling me that he expected on the ensuing day to have his audience of the Caimacan, and the day afterwards to set out on his journey to the camp of the Grand Vizir.

I leave you after this to judge of my surprise and mortification when I learned that yesterday this Ambassador had gone in state to the French palace to visit the *Chargé d'Affaires* of France.

To complete the offensive part of his proceeding, he chose for the day of his visit the anniversary of the coronation of Bonaparte, and of the defeat of the Austrians at Austerlitz; a day celebrated by the French agents in all foreign courts with extraordinary solemnity and parade.

Having carefully inquired into the facts connected with this conduct of the Ambassador, I find that a secret intercourse had for some days been established between himself and the French *Charge d'Affaires*, through the medium of Hagi Selim. No trifling aggravation of his misbehaviour is the deceit practised on Mr. Pisani, my chief Dragoman. This gentleman was in constant habits of communication with the Ambassador, yet he never received from his Excellency the slightest intimation either of the visit he had received from the *Chargé d'Affaires*, or of his intention to return it. Both these matters were studiously concealed from Mr. Pisani.

You will judge, after what I here state to you, that I can have no intercourse whatever, either public or private, with this Ambassador; and that even if I

could forget what is due to my own dignity, confidence, the spring and vital principle of concert in the operations of allied powers, must be extinguished for ever, in regard to an individual who has thus openly as well as secretly connected himself with his Majesty's enemies.

I beg of you to lay these matters before his Persian Majesty without delay, and that you will express at the same time my deep regret at the interruption of the good understanding with his Court, which the transaction of which I complain must occasion.

I will not consider this act as a breach of our alliance, although it is most undoubtedly a flagrant violation of its principle. I will content myself for the present with declaring, with all due submission to his Persian Majesty, that if it be his royal intention, which, from your whole correspondence, I cannot doubt it to be, to render the British embassy at Constantinople instrumental in cementing our alliance, that object will be frustrated by the continuance at this Court of the Ambassador whom his Persian Majesty has sent hither. I therefore make it my earnest entreaty that his Majesty would be pleased to recall both him and Hagi Selim, as persons whom I cannot trust, and with whom it will be impossible for me to communicate.

I am, &c.

To Sir Harford Jones.

Pera, Dec. 4th, 1809.

MY DEAR SIR,

MY ostensible letter of this day's date contains what I think will convince you, that I was not wrong

in discouraging the establishment of embassies between the Persian and Turkish Courts.

The conclusion of the armistice *without* your participation, and the unguarded assurance given me by the Persian Ambassador, that it had been concluded *with* your participation, had sufficiently awakened my suspicions to prevent my making any disclosures to him which could affect the public interests, yet my general conversation has been of a nature to take from him all pretence for complaining of reserve in me.

My opinion is, that both this person and the mission with which he is entrusted are most dangerous to us. I believe his journey to the Camp to be a mere pretence, and that his real destination is France.

For this reason I strongly recommend his being recalled without delay; and also that Hagi Selim, who, in plain words, is a French spy, should be recalled also.

If these persons remain, I can have no confidential intercourse with them, and I shall take care they obtain no credit at the Porte. This, if the King of Persia is sincere, must greatly distress him; but, to say the truth, I suspect he is not sincere. Whether he be so or not, his conduct on the present occasion will prove. I leave him, you see, no excuse, by requiring in express terms the recal of this Ambassador, as a person whom I cannot trust, and with whom I will not communicate.

I ought not to omit, that on translating the King's letter to the Sultan it appears very vague and general. It can be of no use to me now under any circumstances.

After this I think you cannot be too cautious in making further advances of subsidy. Indeed it would be advisable for you to be prepared with the means of withdrawing in safety from the Persian Court.

I am, &c.

P. S. — I suspect that negociations for peace will soon be opened between this country and Russia, through the intervention of France.

To Francis Werry, Esq. — The same to Nicolas Strane, Esq.

Pera, Dec. 10th, 1809.

SIR,

HAVING been informed that reports are in circulation that Mr. Dendrino, in order to recover his liberty, had consented to become a Rayà, I hereby authorise you to declare, in the most public maner possible, that the assertion is utterly false.

To confirm the declaration which I thus authorise and enjoin you to make, I enclose you the literal translation from the Turkish of an official note presented to me on the 25th ult. in the name of the Porte.

The occasion of this note was a peremptory demand on the part of the Chargé d'Affaires of France that Mr. Dendrino should be delivered up to him as a subject of France, and a peremptory demand on mine that he should be forthwith set at liberty.

The Porte, after much altercation with both the missions, has at length set him at liberty, and has transmitted to me, on my demand, the written en-

gagement above mentioned, for the security of his person against the machinations of his enemies.

I also authorise you to declare, that Mr. Dendrino has been released without any conditions whatsoever.

I am, &c.

To Sir Harford Jones.

(In cypher.)

Perā, Dec. 22d, 1809.

DEAR SIR,

IN addition to what I communicated to you in my letter of the 4th instant, on the subject of Hussein Han's behaviour, I am now in possession of one most important particular, which may possibly render it necessary for you to bring matters to an immediate explanation with the Persian Government.

For your more exact information, I send you the enclosures, A and B, which contain the substance of what passed at two interviews, which Mr. Chabert had with him, by my orders, after his visit to the French Chargé d'Affaires.

You will remark that in the first of these conversations Hussein Han admits that he knew, even when he was at Erzeroom, of the return of one of the French agents, whose dismissal from the Persian territories you had but a few days before procured. Of this fact he said nothing to me at our interview, which took place towards the end of November. It is in order to excuse his visit to the French Minister that he now boasts of his discovery through it of Bonaparte's intention to send another Ambassador to Persia; a fact which was no secret, and which, if it had been a secret, Hussein Han (as you will perceive)

did not think of communicating to me until I extorted it from him by my message through Mr. Chabert.

But the point to which I chiefly wish to call your attention is the solemn declaration of Hussein Han contained in the enclosure B, that he has no ulterior commission for Paris. I have, with much pains, sifted out the truth of this matter, and I find, from information of which I have every motive to trust the accuracy, that he *has* a commission for Paris, but that he waits for fresh advices from Persia before he sets out to execute it.

On this head the following particulars are just come to my knowledge, and I lose no time in communicating them to you : —

When the two members of the French embassy, who remained after General Gardanne's departure, arrived at Tabrez, they halted there, and addressed the strongest representations, and the most earnest prayers, to the Persian Government to be permitted to remain in the Persian territories. Among other matters they assured the Ministers that some very important despatches from Bonaparte to the Shah were then actually on the road, and that these were of a nature to give his Majesty complete satisfaction on the subject of Russia. On this ground they entreated permission to remain at Tabrez at least until the despatches should arrive. It appears that their representations were at first not wholly disregarded but that through your influence and timely interference their petition was at length rejected, and that in consequence of this they actually quitted the Persian territories. Hussein Han being then in Persia, the information which had been received from

the two French agents, of the expected favourable despatches from Bonaparte, was communicated to him, and he was then secretly and eventually instructed to proceed to Paris, if that information should prove correct.

You see, therefore, that whether the fresh instructions, which Hussein Han expects to receive from Persia, and by which his conduct is to be governed, be in answer to letters which he wrote from Erzerroom, or (what I think is more probable) in answer to letters he despatched after the interview with Mr. Chabert, in either case he has acted towards me with the most consummate duplicity. I am much afraid, however, that his conduct is but a copy of that of his Government, since, whatever may be his expected instructions, the fact of his having left Persia with a commission for Paris in his pocket *is positive*; and, consequently, that not only his protestations to me, but the whole proceedings of his government towards you, are false and deceitful from beginning to end.

The facts which I have stated will give you, I am afraid, the measure of Persian sincerity; but with the ability which so eminently distinguishes you I make no doubt that the knowledge of them will enable you again to defeat the plans of our enemies, although assisted by a set of intriguers in the King's councils, who, by having prevailed on his Majesty to admit Baron Wrede to conclude an armistice (as it appears) without your privity, and to name an embassy to Paris under pretence of sending one to the Turkish camp, must still be considered as forming a most powerful and formidable faction.

It is with a view of assisting you in holding a firm

language to the Persian Cabinet that I have thrown out, as a menace to Hussein Han, *my intention of withholding the ratifications of the peace, which must pass through my Embassy, if he should venture to proceed on his journey to Paris*; and as I have, at the same time, informed him that I write all this to you, and that by you it will be communicated to his Government, I render him responsible with his head for the event. To exchange the ratifications of a treaty already broken would, in effect, be absurd, as well as useless; but as even a broken treaty may be repaired to last its hour, you may be sure that I shall not act as I threaten, or withhold from you an instrument, of the use of which you are the only competent judge. If you should yourself think proper to suspend the exchange, what I have said to Hussein Han will enable you to throw the blame of the delay upon me (which I authorise you to do in the fullest manner), without binding you to continue that suspension longer than you see occasion.

As circumstances have turned out, I am now not sorry that the Turks have come to a determination of sending a person of their own to Persia. This resolution I can assure you is very much occasioned by the conduct of Hussein Han in connecting himself with the French mission at this place. The Turkish Ministers see plainly that Hussein Han is not fit to be trusted, either for reasons personal to himself, or for reasons attaching to his Government, which appears to them to make so light of its engagements with Great Britain. While they acknowledge, therefore, the importance of connecting their operations with Persia, they make no secret to me of their reluctance to enter into engagements with her until they can

discover what the Persian Court really means; and this they profess themselves utterly unable to comprehend, or, from the behaviour of Hussein Han, to comprehend in a sense highly unfavourable to Persian good faith.

I will apprise you when the Turkish Envoy sets out, and will endeavour to get him instructed to co-operate with you in preventing the return of the French mission.

I am, &c.

To Sir Harford Jones.

Pera, Dec. 22d, 1809.

MY DEAR SIR,

I HAVE just received your letters of the 10th of November.

I most truly feel for the numberless embarrassments of which your situation is full, and which are, I am afraid, not likely to be diminished. All is safe indeed on this side, but you require more substantial support than the mission at Constantinople can give you, to prevail over the complicated difficulties by which you are surrounded.

The reports of a misunderstanding between Russia and France were grounded, as I said in my letter of October 1st, on a belief that Bonaparte had resolved to re-establish the kingdom of Poland. He has since disavowed the intention, and, for the present, every thing between him and Russia remains *in statu quo*.

How it may be when the Emperor Alexander comes to learn the contents of a letter which, at the time I am actually writing to you, the Shah must have in

his possession from Bonaparte, is another affair; but for my part I found no hopes on it.

This letter to the Shah was forwarded by a messenger, who met the remains of the French mission on this side of Erzeroum, in consequence of which one of them (I believe the Sieur Joannin) returned to Persia.

The substance of it is as follows: Bonaparte begins by highly disapproving the conduct of General Gardanne, and tells the Shah that he was very near cutting off his head for leaving Persia. After a great many professions of friendship towards Persia, he adverts to the peace made with England, and asks why the Persian Court should, for that reason, go to war with France, and refuse to admit a Minister to reside there? and he adduces the example of the Ottoman Government, which admits the residence at its capital of a Minister from both nations. He then notifies to his Persian Majesty that he has named another Minister for his Court, and *that he is ever determined to fulfil the Treaty of Alliance of 1807, and to compel Russia to evacuate the Georgian Provinces, which nothing but his wars with Spain, Austria, &c. have hitherto deferred.*

Hussein Han is going on at a fine rate with the French. He has had another meeting with the Chargé d'Affaires at his own house on the 7th instant. He has not judged fit to make any communication to me about it either before or since.

I think it will be highly necessary for you to apprise the Governor-General of Bengal of the circumstances contained in my despatches to you of this day's date and of the 4th instant, unless you have already succeeded, or see a reasonable probability of

succeeding, in obtaining the recal of Hussein Han, the disavowal of his proceedings here, and the second expulsion of the French emissary from the Persian territories, whose return does not appear to have been known to you on the 10th of November.

I send you an official copy of Lord Collingwood's letter respecting the destruction of a division of the French Toulon squadron.

I am, &c.

To Sir Harford Jones.

Pera, Dec. 22d, 1809.

DEAR SIR,

THE Reis Efendi having informed me that he is sending off a Tartar to Tæhran to announce the speedy setting out of a Minister from the Sultan to the King of Persia, I seize this opportunity of acquainting you, that it is fully intended by this Government that their Envoy should cultivate your confidence, and act in concert with you in all matters which concern the common good.

As nothing can be more evidently the interest of the Ottoman Government than the prevention of the establishment of a French mission at Tæhran, it is promised me that private instructions shall be given to this Envoy to co-operate with you in all measures you may be taking for that purpose.

I will write more fully to you on this point when the Envoy sets out on his journey.

I am, &c.

To Lord Collingwood.

Pera, Dec. 28th, 1809.

MY LORD,

I HAVE been honoured with your Lordship's letter of October 6th, which reached me on the 29th of November.

In pursuance of your Lordship's suggestion, that it would be advisable that a firman should be sent to you for the eventual passage of a British squadron through the Dardanelles, I lost no time in applying for one to the Reis Efendi.

The motive which induced me to ask for it, notwithstanding the unfortunate termination of the war between Austria and France, which had rendered operations in the Black Sea comparatively of no further importance, will be best explained to your Lordship by my enclosed despatch to Lord Bathurst.*

I send your Lordship the despatch at full length, in order that you may form an opinion with regard to the situation of the English Embassy at the Porte since the fatal event which I have named. It is true that I entertain no apprehensions of a rupture, but your Lordship and your fleet are the principal sources of my security.

After considering the whole of the despatch, your Lordship will, I trust, acknowledge the propriety of my having written so strongly for an augmentation of the force under your command. Independently of the motives I have alleged, and which concern only our interests at the Porte, there is this bad consequence of your having no ships to spare, namely, that

* No. 4.

whenever the enemy gets out from Toulon the blockade of Corfu must be raised. Now if we cannot succeed in getting Corfu before Bonaparte has done his business in Spain, I am afraid we shall have to sustain many a troublesome campaign to save the Morea and Candia, and even Sicily, from falling into his hands.

I have the honour to be, &c.

To C. J. Rich, Esq., Bagdad.

Pera, Jan. 24th, 1810.

DEAR SIR,

I HAVE received the duplicates and triplicates of your letters of October 23d and 26th, likewise duplicates of your letters of November 26th and 27th.

It gives me great concern to find that neither the firman I sent you from hence, nor the private representations which, at my instance, have been made to the Pacha of Bagdad, have engaged him to alter his behaviour towards you. On the receipt of the letters above enumerated, I renewed my complaints to the Porte, but on this occasion I found your adversary had been before me, and that my representation against him was answered, I may say anticipated, by a strong and serious representation against yourself. To this, as you had provided me the means of replying, I paid no other attention than that of telling the Reis Efendi that I was disposed to recommend to you what he had himself recommended to the Vizir, namely, mutual harmony and conciliation; and in answer to his wish that I would also recommend to

you a due attention to the religious prejudices of the inhabitants of your residence, I stated that you had produced sufficient proof to me that you had been guilty of no offence against those prejudices, and that I would transmit no admonition to you, which, under such circumstances, would have the appearance of a censure. The demand of recal or dismissal I would not give myself the trouble to discuss with him.

As the Reis Efendi seems disposed to credit the assertions of the Pacha, or to cover the weakness of the Porte under the pretence of giving credit to them, I can obtain for the present no further satisfaction from him than a promise to take the complaints on both sides into consideration.

It is unfortunate that it did not occur to you to send me some testimonials signed by *Turks* in support of what, I make no doubt, has been your conduct during the course of this unlucky dispute. It may not be too late even now, and I should strongly recommend your applying to the persons whom you mention to me, and whom there is no necessity for my naming in this place, to put into your hands a counter-statement of the transactions complained of so vehemently by the Vizir.

The real difficulty in your case is one which I have hinted to you in a former letter, but on which I cannot enlarge, as I have no cypher you could read, nor any safe conveyance for a letter in clear.

I much wish the difference could be adjusted in some honourable way, as I am shortly about to return to England.

I am, &c.

P. S.—For your information, I subjoin the copy of the Vizir's complaint against you.

To E. F. Chapman, Esq., Malta.

Pera, Jan. 24th, 1810.

SIR,

By the 10th Article of the late Treaty of Peace between Austria and France, liberty, during a term of six years, is granted to the inhabitants of the countries ceded by Austria to remove with their property from the said countries, if they should think proper.

The bearer, Luca Dabovich, a native of Fiume, being desirous of availing himself of this Article, has applied to me to be received under the British protection, and has signified to me his desire of taking the oath of allegiance to his Majesty. I have examined his papers, and inquired fully into his character; and although I do not feel myself competent to administer to him the oath of allegiance, his voluntary renunciation of his country, rather than swear allegiance to the new masters of it, induces me to grant him a passport to proceed with his vessel to Malta, and further to recommend him to the special protection of the commanders of his Majesty's ships of war cruising in the Archipelago, and to his Majesty's civil Government at Malta.

His vessel (the Spartan), being a very fast sailer, and well armed, might be usefully employed in these seas, which swarm with French privateers and French traders from Genoa and Marseilles. If it should be in your power to procure him a letter of marque, I think it could not be better bestowed.

I am, &c.

To Captain Ferguson, H. M. S. Pylades.

Pera, Jan. 25th, 1810.

SIR,

I HAVE received your letter of the 17th inst., informing me of your having captured and brought into Smyrna the French privateer l'Aigle, and her prize, and giving an account of the circumstances attending that capture.

The intolerable proceedings of the crew of this privateer, and their direct and flagrant breach of the laws of neutrality in firing, without provocation, on your boat's crew, left you, in my opinion, no alternative, except that of capturing or sinking the said vessel.

I consequently approve entirely your conduct, and am prepared to justify it to the Porte.

In the present situation of affairs I will not deny that this business may create me some embarrassment when the complaints of the adverse party (which no doubt will be violent) shall be laid before the Porte; but from these, or any other difficulties in which the support of the national honour may involve me, I shall not shrink.

You may depend on my never consenting that the privateer shall be restored to the French. With regard to the prize, I am not quite so clear, although, under any other circumstances than those which press upon us at present, I should, undoubtedly, sustain your right to her, at least, the propriety of your sending her to Malta for adjudication.

No statement from the adverse party having as yet reached this residence, I am unable to say how the

Porte will proceed. I have exhibited the facts contained in your letter, and in the depositions you enclosed to me, in the form of a complaint against the privateer for a double breach of neutrality, first, in landing his guns, and, secondly, in firing upon your boat.

I will despatch a Tartar the moment there appears a prospect of a satisfactory termination to this affair, meanwhile I feel naturally most anxious to prevent the occurrence of any fresh subject of embarrassment in the discussions to which it will inevitably give rise. The great point *now* is to prevent any violence on the part of the Turkish Government at Smyrna, which you may depend upon it will be most strongly solicited, menaced, and even bribed, by the French, to commit some act which may embroil the English embassy with the Porte. If you should have any notice of such intentions on the part of the Smyrna Government, it would be more prudent to prevent them by carrying the prizes to Cerigo.

I am, &c.

To N. Strane, Esq.

Pera, Jan. 28th, 1810.

SIR,

I HAVE received your letter of December 22d, 1809, and will reply to its contents with the first opportunity.

I now lose no time in enclosing you the copy of a paper which has been officially transmitted to me by the Reis Efendi, consisting of extracts from three despatches from his Highness Vely Pacha to the

Porte, complaining of the conduct of the British Government at Zante in raising recruits among the Rayas of the Morea.

It is my duty to inform you that such conduct is in contradiction to our capitulations, and ought, therefore, to be discontinued.

I enclose, likewise, for your information, the copy of my answer to the Sublime Porte*, and having no reason to doubt that the Porte will issue immediate and rigorous orders to stop the recruiting in Albania by the enemy, I request you to transmit to me from time to time whatever information may reach you concerning the due and punctual execution of such orders.

You will be so good as to make known to Brigadier-General Oswald that you have received this letter from me, and to inform him at the same time that I write to him by another channel.

I am, &c.

To Brigadier-General Oswald.

Pera, Jan. 28th, 1810.

SIR,

I HAVE the honour to enclose you the copy of a paper† which has been delivered to me by order of the Porte, accompanied by a strong requisition that the recruiting in the Morea may be discontinued, together with a copy of my answer to the above requisition.

I send you likewise a copy of a letter which, at the desire of the Porte, I have addressed to Mr. Strane

* January 28th.

† Sent under flying seal to Mr. Strane.

upon this subject, and of which the original will be delivered to that gentleman by an officer of Vely Pacha.

Not having any cipher by which I can correspond with Mr. Strane, I have abstained from all observations on this very delicate subject, and confine myself to recommending to him the greatest circumspection in all his proceedings.

I am, &c.

*To Brigadier-General Oswald.**

Pera, Jan. 28th, 1810.

SIR,

I HAVE the honour of acknowledging the receipt of your letter of Dec. 12th, 1809.

With regard to the Sept-insular flag, the Porte has notified to me the following as the rule by which it means to abide under the present circumstances.

1st. Neither to do nor permit any thing to be done which implies that it *now* recognises the Republic.

2d. To recognise the Republic as established by the Treaty of Amiens, whenever we get possession of Corfu.

It would require a volume to detail to you the various disputes I have had with the Turkish Ministers on this question. I shall confine myself, therefore, to mentioning the two motives which have evidently influenced the above determination.

1st. The motive for not recognising the Republic *now* is, — fear of the French; the Minister of that Power having declared, by order of his master, that

* A copy of this letter was sent to Mr. Strane.

such an act would be regarded as a declaration of war. It must be confessed that, in this instance, the French have some colour of right on their side, as it is most certain that General Sebastiani, during the absence of the British Embassy from Constantinople in 1807, did obtain the acknowledgment *de facto* from the Porte, although he could not obtain it by a written instrument, of the annexation of the Seven Islands to the French dominions.

2d. The motive of the Porte for consenting to re-recognise the Republic afresh, whenever we get possession of Corfu, is grounded on the expected re-establishment of its own rights of paramount sovereignty by such an event. The treaty of 1800 between the Porte and Russia, confirmed by all the Powers at the Peace of Amiens, contains an express clause of reservation of sovereignty, *with tribute*, in favour of the Porte; and although, while the Islands were under Russia or France, such a reservation might appear of little value, the Porte may expect to derive some advantage from it, whenever they fall under the protection of Great Britain alone.

Here it becomes necessary for me to state for your information, that not choosing to be the dupe of this double-faced policy on the part of the Turks, immediately on my hearing of the occupation of Zante * by the troops under your command, I presented the enclosed note to the Reis Efendi, demanding categorically an answer, aye or no, to the question contained in it. To this note I knew very well that I should obtain no answer in writing; but my purpose would be fully answered by the line of conduct which the Porte should adopt upon receiving it. Accordingly, by re-

* Oct. 30th, 1809.

fusing to admit the Sept-insular flag into their ports, they have expressly disclaimed and disavowed the existence of the Republic. Next to an express recognition of the Republic, this was what I chiefly wanted, my object being either to secure the immediate advantages attendant upon such recognition, or to get rid of all embarrassing claims of Turkish sovereignty in any future arrangements which his Majesty might think fit to make for the government of the Islands.

Having stated to you the reasons for which the Porte refuses *now* to acknowledge the Republic, and those for which it will consent to acknowledge it hereafter, I proceed to acquaint you with the conduct it has adopted with regard to the Islands actually occupied by his Majesty's forces.

These Islands are considered as under English protection, and the inhabitants as English Rayàs; the Porte therefore admits them *as such*, together with their ships, into the Ottoman harbours, and grants them all the privileges of British subjects.

It strikes me, therefore, that without any formal grant of the British flag, and simply by the act of hoisting it when they go into a Turkish port, and while they remain there, all the purposes of a free intercourse with the Turkish states, whether for trade or provisioning the Islands, would be answered. No questions will be asked. They have only to declare themselves British; and this declaration can be managed entirely between themselves, assisted by our consuls and the officers of the Turkish Government. This, as I have observed, would obviate the necessity of any formal grant of the British flag on our parts, without subjecting the Sept-insulars on theirs to any

thing derogatory to their rights as an independent State, since the adoption of the flag of a more favoured nation is what is practised every day by States who trade with the Porte having no treaties with her, and particularly by the Americans, who are still considered as English Rayàs.

This state of things, however, cannot be of long duration; as either Corfu must fall, or France must quarrel with Turkey, or Turkey with us, before many months elapse. The last of these three cases is by far the least probable.

I am, &c.

To Sir Harford Jones.

Pera, Jan. 30th, 1810.

DEAR SIR,

HAVING been informed by Hagi Hossein that he is going to send off a Tartar to Tabreze in the course of to-morrow, I profit by the opportunity to acknowledge the receipt of your two sets of despatches, of December 27th and January 3rd.

I beg you to lay my most humble respects at the feet of the Prince Royal, and to express my grateful thanks to H. R. H. for his prompt attention to my remonstrances against the conduct of Kerbelai Hossein.

I am preparing an answer to the letter with which H. R. H. was pleased to honour me on that occasion; but the early departure of the Tartar will prevent my being able to finish it in time.

You will have the goodness to mention to H. R. H. that, in consequence of a most pressing request from Meerza Hassan, contained in a letter from that minis-

ter to Hagi Hossein, and from its having been stated to me that it would be a personal accommodation to H. R. H. if Kerbelai Hossein were allowed to remain a few days longer at Constantinople, in order to execute some commissions with which he was charged on the part of H. R. H., I have abstained from pressing his instant departure. He will be ready to set off, however, in a week from this day.

I make a point of his being accompanied by Hagi Selim, whom nothing can restrain from intriguing at the French Palace.

It is my intention to implore H. R. H. to grant his forgiveness to Kerbelai Hossein, whose recall, marked as it is by H. R. H.'s indignation for having visited the French Palace on the 3rd of December, is satisfaction enough for me.

I am, &c.

To Sir Harford Jones.

Pera, Jan. 30th, 1810.

DEAR SIR,

ALTHOUGH I am preparing to despatch a Tartar to you in a very few days, I will not omit informing you by this occasion that your letters announcing the second dismissal of Jouannin reached me just in time to accompany my despatches to Government, in which I gave an account of the conduct of Kerbelai Hossien Han — of the return of Jouannin to the Persian frontier — and of my correspondence with you on these events. No inconvenience, therefore, (as you seem by the last paragraph in your letter of December 27th to apprehend) can possibly result

from the communication which I thought it my duty to make of these transactions, since it will appear at one and the same moment to his Majesty's Government that the intrigues of France had recommenced and had been defeated.

Your despatches of the 3rd inst. were received here on the 26th, and shall be forwarded without delay by an English messenger whom I mean to despatch express with them. I will reply to their contents by the next Tartar. There is a paragraph in your letter to Mr. Morier which I am convinced you will excuse my not *instantly* proceeding upon, as you could make no use of what I should do towards the execution of its directions until the arrival of the ratifications of the Persian Treaty, which may now be expected every day.

The day of the departure of the Turkish Minister for Tehran is not yet fixed. The internal situation of the Government here seems for the present to occupy all the attention of the Divan.

It will be utterly impossible for me to send you one of the dragomans of the Embassy; but I am busily employed in finding some person who may be trusted in matters so important and so delicate as those you mention.

I am, &c.

To Sir Harford Jones.

Pera, Jan 30th, 1810.

DEAR SIR,

I HAVE the satisfaction of informing you that the Porte has complied with the wishes of the Persian

Government, by consenting to re-establish Selim Pacha as Governor-General of Akirea, and to remove Sheriff Pacha. The necessary firmans are despatched to H. R. H. the Prince of Persia by Hagi Hossein this day.

The recommendation of H. R. H. with respect to Cara Bey's appointment to the Pachalic of Cars will also most probably be complied with.

I am, &c.

*To Dr. Sewell, Judge of the Vice-Admiralty Court,
Malta.**

Pera, Feb. 12th, 1810.

SIR,

UNDERSTANDING that there are doubts with regard to the construction of the 3rd Article of the Treaty of Peace signed between the Ottoman Plenipotentiary and myself on the 5th of January, 1809, I take the liberty of sending you, first, a correct Copy of the Treaty, in the original French ; and secondly, an explanation of the intention of the parties in framing the above Article.

English property to a considerable amount having been sequestered soon after the passage of the Dardanelles by Sir John Duckworth, I inserted in my *Projet* the usual condition for its restitution.

In the Turkish *Contre-projet* no notice was taken of this condition ; but another was offered me, including a demand of compensation for the Turkish ships burnt at the passage of the Dardanelles, and proposing restitution on both sides of all merchant

* A copy of this letter was sent to Captain Stewart.

ships, and all other property *captured* during the war. These were the terms of the proposal : —

“ Les vaisseaux de guerre de la Sublime Porte qui ont été brulés par les Anglais dans le détroit de la Mer Blanche seront indemnisés sur un pied exact ; et tout bâtiment marchand, et autres effets et marchandises, qui ont été pris *par les vaisseaux de guerre* de la Sublime Porte, et de part et d'autre, seront entièrement remis et restitués.”

This Article, as well for what it demanded as for what it proposed, was peremptorily rejected by me from the first moment it was produced. It was brought forward at various periods of the negociation, and in many different shapes, accompanied with the most positive assurances that its admission was the *sine quâ non* of peace. It was afterwards attempted to be modified by a restriction to ships of war captured, but not destroyed ; then to merchant vessels only. In short, there was scarcely a form in which it was not offered me, with as little success for the one as for the other. The principle was one which, in my judgment, admitted neither of modification nor of compromise ; consequently there was no other way of disposing of the Article except by rejecting it, which I did *in toto*.

When at length it was abandoned, and we got to the other parts of the Treaty (which was of necessity drawn up in the French language, as the Turkish dragoman knew no other), in settling the Article which relates to the restitution of British sequestered property, the Turkish Plenipotentiary fairly enough demanded that this principle of restitution should be extended to Turkish property *under similar circumstances*. I said that there neither was, nor could be,

any Turkish property under similar circumstances. He assured me that there were (as he was informed) a few Turkish ships lying at Malta at the beginning of the war, on which an embargo had been laid. I replied that the principle did not apply; that there was a wide difference, in cases of war, between property belonging to individuals who were settled in a country under the protection of the laws, and property committed to the chances of the sea; that most probably the ships he alluded to had already been condemned; and if so, that I would not hear of compensation. The point was much debated; the Turk either could not, or would not, comprehend the distinction between property on shore and property afloat. At last I agreed to restore such ships as might upon inquiry be found to have been detained under the embargo, and were not actually condemned at the time of signing the Treaty. This principle seemed to me to be sufficiently provided for in the following Article: —

“ S'il y auraient des effets et propriétés appartenans aux négocians Anglais en sequestre sous la juridiction de la Sublime Porte, ils doivent être entièrement rendus et remis aux propriétaires; *et pareillement* s'il y auraient des effets, propriétés et vaisseaux appartenans aux négocians et sujets de la Sublime Porte en séquestre à Malthe, ou dans les autres isles et états de sa Majesté Britannique, ils doivent être également entièrement rendus à leurs propriétaires.”

It is clear that these words apply to nothing but to the property actually under sequestration in the dominions of the two Powers respectively. Now, Turkish property sequestered at Malta, &c. is, by

the word “*pareillement*,” made to reciprocate in every sense with English property sequestered in Turkey. But there was no English property under that predicament in Turkey, except that which had been seized upon and sealed up by the Government immediately *on the breaking out of the war*. Consequently there is no Turkish property to which the Article can apply, except that which was at Malta at the time of laying on the embargo.

As little can this Article, in my apprehension, be construed to affect captures at sea. These are the acts of individuals; and, as I have already stated, the claim respecting them was rejected by me *in toto*. But sequestration and embargo are acts of Government; and to such acts the Article in question is limited by its very terms.

I have to apologise for troubling you with these details; but I hope that they may not be wholly useless in contributing to the right interpretation of an Article so materially affecting the subjects of the two countries.

I have the honour to be, &c.

To Lord Collingwood.

Pera, Feb. 14th, 1810.

MY LORD,

I RECEIVED your Lordship's letter of 30th Dec., informing me that you had appointed the Frederickstein and the Pylades to protect the trade to Smyrna, and to be in readiness for any further events to which the peace between Austria and France might give

rise at this place. I also received at the same time a letter from Captain Nourse, acquainting me with his arrival at Smyrna.

I beg leave to thank your Lordship for your promptitude in providing for a case which, after the unfortunate termination of the Austrian war, there seemed to be little hope of avoiding.

By a fortunate concurrence of circumstances, however, I have been enabled to keep my ground; and when I last wrote to your Lordship, matters appeared to me so safe, and our peace so secure from all immediate danger, as to justify my quitting a post at which nothing but a point of honour could have detained me so long.

This security is now augmented by the effect which Bonaparte's speech of the 3d of December has produced on the Turkish councils; and I think I can now answer that nothing but the last extremity, and even that not certainly, would induce the Porte to separate from Great Britain.

I will not pretend to say what effect may not be produced by a French and a Russian army of 100,000 men each, directing their march to Constantinople. It is most likely that the Turks would yield, under such circumstances, to any terms of peace to preserve their capital. But this state of things cannot take place so immediately. Spain must be conquered, and many other difficulties must be removed, before France could begin such an expedition; and Russia will require another year before she can assemble and *provide* an army for such a march as she will have to make to carry her share of it into execution.

With all these chances, however, in our favour, we must begin to look about us in the Archipelago. The

Turks, when driven to choose between us and France, will rather consider what power we may have to support them in resisting France, than what power we may have to annoy and dismember their Empire: they will consequently rather leave their Islands exposed to our attacks than run the risk of being driven out of Europe.

In this view of the subject, which is very likely to be brought under your Lordship's consideration before the year is over, it might perhaps be useful to set on foot some inquiries as to the degree of resistance we might meet with in taking possession of Candia, Cyprus, and even Rhodes. I can do little myself towards such inquiries, as there is not a single agent in our service on whom it is possible to depend either for truth or fidelity.

I have the honour to be, &c.

*To Major-General Oakes, Malta.**

Pera, Feb. 14th, 1810.

SIR,

THE friendship which subsists between his Majesty and the Ottoman Porte, the intimate connections which are established with it by treaty, and the deep interest which Great Britain must ever take in the existence of the Ottoman Empire, induce me, on a representation from this Government of the great and pressing necessities of its army, to request most earnestly that you would send up without delay to

* A copy of this letter was sent to Mr. Chapman.

Constantinople a supply of 5000 quintals of gunpowder and 3000 quintals of lead.

In addressing you, which I hereby do, an official demand for these articles, I take the responsibility of furnishing them wholly and solely upon myself.

If it should be possible for you to comply with this demand, no time is to be lost in sending the articles. The danger is great and imminent. The Russian army is receiving prodigious reinforcements, and will take the field in a few weeks; and this Empire is assembling all the troops it can call together to make a last and decisive effort for its preservation.

I am, &c.

P.S. I forward a copy of this letter to his Majesty's Government.

To Sir John Stuart, K. B., Messina.

Pera, Feb. 16th, 1810.

MY DEAR SIR,

* * * I HAVE remained here for these last four months literally from a point of honour, having had nothing to do, since the Austrian Peace, which deserved the sacrifice of time, health, and patience which I am obliged every day to endure afresh. But the Austrian Peace, by bringing the French boundary down to the Save, and by putting France in possession of almost all Croatia, encouraged our enemies to renew their attempts to get the English Embassy sent away from hence, and consequently obliged me to stay to make what head against them I could. All sorts of idle

reports were spread about when the news of this fatal peace arrived, (and by none more industriously than by our own countrymen); so that my departure at that moment, besides bearing the appearance of an abandonment of my post in a moment of difficulty, would really have caused an alarm attended with considerable public inconvenience. I have remained, therefore, until now, when the French, after repeated unsuccessful assaults, have given up all further attack upon me.

The truth is, that these Turks see that they have not a friend in the world except Great Britain, and know very well that they would gain nothing from either France or Russia even by consenting to a fresh rupture with us. They are convinced that they are marked out for destruction, so they have taken their resolution to support their engagements with us till the very last extremity. I find no harm, however, in reminding them civilly every now and then that Lord Collingwood is not far off, and that he has received a large reinforcement from home, together with most extensive powers with regard to its employment.

No negotiations for peace are going on with Russia. I have endeavoured in every way to ascertain this point; and the result is, that I may safely say that the Turks will try another campaign before they consent to give up Walachia and Moldavia. All this resolution would be very well if they possessed the means of recovering these provinces, either by war or negotiation; but the fortresses of the Danube are all gone, and they have not a point at which they can cross the river to advance. They seem to forget too that this campaign will not leave them as it found them; and they don't consider that, unless they make peace with Russia directly, France will come into the contest, and

that then they will be too happy to escape with surrendering the provinces on the Danube to Russia, the Morea to France, and with acknowledging the independence of Servia. But my opinion is, that they would not get even such good terms as these. There is a chance, if they were *now* to make peace with Russia, that that Power would not be so ready to assist France in her views on Albania and the Morea. But if they enter upon another campaign it will be too late. That cannot be finished before France is ready to come forward; and when she once puts herself in motion with Russia, there is an end of the Turkish Empire in Europe.

The Russian army has withdrawn itself from this side of the Danube, and is assembling at Bucharest. If so, there can be little doubt that their plan is to march into Servia. Once in possession of that country, and holding Walachia and Moldavia, Constantinople is at their mercy.

Immense levies are ordered throughout the Turkish dominions; but there is neither money, nor arms, nor provisions, nor camp equipage, nor ammunition, nor any thing. I have begged 5000 quintals of gunpowder for them from Malta, but God knows whether I shall get it. If you could assist me in this matter, it would really be serving Turkey, and, upon the whole, I think she deserves it. * * *

To Marquis Wellesley.

Pera, Feb. 22d, 1810.

MY LORD,

THINKING that your Lordship may wish to know as distinctly as possible the time at which I propose leaving Constantinople, I take the liberty of acquainting your Lordship that I mean at all events to wait the arrival of such instructions as your Lordship may honour me with, after having considered those parts of my despatches brought by Basilico to which an answer may appear necessary.

The peace concluded with Persia, and the plans of connection and alliance between Persia and Turkey suggested by the Shah, are subjects also on which I am peculiarly anxious to learn your Lordship's sentiments; especially as the Ambassador from the Sultan to the Shah has not yet set out from Constantinople, and as I have reason to think it may be in my power to influence the instructions with which he will be charged.

On the supposition, therefore, that by the return of Mr. James Morier with the ratification of the Persian Treaty your Lordship may acquaint me with the system intended to be pursued with regard to the union or separation of these great Mohammedan Powers, and on the supposition likewise that Mr. Morier is already far advanced in his voyage hither, I think it my duty to delay for the present the demand of my audience of leave.

Your Lordship therefore, by allowing about two months for Mr. Morier's voyage from England to Constantinople, will be able to determine pretty exactly the time at which I shall set out.

I except the very unlikely case of Mr. Morier bring-

ing me any instructions from your Lordship towards the execution of which it may appear that my personal exertions are necessary.

I have the honour to be, &c.

*To Mr. Morier, Mr. Werry, Capt. Leake, Mr. Strane,
Sir H. Jones, Mr. Rich, Mr. Barker, Mr. Chapman
(Malta), Mr. Foresti, Mr. Charwaud, Mr. Lusieri.*

(Circular.)

Pera, Feb. 22d, 1810.

SIR,

His Majesty having been graciously pleased to permit me to return to England, I have to acquaint you that, unless very unexpected events should detain me, it is my intention to leave Constantinople whenever the season becomes favourable.

I should long ago have executed this intention had I not perceived that the peace between Austria and France, and especially that article of the Treaty which carries the boundary of France to the Save, had revived a hope in our enemies of engaging the Porte to break with Great Britain.

France had insisted on having Croatia, evidently with a view of dictating the law at Constantinople. That her first act of good neighbourhood towards the Turks would be to compel them, if possible, to go to war with us, no man could doubt. That she would succeed, I never had the slightest apprehension. Yet, with the fullest reliance on the good faith and honour of the Porte, I did not think it right to quit the affairs of the British Embassy in a moment of even

apparent difficulty, nor to sanction by my sudden departure the idle reports that had been disseminated of approaching hostilities with this country.

The event has in every way answered my expectation. The threats of France are disregarded: every demand injurious to our friendly relations with Turkey has been rejected with indignation: and our enemies are themselves convinced that they will best consult their own interest by abstaining from a repetition of their offensive proposals.

Under these circumstances I quit the Embassy, without a fear for the stability of the peace, and with the assurance that this powerful empire is determined to assert its independence to the last, to adhere to its treaties, and, if necessary, to put forth its whole force to maintain them.

I am, &c.

To C. J. Rich, Esq., Bagdad.

Pera, Feb. 22d, 1810.

DEAR SIR,

I SEND you by this opportunity a circular addressed by me to his Majesty's Consuls and other officers in the Levant, announcing my intended speedy departure from Constantinople.

I send you likewise two Turkish copies of certain passages in Bonaparte's speech to the French Legislative Assembly, which materially concern the Ottoman empire.

I would much recommend it to you to endeavour to render this latter communication serviceable to-

wards an accommodation between yourself and the Vizir. *My* situation at Constantinople had for many months been extremely unpleasant, in consequence of the reviving ascendancy of French influence in the Divan; but this lucky *sortie* of Bonaparte has enabled me to make up all my differences with the Ministers, and to secure our peace against every hazard for the present.

My former letter to the Vizir does not preclude your communicating the Turkish extract to him *in my name*, accompanied with any thing conciliatory you may think proper to add.

Believe me, dear Sir, &c.

To Sir Harford Jones.

Pera, Feb. 20th, 1810.

DEAR SIR,

I SEND enclosed a duplicate of my letter to you of January 30th. It is with much concern that I have now to add what follows:

At the expiration of the ten days allotted to Kerbelai Hossein for his stay at Constantinople, — a period, I may say, agreed upon between him and me for the execution of his commissions for the Prince Royal, — finding that no preparations were made for his departure, I sent to inquire the reason of the delay. After hearing a variety of shuffling and contradictory excuses, I found myself under the necessity of making use of the authority which, from your letter of December 27th, and from the orders *said* to be sent to Hagi Hossein, placing the whole of the

Persian mission at Constantinople under my directions, I conceived to be vested in me, and I summoned Kerbelai Hossein, by an official message, to obey forthwith the command conveyed to him by the Prince's firman.

On receiving this message Kerbelai Hossein, finding all further prevarication ineffectual, threw off the mask at once. He denied my authority to remove him from Constantinople; declaring that he would not quit it in a manner which, as he pretended, bore a character of disgrace. He affirmed that he was accountable to his Sovereign alone for his conduct, and protested that nothing should make him stir until the arrival of Mirza Ameen.

At the hour I am writing the Grand Vizir has sent him his answers for the Shah and the Prince Royal. The Reis Efendi has sent him two messages to quicken his departure. Hagi Hossein *informs* me that on his part he has represented to him in the strongest manner the indecency and impropriety of his conduct in persisting to stay. All is to no purpose. From submission and repentance, from humbly imploring me, which he did when first the Prince's letter arrived, not to insist on his instant departure, as that would prove his utter ruin, this man now sets me openly at defiance, and braves me in a tone and language which bespeak a man conscious of his strength, and sure of being supported.

It is fit that you should be informed of these particulars. I hope and trust that they will not be found connected with graver matter than the mere personal character of Kerbelai Hossein, but I confess to you that I am not without my fears that all is not right at the court which employs him.

These fears are strengthened by your letter of December 27th. Kerbelai Hossein's commission even then was represented to you as merely that of a messenger to *Asker Khan*. Neither his language nor his conduct at this place, nor the conduct observed towards him by the French Minister, correspond with that description of his quality.

The French Chargé d'Affaires received his visit with the honours due to a minister of the second rank; testified at all times the utmost anxiety to forward him on his journey; and even presented an official note for his passports.

In a conversation with the Reis Efendi, before the arrival of the Prince Royal's firman, in which that minister endeavoured to dissuade him from prosecuting his journey, representing the ill impressions which the Court of Persia would give of its sincerity by sending a new minister to France so immediately after having bound herself to England to break off all connection with that country, Kerbelai Hossein constantly replied and reasoned as a man invested with an official character, and bound to obey his orders. He went further. He took occasion in this very conversation to complain to the Reis Efendi of the manner in which he had been treated by the Porte; representing that he had received none of those attentions due to the envoys of a Prince so powerful and so much the friend of Turkey as his master.

This, and much more, I had from the Reis Efendi himself. But it is not all. I know with what caution information is always to be received for which money is paid. When proceeding from direct sources, however, it is not to be neglected. Information of this description has been given to me, grounded on Ker-

belai Hossein's own acknowledgment, *that he was going to Paris to replace Asker Khan.*

For the circumstances in which this commission for Paris originated I refer you to my cyphered letter of December 22d. I refer you to the enclosure (B) in that letter for his denial of it, and for his treating the report as the mere fabrication of the French to create mischief.

I offer no comment on the breach of his solemn promise not to set out for the Vizir's camp until the receipt of further advices from Persia. I will only say, that he had his foot in the stirrup (I speak nearly to the letter) when the firman of recall was delivered to him.

On his being afterwards reproached with all this complicated duplicity towards me, he said that he had not been instructed to acquaint me with more of his proceedings than such as related to his journey to the Vizir's camp. In his interview with me he declared the very reverse, assuring me that he had been strictly ordered to consult with me, and to follow my advice in all things.

To conclude, why should he have been dispatched to Constantinople unknown to *you*? His journey was not so trifling in its object as not to deserve being mentioned, since the ministers judged it of sufficient importance to furnish him with strong recommendations to *me*.

In short, my dear Sir, the more I reflect on this man's conduct, beginning from his ostentatious visit to the French Palace, and ending with his bold refusal to obey the firman recalling him to Persia, the more am I compelled to suspect that there is something at the bottom of the conduct of the Court of Persia not

quite fair towards Great Britain. Much I admit is done towards breaking off all intercourse with France, but that intercourse is not yet broken off. Neither do the facts I have detailed to you in my late correspondence justify my believing, were I to judge from those facts alone, that there is as yet a serious intention of coming to that absolute and total rupture with France to which I have understood the Court of Persia to be pledged.

Let me add, for your information, that the French Minister denies the fact of Joannin's second dismissal, and asserts that he is at Tehran. This, to be sure, is mere boasting, but I confess it surprises me not to see him at Constantinople. If his dismissal had been peremptory, would he continue to hover over the Persian frontier?

All these circumstances considered, I must entreat you, in presenting the enclosed letter to the Prince Royal, to observe, — First — that the gracious intentions of his Royal Highness that a satisfaction should be made to me by Kerbelai Hossein for the public affront offered by him to the British Embassy, have been defeated by this man's positive and peremptory refusal to do that which he was ordered to do as a satisfaction, and which alone I could consider as such.

Secondly — That the worst public effect is produced by this disobedience of Kerbelai Hossein. I beg of you to remark to his Royal Highness, that in compliance with the wishes of his Persian Majesty, and with a view of binding our interests together by the strongest ties, I have been for these last six months labouring to remove all impediments in the way of an union between Persia and Turkey: that

although, from long habits of jealousy and mistrust, the task was most difficult, I had of late succeeded in overcoming the principal obstacles to its accomplishment: that much of my success had been owing to the representations I never ceased to make of the frank, the steady, and the decided conduct of the Court of Persia in her recent transactions with Great Britain. In this improved situation of our prospects, and after I had removed the doubts excited in the minds of the Ottoman Ministers by the conduct of this Kerbelai Hossein, how mortifying to us all—how hurtful to the common cause, must it not prove, to see those doubts revive, and to find them countenanced by an act of contumacy on the part of this very same agent, too bold and too flagrant to be accounted for, except on the supposition of his feeling secure of protection from his Court?

With all this I beg you, however, to entreat his Royal Highness, in my name, to inflict no other punishment on Kerbelai Hossein than such as may render him fully sensible of his ill conduct. The chief point is to remove the bad impressions which that conduct has produced on the Turkish Government. What regards my own person is the last thing in my thoughts.

The bad impressions I notice are unhappily revived just as the Turkish envoy, appointed to reside at the Court of Tehran, is setting out on his mission. His instructions to act confidentially with you will not be altered, but you cannot wonder if he be instructed at the same time not to trust too much to the apparent alliance between Great Britain and Persia. How greatly this want of confidence may injure our affairs, no man can judge better than

yourself. But you must admit also that the Turks reason fairly on this matter, in their view of the insincerity of a Persian connection. They set out with professing the utmost mistrust of Persia. They say that the only thing to which they would trust for the performance of any of her engagements is her alliance with Great Britain. While this alliance lasted, Turkey might perhaps feel safe in entering into a treaty with Persia. They might trust Persia for our sakes — they would not for her own; but if, at the very moment of contracting such an engagement, the conduct of Persia towards Great Britain herself was equivocal, where was the hope that it would be fair towards Turkey? I confess I see no answer to this objection, except by denying the fact of any change of system in the Court of Tehran.

I am waiting anxiously for your answers to my letters of December 22, 1809. They will have enabled you, probably, to clear up every doubtful part of this business, and to convince me of the futility of my fears.

I am, &c.

To the Prince Royal of Persia, Abbas Meerza.

Constantinople, Feb. 20th, 1810.

MOST ILLUSTRIOUS PRINCE!

My heart was gladdened beyond what it can express when I received the letter with which your Royal Highness has honoured me, full of assurances of your Royal Highness's goodwill towards myself, and containing so undoubted a proof that your Royal

Highness will not suffer the glorious alliance which, under your auspices, has been completed between Persia and Great Britain, to be disturbed by the restless intrigues of our enemies.

My excellent and enlightened colleague Sir Harford Jones will inform your Royal Highness, that the gracious and friendly intentions conveyed to me in your most precious letter, and accompanied by a firman from your Royal Highness, ordering Kerbelai Hossein immediately to return to your Royal presence, have, by the disobedience of that officer, not been attended with effect.

It is with much regret that I inform your Royal Highness, that both Kerbelai Hossein and Hagi Selim are devoted to the French, and act in all things as that party pleases. Our affairs at this Court never can go on well while either of these two persons are suffered to remain at Constantinople. I have in vain informed them that it was my wish that they should depart, and that it was your Royal Highness's command that they should act in compliance with my directions. They give themselves up to French agents, by whom they are advised to remain here.

A more pleasing task is that which I now perform, in acquainting your Royal Highness with the arrival in London of the most excellent Meerza Abdul Hassan on the 5th of December. He was received with the highest distinction by the Government, and by the noble and illustrious personages of the English nation. On his arrival nothing was heard but the sound of triumph and rejoicing, and the people shook hands in the streets, and congratulated each other on the union of our two powerful empires.

The ceremonial of his presentation to the King was

to take place a few days after the time at which this account left England. I am, therefore, in the expectation of the speedy return of Mr. Morier with the ratification of our happy treaty. On that occasion it is a matter beyond all doubt that all complaints will be removed, and that your Royal Highness will see, and be convinced of, the high and unalterable esteem of the King, my master, for his Persian Majesty, your Royal Highness's invincible Father. Friendly alike to the person and to the Crown of his Persian Majesty, my most gracious Sovereign the King of England will omit nothing, on his part, to render indissoluble the union now subsisting between the two empires.

I humbly request your Royal Highness to accept the expression of the sentiments of high admiration, and of lively gratitude with which I have the honour to be, &c.

To Sir Harford Jones.

Pera, Feb. 25th, 1810.

MY DEAR SIR,

I SEND you some newspapers, down to the 11th of December. You will see by them that Meerza Abdul Hassan arrived in London the beginning of December, and that he was received with extraordinary honours and attention. The strange state of *Ministerial* affairs may possibly have delayed the sending out the ratifications, but there can be no doubts with regard to ratifying the treaty, and of this I hope the

assurance at the present moment will enable you to keep the high ground you have hitherto stood upon at the Court of Persia. Among the *possible* causes of delay in sending the ratifications, may not the circumstance of the Marquis Wellesley's appointment to the Foreign Office, be one? May he not (whatever his opinion may be in favour of annexing to the Government of Bengal, which he so long directed, the controlling power over the Persian mission,) see the necessity, under the circumstances which will have come to his knowledge, of making some arrangement satisfactory both to his Persian Majesty and the Governor General, to be communicated to each at the time of exchanging the ratifications and settling the mission on a permanent basis? and may not the extreme difficulty of such an adjustment require more time than our impatience can at first conceive to be necessary? I think this very likely; but it leads me to no fear about the ultimate issue, which must be favourable to the treaty, and to you as the negotiator of it.

The situation of the English embassy here is, now, all that I can wish. The foolish insult passed by Bonaparte on the Porte (calling it, with affectation, *l'Empire de Constantinople*) has strengthened my hands prodigiously, and enabled me to preserve *le haut du pavé*. I send you with this letter an extract in Turkish of the offensive parts of Bonaparte's speech. It may not be useless, perhaps, to translate it into Persian, as there is an expression in that part which relates to Walachia and Moldavia, which must render it clear to Persia that the union of Bonaparte with Russia can have no effect favourable to her views for the recovery of Georgia.

You may assure the Persian Government that the Porte is determined to try seriously this campaign what it can do for the recovery of Walachia and Moldavia. Many efforts have been making to bring about negotiations, but as the basis of any negotiation on the part of Russia is ever the cession of these provinces, and as neither the Ministers dare propose it to the Sultan, nor the Sultan (if he were willing) to the people, there will in my opinion be nothing done until the end of the year. What may happen then is beyond my powers of prophecy.

I have very little hopes from Spain. The Cortes are not to meet until the 1st of March, at which time it may be doubtful whether they can meet on Spanish ground. When they do meet, it is again doubtful whether they will take the proper measures to save the country.

I am, &c.

P.S.—I add a copy of Bonaparte's speech to the French legislative body, likewise some extracts from the French papers, by one of which you will see that Asker Khan is at Paris, *very well settled there*.

To Sir Harford Jones.

Pera, Feb. 25th, 1810.

DEAR SIR,

I HEREWITH enclose you an extract from my despatch to the Secretary of State of Jan. 10, in which

No. 7.

I offer my opinion to his Majesty's Government with regard to your second advance of subsidy to the Court of Tehran.

I am, &c.

To E. F. Chapman, Esq., Malta.

Pera, Feb. 27th, 1810.

SIR,

THE Ottoman Government having refused to order the British property captured on board the *Madonna Caligata* to be delivered up, I have found myself under the necessity of laying the case before his Majesty's Government, and of asking for instructions as to my further conduct on that business.

Understanding that the two French vessels captured by Captain Jackson, of H. M. S. *Herald*, have not yet been delivered up according to the sentence of the Vice-Admiralty Court, I take the liberty of suggesting to you the propriety of detaining them by the authority of Government until such time as an answer can be received to my despatch on the subject of the *Madonna Caligata*, from his Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

I am, &c.

To Mr. John Lee, Smyrna.

Pera, Feb. 27th, 1810.

SIR,

As I am speedily about to set out for England, and as I wish to render my return as useful as possible to our common interests, I shall make no apology for troubling you on a subject of which every day's experience proves to me the great importance; I mean, the American trade. Not only my own attention has been much called to this matter of late, but it has awakened the attention and even the jealousy of the Turkish Government to such a degree as to render some arrangement absolutely necessary. I set out with telling you that I am, on principle, friendly to the American trade; but before I encourage it, I must be sure that its extension will not be hurtful to our own; and then I do think we have a right to the thanks, at least, of the Americans for whatever we may do in their favour. Exclusion is impossible, even if right. They would come in, either through France or through Russia, neither of which would suit us.

As it now becomes necessary, therefore, that his Majesty's Government should adopt some settled principle of action with respect to Americans trading to the Levant *as British subjects*, and as any system we may resolve upon must have its foundation in facts, I take the freedom of requesting you, Sir, whose zeal for the interests of your country, and whose extensive information on this particular point, have long been known to me, to furnish me with such comparative accounts as it may be in your power to procure:

1st. Of the trade carried on in British and American bottoms since the signature of our peace with Turkey.

2dly. Under a separate head, the proportion of colonial produce imported at Smyrna in British and American bottoms.

3dly. Any other general information calculated to show the increase or diminution respectively of the British and American commerce.

As I most probably shall not leave this place before the end of March, you will have ample time (supposing it to be in your power to spare it from your other concerns) to transmit to me your opinion on these topics. I hope, on my arrival in England, to convert them to the public benefit; and believe me, Sir, I shall have great satisfaction in mentioning the source from which the information I hope to receive will be derived.

I am, &c.

To Sir Harford Jones.

Pera, March 3d, 1810.

DEAR SIR,

SINCE the arrival of your despatches of Feb. 3d, I have made another ineffectual effort to get Kerbelai Hossein away from this place. He sets me absolutely at defiance, and says plainly he *will* not go until the arrival of Meerza Ameen.

The truth is, that he has been persuaded to wait the arrival of Joannin, in order that he may be the bearer of Bonaparte's letter, or of such other propo-

sals as may be received here from Paris, relative to the re-establishment of the French Mission.

In fact, Joannin arrived yesterday at Constantinople. During the whole of the preceding day the intercourse between Kerbelai and the French Palace had been incessant.

All this had a very bad effect with the Turks. Yesterday, on my applying to the Reis Efendi for a good house to be prepared for Meerza Ameen, he said that every attention should be paid to my wishes, but that he expected no good from any connection with the Persian Court. He *was sure* that Kerbelai would *not dare* to act in opposition to the orders of the Prince Royal, unless he were encouraged so to do by his Court.

I had a long interview yesterday with the Turkish Envoy, who is about to proceed to Tehran. He is a very respectable and sensible old man, a thorough Turk, who is convinced of the necessity of uniting England and Turkey by the closest ties, and who would wish to engage Persia in the same cause, if Persia can be got to act fairly. He assures me that this is the principal, if not the sole, object of his mission, and as he means to be on the most confidential terms with you, he entreats me to urge you to similar confidence in return. He only waits for some money to set out on his journey, but this Government is dreadfully poor.

Fresh propositions of peace from Russia, on the basis of ceding Walachia and Moldavia, have been received and rejected. The Turks are determined on another campaign.

* * *

To the Duc de Sierra Capriola, St. Petersburg.

Pera, le 11 Mars, 1810.

MONSIEUR LE DUC,

J'AI l'honneur de vous avertir que le Baron Hubsch, Chargé d'Affaires du Dannemarc à la Porte, a eu le 8 de ce mois une conférence avec les Ministres dans laquelle il leur a présenté une lettre de Mons. de Romanzoff en date du 10 Janvier, dont voici à peu près le contenu : —

“ Qu'il lui écrivait par ordre de l'Empéreur pour témoigner l'étonnement de S. M. I. de l'indifférence de la Sublime Porte au sujet des ouvertures de paix que S. M. lui avait si souvent faites. Qu'autant que S. M. désirait de terminer cette guerre, autant Elle était surprise de voir le Gouvernement Ottoman si peu attentif à son véritable intérêt en abandonnant les cités Saintes de Mecque et de Medine, où la souveraineté du Sultan n'est plus reconnue, et où il n'y a que des habitans Musulmans, et en attachant tant de prix à deux Provinces où les habitans sont tous Grecs, et qui par conséquent devraient plutôt appartenir à la Russie qu'à la Turquie. Que l'Empéreur Alexandre prenait un grand intérêt à l'indépendance de l'Empire Turc, et lui proposait la paix comme une chose essentielle à sa conservation. Que le Baron Hubsch était autorisé de faire cette communication au Ministère Ottoman, et de lui observer en même tems que l'Empéreur n'avait point, jusqu'alors, poussé la guerre avec toute la vigueur dont il était capable ; mais qu'une fois recommencée par le refus de la Porte d'accepter les conditions proposées, il se pouvait bien qu'une bataille décisive ferait approcher les armées

Russes jusqu'à la capitale de l'Empire, et obligerait S. M. à *la fin* d'entrer dans le nouveau système."

Le Baron Hubsch fit lecture aussi d'une lettre de son collègue l'Envoyé du Dannemarc à St. Pétersbourg, qui contenait une exhortation à la Porte de prêter l'oreille aux ouvertures actuelles, en y ajoutant qu'un refus pourrait amener les choses à un point où la Porte se trouverait dans la nécessité absolue *d'entrer dans le Système du Continent*.

Après l'avoir écouté jusqu'à la fin, le Reis Efendi fit sentir au Baron Hubsch tout ce que l'ingérence d'un Ministre Danois avait de déplacé à cette occasion ; et il a éconduit le dit Baron en l'assurant que le peuple Musulman se leverait en masse plutôt que de consentir au démembrement des deux Principautés ; qu'ils regardent comme le grenier de la Roumelie et de la capitale.

Hubsch ayant insisté sur une réponse catégorique avec laquelle il allait envoyer son fils à St. Pétersbourg, le Reis Efendi lui repliqua qu'il n'avait qu'à écrire ce qu'il venait d'entendre de sa bouche ; qu'au reste il prendrait les ordres de S. H., et les lui ferait connoître par son dragoman.

Cette communication m'a été faite en toute confiance par le Reis Efendi lui-même. Il a ajouté que la Porte avait maintenant les yeux ouverts sur tout : — que la France, après mille trahisons, avait fini par se démasquer elle-même : que jamais la Porte ne se servirait ni de cette voie là, ni de celle du Danne-marc, pour entrer en négociation avec la Russie : qu'elle n'avait d'autre amie que l'Angleterre, à laquelle elle était résolue de rester invariablement attaché, arrive qui pourra.

D'après ce que je viens de vous exposer M. le Duc,

vous sentirez bien que s'il est question d'obtenir des Turcs la cession des Provinces par la voie de la négociation, ce n'est que l'Angleterre qui peut les y conduire. Il s'en suivra qu'il serait d'un grand intérêt pour la Russie de nous faire entrer dans les ouvertures pacifiques qu'Elle fait à la Porte. La Russie n'a absolument rien à démêler avec l'Angleterre, qui remplirait dans les conférences plutôt le rôle de médiateur que de partie belligérante. Cependant il ne faudrait pas non plus qu'Elle compte pour rien une paix que nous desirons sans doute, mais dont nous n'avons pas besoin.

Je dois ici vous observer que puisque le Gouvernement Turc refuse de s'ouvrir au Baron Hubsch, la réponse avec laquelle ce nouveau pacificateur va expédier son fils à St. Petersburg ne contiendra rien moins que les vrais sentiments de la Porte. Le motif de cette réticence est très simple. On sait ici que cet agent Saxo-Danois n'est ni plus ni moins que serviteur dévoué de Monsieur de Maubourg, et qu'ainsi toute communication qui pourrait lui être faite passerait de suite entre les mains des Français, dont on connoit la mauvaise foi, et le désir de voir s'éterniser les embarras de la Porte et de la Russie. Je puis me flatter d'être beaucoup plus dans leur confiance. C'est par une suite de nos liaisons, qui se fortifient de jour en jour, que je crois entrevoir que la Porte, tout en déclarant à Monsieur Hubsch qu'Elle ne veut entendre parler de rien que du *status quo* avant la guerre, serait disposée à désister beaucoup de cette prétention pourvu qu'on leur rend la paix supportable en ne pas insistant sur la cession des deux Provinces en totalité. Il est de mon devoir de l'autre côté d'assurer Votre Excel-

lence que la résolution est prise de tenter le sort des armes plutôt que de souscrire à cette dernière condition.

J'ai l'honneur d'être, &c.

To Major-General Oakes, Malta.

Pera, March 13th, 1810.

SIR,

HAVING been again most earnestly solicited by the Turkish Government to apply to you for the supply of powder and lead mentioned in my letter of the 14th of February, I take the liberty of requesting you to send by H. M. S. Salsette, whatever quantity it may be in your power to spare within the quantity specified in the above letter.

I have the less scruple in troubling you with this second application, as the want of these necessary articles in the Turkish armies is so great, that their taking the field, or not, a month sooner, will depend on their obtaining this assistance.

The Russians, in great force, wait only the issue of a fresh proposal they have just made for peace, to commence operations. The proposal has been rejected.

If you will send at the same time the price of the articles, I may be able to procure payment for them from the Turkish Government, although I confess that such was not the principle on which I made the application, nor what I would recommend his Majesty's Government to insist upon.

I am, &c.

*To Francis Werry, Esq., Major-General Oakes, and
E. F. Chapman, Esq.*

Pera, March 13th, 1810.

SIR,

THE Prince de Neuwied, (who will deliver this letter to you under the adopted name of the Count de Braunsberg,) and his companion the Count de Hartopp, are Austrian officers of the most distinguished merit, who, in consequence of the peace between Austria and France, have entered into the Spanish service with the rank of lieutenant-colonel. They have been recommended to me in a very particular manner, by persons of high rank and of the first military talents at Vienna, and I beg leave to request that you would show them all the attention and countenance that may be in your power.

The principal object is to get them to Cadiz as soon as possible. And I should hope it would not be difficult to get them a passage on board any ship of war that may be going that way.

I am, &c.

To Barth. Frere, Esq., Seville.

Pera, March 13th, 1810.

DEAR SIR,

THE Prince de Neuwied, who will deliver you this, has a letter for Lord William Bentinck, from General Nugent, aid-de-camp to the Archduke John; and he

will thank you to put him in a way of forwarding it. The Count de Hartopp was in great favour with the Archduke Charles, with whom he served in all the hard-fought battles of Ratisbon, Aspern, and Wagram.

You know most probably that measures have been taken to engage Austrian officers of merit, who have been reduced by the peace, and who may show an inclination for the Spanish service. I take this opportunity of apprising you that the plan has had great success, and that many officers of excellent military character have already agreed with the person left by M. Bardaki to direct the business, and only wait for the means of reaching Spain.

I have the satisfaction of informing you that the aspect of affairs at this place is highly favourable to the continuance of our peace with Turkey. All the efforts of our enemies to produce a rupture with Great Britain have tended only to confirm more strongly the connection between the two countries.

Fresh offers of peace have just been made to the Porte by Russia; but as they are grounded on the cession of Walachia and Moldavia, they have been peremptorily (I think too peremptorily) rejected. Russia has lowered her tone very much in the last overtures. She no longer demands the dismissal of the English Embassy, but confines herself to declaring that *if* her present offer shall be rejected, she means to push the war with so much vigour, that the Porte may find itself at last obliged to accede to the Continental System.

We have rumours here, apparently from authentic sources, that a fundamental change has taken place in the Russian administration, and that a council of

thirty-five has been nominated exclusively to determine on all questions of peace and war. If the moderated tone of this last overture be the first result of this change, we may reasonably hope for still happier effects from it.

I am, &c.

To Lord Amherst, Palermo.

Pera, March 14th, 1810.

MY LORD,

As your Lordship may probably be desirous of knowing in what state I am about to leave our affairs at the Porte, I take this opportunity of informing your Lordship briefly as follows: —

Ever since the peace between France and Austria, the French have been endeavouring, by threats, promises, and intrigues, to obtain, first, the removal of the English Embassy, or, secondly, the reduction of its influence and consideration to such a point as to render its existence at Constantinople incompatible with the honour and dignity of the British name.

It were long to tell by what means I have been able to resist those efforts. Suffice it to say, that our enemies have completely failed in their object; that they have lost their own consideration in the attempt; and that the Porte is now thoroughly aware of the views of France against its own territory and independence.

Such a state of things enables me to avail myself of his Majesty's gracious permission to quit Constantinople; and I hope to embark early next month in

the Salsette frigate, leaving Mr. Stratford Canning in the character of his Majesty's minister plenipotentiary.

Matters between the Porte and Russia are, to all appearance, as unfavourable as ever to peace. To put your Lordship in possession of their exact state, I subjoin a Copy of my last Despatch* to the Secretary of State.

I wish I could say that the Turks are in a condition to support the refusal they so resolutely repeat, to negotiate on the proposed basis. But at the moment that I have the honour of writing to your Lordship, so far from having a chance of recovering the Provinces for which they contend, they do not appear to be able to resist the progress of the Russian arms to the very heart of their dominions.

The plan of the Russian campaign is to enter Servia by Viddin, and to throw in a second body of troops, under convoy of their fleet, from Sebastopolis into Roumelia. France will form a diversion by means of pretended rebel troops on the frontiers of Bosnia, and will thus facilitate the junction of the two Russian armies at Adrianople.

If this should take place, (and I see nothing to prevent it,) the capital can be saved only by its not having been yet agreed upon between France and Russia to whose lot it shall fall.

But this will not prevent the invasion of the Morea by France, nor its speedy conquest, unless we should first gain possession of Corfu.

European Turkey will then be reduced to what Bonaparte, not without an eye to this event, has emphatically called "*l'Empire de Constantinople*."

* No. V.

Beyond this point I will not venture to speculate ; but I will try to hope that, before the event, a ray of reason may discover to the deluded Emperor Alexander, if not the misery and ruin in which he has involved Europe by his compliance with the views of Bonaparte, the extent at least of the calamities which his wretched policy is preparing for the Russian Empire itself.

I have the honour to be, &c.

To Isaac Morier, Esq.

Pera, March 17th, 1810.

SIR,

I HAVE desired Mr. Pisani to furnish you with a statement of some proceedings which have taken place at the Porte relative to a complaint made to me by Mr. Rich, the Company's resident at Bagdad, against the behaviour of the Vizir. He will give you copies of Mr. Rich's original application to me, of my note to the Porte, of the firman issued by it, and of the Vizir's letter to me, announcing the amicable arrangement of the dispute, and also of Mr. Rich's letter to me in consequence.

You will have the goodness to transmit these documents to the Honourable the East India Company ; and, at the same time, to inform them that Mr. Rich has been received and acknowledged by the Vizir in the character of resident.

As the Vizir himself is a person whose good will it is become essentially necessary to cultivate in the improved state of our relations with Persia, I recom-

mend it to you to make a trifling present, of about 250 piastres in value, to the officer who was the bearer of his despatches to me ; and likewise 500 piastres to his Capi-Kiaya, who is a man of some rank.

I am, &c.

To Sir Harford Jones.

Pera, March 27th, 1810.

DEAR SIR,

I HAVE to acknowledge the receipt of your letters of the 12th and 13th of February.

Nothing can be so absolutely false as the assertion of the Russian Plenipotentiary, that Russia, Austria, and France are united for the dismembering of Turkey. You may give the Prince Royal to understand, although the rupture of our relations with the Court of Vienna forbids my making any authorised communication in her name, that a special complaint will forthwith be made by the Austrian Government to that of St. Petersburg, respecting the conduct of this Plenipotentiary in thus wantonly exposing the House of Austria to a rupture with Turkey.

The exact reverse of what this man has asserted is the fact. Never were the Three Powers, of Russia, Austria, and France, at so great a distance as they are at present from any mutual understanding prejudicial to the Turkish Empire.

The last courier from Vienna brought an account of the Emperor of Austria having consented to give his daughter the Archduchess Louisa in marriage to

Bonaparte. Observations on this event are useless at this moment, nor have I time to make them. Suffice it to say, that it has totally deranged, *for the present*, all the plans that may reasonably be supposed to have been in agitation between France and Russia for the further dismembering of Turkey.

* * * * *

These sentiments, together with the most solemn assurances that the Emperor of Austria, in consenting to a family alliance with Napoleon, had in no respect changed his system with regard to Turkey, were at the express command of the Emperor communicated to the Ottoman Ministers by the Intermuncio, on notifying his Imperial Majesty's resolution with regard to the marriage.

On the other hand, Russia is both disgusted and alarmed at this unlooked-for event. That Bonaparte will in the end find the means of satisfying her, I make no doubt, unless strong and judicious measures be instantly adopted in the English councils; but at the present moment the discontent is very high at St. Petersburg, and may be made to lead to great and salutary ends.

France, for many reasons, is obliged still to conceal her ultimate designs on Turkey. In the mean time she will not suffer Russia to establish herself on the Danube.

Turkey sees her advantage in this state of things; and you may be sure that I have not been negligent in pointing them out to her. She is more than ever determined on trying the event of another campaign.

As to negotiating through France, depend upon it that nothing is more distant from her thoughts. If she should treat at all, she will endeavour to join

England in the negotiations. But even in this event she would be as far as ever from yielding the Provinces. Nothing but the last extremity would induce her to do this ; and unless Russia should desist from the demand, another campaign appears inevitable.

My opinion concerning negotiations with Russia during a war with her is, *to fight until she signs a peace*. But to this, as to all general rules, there may be exceptions, arising from circumstances and times. Applying this principle to the admission of Baron Wrede at Tabreze, I can only add, that I hope nothing will be signed with him until you hear *for certain* that Turkey is about to make her peace separately. I quite agree with you in the position, that it would be absurd to force Persia to continue the war if Turkey should make peace, and particularly if Persia could obtain conditions as favourable in our sense as you state it to be her determination to insist upon. But my letters, both of the 20th and 25th of February, and of the 3d of March, will have enabled you to tranquillise that Court with regard to the intentions of Turkey on all points, and to convince it that no peace will be listened to here on the basis of surrendering the two Provinces.

I am, &c.

To Sir Harford Jones.

Pera, April 4th, 1810.

[ENCLOSING three letters from the Porte, — addressed to the Prince Royal, to Meerza Scheffea, and to Meerza Hassan, — notifying that in order to con-

solidate the union, between Turkey and Persia, the Sultan had appointed an envoy to reside at Tehran, and that he would speedily set out. Also enclosing an abstract of the letters.]

To the Commanding Officer off St. Maura.

Pera, April 8th, 1810.

SIR,

At the particular desire of the Ottoman Government I transmit to you the enclosed communication, which has just been received here from Ali Pacha, the Vizir of Albania.

In consenting to forward it to you, for your information, I at the same time acquainted the Ottoman Government that it was perfectly unnecessary to accompany it with any recommendation of the nature required, as no disposition had at any time been manifested by the Officers commanding his Majesty's forces to infringe the neutrality of the Porte, neither was it fair to presume that such was likely to be their conduct.

I am, &c.

To Major-General Oakes, Malta.

Pera, April 15th, 1810.

SIR,

I HAVE received your several letters of the 21st, 22d, and 31st of March, informing me of your having

sent up, according to my letter to you of the 14th of February, a supply of gunpowder and lead for the use of the Ottoman Government.

I beg leave to return you my warmest thanks, and also those of the Ottoman Government, for your readiness in complying with my request, and for the promptitude with which you have executed this service. You will learn with satisfaction that nothing could be better timed.

The transport containing the powder arrived off Cape Janissary on the 10th instant, under convoy of his Majesty's brig the Bustard. The Salsette arrived also on the 12th.

There being no necessity for detaining the brig, I have desired Captain Markland to shift the lead on board the Salsette, and to return with my despatches to Malta. I have also requested Captain Bathurst, of the Salsette, to take charge of the transport, and bring her up with him to Constantinople.

I wish I could return the transport with a cargo of grain, but we are here nearly in a state of famine. The most serious consequences are even to be apprehended, if we have not an immediate supply.

I have the honour to be, &c.

One Inclosure.

To Sir Harford Jones.

Pera, April 17th, 1810.

DEAR SIR,

YOUR despatches and letters of the 27th ultimo were received here yesterday, and I lost not a moment in laying the chief matter of them before the Ottoman Government. I already know that the impression which they have made is very great, and I do not despair of bringing the Divan to a favourable and immediate decision.

I will not disguise from you, that if the armistice be concluded, the effect of that measure on the Turkish councils will be to destroy all hope of combining them with those of Persia for mutual defence. Between armistice and peace, the Government here sees little or no difference.

It is not for me to censure the conduct of the Persian Ministers for their determination on a matter on which I have no local knowledge to enable me to form a judgment; but I really cannot be silent when I find that the impudent fabrications sent them from Constantinople by agents, whom they well know not to possess the means of procuring any genuine information, and the monstrous falsehoods told them (according to their statements to you) by * *
* * are put forward as motives to influence the grave decision of their Cabinet.

On the first of these points, after assuring you that there is not one word of truth in the tales from Constantinople communicated to you by Meerza

Bozurg in the conference of the 28th of February, I will take the freedom, *for your own sake*, of recommending it to you to complain to the Prince Royal, and to obtain from his Royal Highness the expression of his most marked displeasure towards his agents *here* for so grossly misleading his Royal Highness and the Persian Court. If they had been paid by the French they could have written no otherwise; and I much fear that their reports, unless you can contrive to stop them in their source, will hereafter embarrass you extremely.

To enter into a regular refutation of all these falsehoods is beyond my patience. There is one of them, however, which appears to have been advanced with so bad an intention that I must give myself the trouble of contradicting it, which I do by authority. The Turks *never* have asked peace from Russia; on the contrary, Russia has repeatedly asked it from the Turks, although I admit without receding from the basis so often insisted upon, of having the Danube for their boundary.

To make this matter still clearer to the Persian Government (although on looking over my correspondence with you I find that I never have omitted assuring you of the fact), I now inclose you the substance of a letter from Count Romanzoff to Baron Hubsch, which that agent was authorised to communicate to the Turkish Government, which he did so communicate, and to which he has just received an answer. This answer is a positive refusal to treat, couched in still higher terms than ever, and accompanied with reproof to Russia for choosing such a channel as Baron Hubsch for the conveyance of her

proposals. With this ungracious message his son will be despatched to St. Petersburg in the course of to-morrow.

I will add, in confidence, that at my instigation Turkey has taken this opportunity of offering to treat with Russia jointly with Great Britain. Of course Persia will be included if this offer should be listened to.

As for the extravagant assertions of * * * *, contempt would be the true answer to them, if it did not appear from your letter that he had really made some impression on the Persian ministers. I repeat to you, therefore, that there never *at any time* has been the slightest approximation to an union between Austria, Russia, and France for the partition of Turkey; that Austria, on the contrary, has never even consented to the annexation of the provinces on the Danube to the Russian Empire; that she is at this moment encouraging Turkey to resist their cession, and has even hinted the possibility of helping to recover them; and that in communicating the marriage of an Austrian princess with Bonaparte, the Internuncio has expressly declared that that event was an additional security for the Ottoman Empire, whose independent existence *in Europe* would ever form an essential part of any system into which Austria might enter.

With regard to M. Wrede's assertion, "That the Russian army only waited the opening of the spring to march to Constantinople," I can assure you that the Russian army is in no condition to advance to any great distance from the banks of the Danube. A corps of 6000 men which crossed lately into Servia, has been cut to pieces. The Grand Vizier's army is

already very considerable, and rapidly increasing. Bonaparte looks to Constantinople for himself one of these days, and never will allow Russia to fix herself on this side of the Danube.

I have deemed it absolutely necessary, my dear Sir, to enter thus explicitly into the subject, in hopes that it may once for all convince the Persian Government of the mistakes into which it will be sure to fall if it continues to trust to French or Russian agents, or even to its own, in contradiction to the representations which I have from time to time made to you of the state of affairs at Constantinople.

I am, &c.

To Sir Harford Jones.

Pera, April 23d, 1810.

MY DEAR SIR,

I SEND send you what I had ready before the fire, of which Mr. Morier will write you an account, and which has *all but* burnt down the palace.

Meerza Ameen will write fully by the Tartar who brought your despatches of the 27th March, and whom I shall re-despatch the moment I get the firmans from the Porte. These will be exactly as the Prince Royal desires. The Turkish Ambassador only stays for money. I can say no more in this confusion, and with the multiplicity of business I have to go through.

Yours, &c.

P.S.—I will write fully to the Prince Royal. My departure cannot take place before a fortnight or three weeks from the date of this.

2d P.S.—I have this moment received despatches of the greatest importance from Vienna.

There is a plan now in agitation by the French party in the Austrian councils to engage Austria in an alliance with France. * * *

* * * I am not informed what chance of success the projectors of this plan may have; but of the truth of the fact my correspondent is positive. You may begin, therefore, but with all caution, to open your eyes a little favourably towards Russia. I hope another post from Vienna may reach this place before I go.

R. A.

To Lord Amherst, Palermo.

Pera, April, 24th, 1810.

MY LORD,

THE bearer, Monsieur Raddi, will communicate to your Lordship a variety of particulars respecting my recent transactions at the Porte, and which the calamity that has just happened at Pera, and the share I have had in it, prevent the possibility of my committing just now to paper.

Monsieur Raddi will also submit to your Lordship's consideration his ideas respecting the re-establishment of the order of St. John of Jerusalem. In these ideas, generally speaking, I perfectly concur; and the more

so as the measure itself will be one material step towards the establishment of a totally different system of maritime warfare, now rendered indispensably necessary by the new circumstances in which Europe is placed.

I have the honour to be, &c.

To the Prince Royal of Persia.

MOST HIGH AND MOST ILLUSTRIOUS PRINCE!

THE weighty and urgent matters contained in Y.R.H.'s most honoured letter have sunk deep into my mind. I lost not a moment in communicating its contents, full of wisdom, to the enlightened Ottoman council; and I showed them the necessity of immediate decision, as well for the security of their own dominions against the common enemy, as for the confirmation, by deeds as well as by words, of the friendship they have professed, and which in my conscience I believe they feel, for the royal house of Persia. Immediately after I had represented these matters, the Ottoman Government aroused itself as from a deep sleep. They felt the force of all which Y. R. H. has proposed for the common good, and without losing time in vain ceremonials, which is too much their custom, they instantly obtained from the most illustrious Emperor of the Ottomans the two Imperial firmans, which I have now the honour of transmitting to Y. R. H.

There can be no doubt that these firmans will prove fully satisfactory to Y. R. H., and that the Turkish frontier contiguous to the territories of the

Persian Empire will be put in such a state of defence as to leave Y. R. H. no anxiety on that side.

Let me now most earnestly entreat Y. R. H. not to listen to the tales of those who, with the wicked intention of sowing the seeds of discord between the two high and powerful Mohammedan Courts, seek to persuade Y. R. H. that Turkey is endeavouring to make peace with Russia through the mediation of Bonaparte.

I assure Y. R. H. that Turkey believes not in any of the promises of that deceitful chief. Turkey well remembers that he promised to assist her in expelling the Russians from the Crimea. How has he performed that promise? By assisting Russia to keep possession of Moldavia and Walachia. In like manner he promised to assist your royal father to recover Georgia. How has he performed that promise? I need not multiply words. He has deceived every king and every people that ever trusted him.

But to prove more satisfactorily to Y. R. H. that Turkey is in no humour to make peace with Russia, I have sent to my excellent and most sagacious colleague, Sir Harford Jones, a full account of the proposals for peace which Russia herself has just made through the Danish agent at this Court, together with the spirited and determined answer of the Sultan. His Imperial Highness has ordered his ministers to acquaint Russia that 300,000 men will be assembled before long on the Danube, and that until these 300,000 are reduced to one man, he will not listen to peace on the terms which Russia has proposed.

I also can assure Y. R. H. from the best information, that the Russian forces on the Danube are by

no means in a condition to advance into the interior of the Turkish territories. They have already attempted to penetrate by Widdin ; but have been defeated with the loss of 6000 men, and forced to recross the river. If they presume to cross it again, and advance towards Adrianople, they must all miserably perish.

It is also a most wicked falsehood that Austria has joined against Turkey. I pray Y. R. H. not to listen to these abominable untruths. Our affairs will always be governed by our enemies if we take their assertions for facts. Austria, it is true, has been forced to give one of her princesses to France ; but this was only to secure the peace of her own territories, which had suffered during the last war the most horrible calamities. I trust that the artifices of Bonaparte will not succeed in drawing Austria further into his snares ; but if they should succeed, and if any further danger should menace the Ottoman Empire, Y. R. H. may depend on my informing you in time.

I beseech Y. R. H. therefore to make manifest your high displeasure towards the agents of the Persian Court at Constantinople who have transmitted such false and wicked accounts of events. By the blessing of God's providence, the wise and penetrating Meerza Ameen is now arrived, and henceforward your royal Court will be fully and truly instructed in what is passing.

I humbly request, &c.

To Francis Werry, Esq., Smyrna.

Pera, April 29th, 1810.

SIR,

I WILL do every thing in my power to obtain from the Ottoman Government that the St. George's capture shall be suffered to proceed to Malta for adjudication, and shall undoubtedly support all your proceedings at Smyrna respecting her.

I must at the same time greatly lament that this vessel has been brought into Smyrna. Really people seem to think it a matter of perfect indifference to what degree they commit the king's government on questions the most difficult to manage with Turkish Ministers.

I beg of you, therefore, as a standing rule, to tell all cruizers to carry their prizes to Cerigo or to Malta. It is impossible, I repeat it, to make the Turks understand that taking possession of a vessel bearing the Ottoman flag, is not the same thing as committing an act of hostility.

For the present I beg of you to do all you can to keep the prize-master and his men on board the captured ship, until I can obtain a decision from the Captain Pacha; and *on no account* to suffer Captain Maltass to be prevented returning to Malta with his prisoners.

I am, &c.

*Mr. Stratford Canning to Captain Nourse, H. M. S.
Frederickstein, Smyrna.*

Pera, May 18th, 1810.

SIR,

MR. ADAIR is unfortunately so ill as to be unable to write to you himself. His Excellency has, therefore, directed me to inform you, that yesterday he received your letter of the 13th inst., and begs leave to express his entire approbation of your late transactions, as therein detailed. His Excellency feels that you have supported the honour of his Majesty's flag in a manner worthy of a British officer ; and you may depend, Sir, upon receiving from him the support that you so highly deserve.

According to our notions of what is equitable, nothing can be clearer than the grounds of your conduct — and according to the regulations of our maritime law, nothing more lawful than the manner in which you acted. Yet this is one of the cases which will not fail to occasion considerable difficulty with this Government. Our laws of search and detention the Turkish Ministers either do not or will not understand. The detection of fraud, and the consequent seizure of enemy's property by our cruizers are construed by them into affronts offered to the Ottoman flag. Every thing taken under their colours instantly becomes a bone of contention ; and as their colours are often found to cover French property, and are therefore often disregarded, they are worked up into a state of irritation on this subject that threatens to be ultimately attended with the very worst consequences. Now, although we may have undoubted

right on our side, and power to assert that right — yet the present circumstances make it advisable to avoid, as much as possible, every thing that may lead to an irritating discussion between the Porte and his Majesty's ambassador; not that it is meant to recede from any right, but merely to avoid stirring *questions* of right, except in cases of absolute necessity. The Turks cannot be allowed to retain much longer such indistinct ideas of maritime law, — and therefore, as some arrangement must shortly be made for the prevention of future disorder, it were to be wished that the consideration of the general principle should not be embarrassed by any particular subjects of dissension. But perhaps this is rather to be wished than expected.

You will scarcely believe, Sir, that the Porte carries its absurdity so far as to deny to our cruizers the right of carrying suspected vessels trading under its colours to our own Courts of Admiralty for adjudication. From this, however, you will immediately perceive the many difficulties produced by carrying such prizes into a Turkish port.

I have the honour to be, &c.

To C. J. Rich, Esq., Bagdad.

Pera, May 21st, 1810.

SIR,

HALITY EFENDI, by whom this letter will be transmitted to you, is a Turkish gentleman of great respectability, who held the situation of Reis Efendi

under the late Sultans Selim and Mustapha. His sentiments in favour of peace with England exposed him to the hostility of General Sebastiani, who succeeded in procuring his banishment. Notwithstanding which, it appears that I was in some degree indebted to the effects of his influence for the successful issue of my negociation at the Dardanelles. He has since been permitted to return to Constantinople, and is now charged by the Sultan with a commission to settle some pecuniary claims which the Porte professes to have upon the Pacha of Bagdad.

In order to facilitate, as much as possible, the object of his mission, Hality Efendi is anxious to have your countenance, and the Turkish ministers themselves have directed him to cultivate a good understanding with you. It is at all times fitting that persons in the service of Governments at peace with each other should be on friendly terms; it is sometimes useful to make this state of friendship evident to the public. For these reasons, I now beg leave to recommend Hality Efendi to your kindest attention, to the end that, on his arrival at Bagdad, he may receive from you such public marks of distinction, as you may think sufficient to evince your regard for his character and commission. He promises, on his part, not to be backward in giving you similar testimonies of confidence and respect.

But his commission is not confined to the above-mentioned object. He is further directed to inquire into, and to prosecute, a plan suggested to me by Mr. Rudland, the Honourable the East India Company's agent at Mocha. The inclosed extract of a letter which I received some time ago from that gentleman, and which I then communicated to the Porte,

will give you the necessary information on the subject. Hality Efendi is himself also in possession of this plan, for the general furtherance of which, as well as for opening a correspondence with Mr. Rudland, he will look to your assistance and advice.

I am, &c.

To Mr. Rudland, Mocha.

Pera, May 21st, 1810.

SIR,

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, dated May 22d, 1809. Though I lost no time in communicating to the Turkish Government that part of it which concerns their interests, yet I was unwilling to write to you upon the subject, until I could acquaint you with the measures to be adopted by them in consequence of your suggestions.

I have now the honour to inform you that the Porte has sent to Bagdad a confidential person, who is instructed to open a correspondence with you, for the direct purpose of inquiring into and prosecuting the objects proposed in your letter to me. This person is Hality Efendi, a Turkish gentleman of great respectability who has filled the situation of Reis Efendi, and who for some time enjoyed at this Court a considerable share of influence which he directed to the re-establishment of peace with England.

I have apprised Mr. Rich, the Honourable the East India Company's resident at Bagdad, of the nature of his commission, and have strongly recommended him to the countenance and assistance of that gentleman,

in order to facilitate not only his communication with you, but the general success of whatever measures he may think proper to pursue in furtherance of his views.

I am, &c.

To Mr. Rudland, Mocha.

Pera, June 5th, 1810.

SIR,

THE letter you were so good as to write to me dated May 22d, 1809, did not reach me before the month of March in the present year. I have paid great attention to its object, and can assure you that this Government is, at present, very well disposed to assist you in it.

I have strongly recommended to the Turkish Government a strict examination into the state of the revenue which they have a right to derive from their different ports in the Red Sea, and have stated to them in substance the information contained in your paragraph No. 7. The communication was received with the utmost thankfulness by the Ministers, but they are so slow in their motions that I doubt their taking any effectual steps towards profiting by it. However, they have lately despatched a Turk, of the name of Hality Efendi, a person of great weight and abilities (a true friend also to our interests), to Ali Pacha, the Vizier of Bagdad, on a special commission, and him they have instructed to open a correspondence with you on this subject, through the medium of Mr. Rich, the Company's resident at Bagdad. I have

of course acquainted Mr. Rich with the matter to which this correspondence will be directed.

At the desire of Mr. Morier, I now take the liberty, in case of your having any pecuniary or commercial matters with the East India Company which it may be necessary to transact at Smyrna, of recommending to you the house of Messrs. Lee and Co.

The respectability and punctuality of the above house is so universally known and acknowledged that I need do no more than mention them to you on the present occasion.

I am, &c.

To Admiral Sir Charles Cotton.

Pera, June 7th, 1810.

SIR,

I RECEIVED with great satisfaction the honour of your letter of May the 1st, announcing to me your appointment to the Mediterranean fleet. I beg to offer you my sincere congratulations on that event.

My correspondence with the late Lord Collingwood, which perhaps may have been put into your possession, will have apprized you of many important particulars respecting the early period of my embassy. I have now only to add that I consider our peace with the Turks to be as secure as the uncertain state of Europe will admit. I have no fear whatever from French artifice, intrigue, or menace, so long as Spain holds out and Austria keeps aloof from a more strict alliance with Bonaparte. But if France, *Austria*, and Russia should finally agree upon their system,

and should begin by an offer of peace to the Turks on condition of their breaking off all connection with England, I will not answer for the consequences.

There is one thing, however, which has led to some angry discussions between myself and the Turkish Government, and which may eventually end in direct hostility ; and this is our searching their vessels in the Archipelago. The Turks *never* can be made to understand the right we claim and exercise (and which we must ever claim and exercise if we mean to be an independent nation), of searching neutral vessels ; and, as some instances have lately occurred to bring this matter more immediately under their eyes, they have complained most bitterly to me, and have even threatened to adopt a measure to which I do not see how the British Government can submit. This is, to declare the Archipelago, drawing a line from the Morea to Egypt, a close sea.

My utmost exertions have been employed, and are still employed, to prevent their taking this step ; at least until I can reach England, and state to his Majesty's Government the various matters in dispute between us. I hope, before my departure, to gain this point, but if I do, it will be with much difficulty.

The officers on this station have conducted themselves, in all matters which have come under my cognizance, with the utmost propriety. They cannot avoid exercising the right of search, as the French carry on an immense trade under the Ottoman flag. I know no instance in which they have gone beyond the line of their duty ; the embarrassments, therefore, in which I have been involved with the Porte, on

account of the proceedings of our navy, are not attributable to them. Nevertheless, I think it would be very useful, under our present ticklish circumstances, if you were to issue a special instruction as well to the officers stationed at Corfu, as to those at Smyrna, to be as forbearing as possible towards the Ottoman flag. It would also be well if you could send a copy of any instruction, which you may think proper to issue to this effect, to Mr. S. Canning, whom I leave at Constantinople, in the character of Minister Plenipotentiary, with a view to its being communicated to the Ottoman Government.

I have the honour to be, &c.

P. S. — I am sending a confidential agent to Candia, in the character of Consul. Circumstances may hereafter render his correspondence with you of importance, as I have instructed him to examine minutely into the military state of the island, and when he shall have obtained a sufficient knowledge of it, to make his report to the commander-in-chief of his Majesty's naval forces in the Mediterranean. His name is George Reggio. He acted as interpreter to Lord Cavan during our expedition to Egypt in 1802. I recommend the greatest secrecy in writing to him.

R. A.

To Sir Harford Jones.

Pera, June 10th, 1810.

DEAR SIR,

I HAVE the honour of forwarding a variety of despatches to your address, just received from London, and to congratulate you sincerely on the approbation which your conduct, during the whole of your arduous mission, has received from his Majesty's Government.

I am truly concerned to inform you that the Turkish Government, although in such imminent danger from the advance of the Russian forces, who have crossed the Danube and taken Silistria, appears perfectly indifferent to the improvement of its connections with the Court of Tehran. Meerza Ameen, although seconded on all occasions by the strongest representations on my part, can obtain nothing that he requires from the Ministers. I can attribute this to nothing but to the growing insolence of these Ministers ever since they have heard that France and Russia were upon bad terms. This fact they believe, although they have no authority for it. Perhaps the disasters which have just happened on the Danube, and which most probably will be followed up by the total defeat and dispersion of the Grand Vizir's army, may bring them to their senses.

I beg of you to assure the Prince Royal, that if his commissions to this Government are not executed, it is not for want of zeal, ability, or industry on the part of Meerza Ameen, of whose indefatigable exertions I am witness; but that the fault is altogether with the Turkish Government. Meerza Ameen is

greatly distressed, fearing to incur the anger of his Sovereign for effecting so little. I assure you it is scarcely possible to effect any thing with this Government: their infatuation is beyond all description.

You will have the goodness also to present my most humble respects to his Royal Highness, and to assure him that on my return to England, whither I am absolutely compelled to go for the recovery of my health, I shall without ceasing employ myself in whatever may tend to cement and strengthen the union between the two Empires; and that in whatever situation I may find myself, I shall ever retain the deepest sense of the manner in which his Royal Highness has been pleased to distinguish me in his correspondence during my residence at Constantinople.

I am, &c.

To Mr. George Foresti, Jannina.

Pera, June 12th, 1810.

SIR,

I HAVE received your two letters of May 21st, together with an enclosure from General Oswald, in which he speaks very handsomely of your conduct, and of the assistance he received from you during your stay at Jannina, in carrying on his operations against St. Maura.

You will continue, therefore, to reside at Jannina until his Majesty's pleasure can be known.

I am sorry that it is not in my power to place this appointment on a more permanent footing, as in fair-

ness I think it right to acquaint you that I had long ago promised it (so far as it depended on me) to Mr. David Morier, whenever Captain Leake should think fit to retire from the Court of Jannina.

You will follow, in all matters which relate to the operations against Corfu, or to the benefit and protection of the Ionian Islands already rescued from the hands of the enemy, such directions and recommendations as General Oswald may send you from time to time.

You will also take every opportunity, when it can be done with safety, of transmitting to my successors in this Embassy such information as you may be able to obtain respecting the general state of affairs in the quarter where you reside.

On my leaving Constantinople (which I believe will be before the end of this month), the affairs of the Embassy will be administered by Mr. S. Canning, who will reside here in the character of his Majesty's Minister Plenipotentiary.

I am, &c.

To Ali Pacha.

MOST HIGH AND MOST POWERFUL PRINCE,

I HAVE duly received the honour of your most friendly letter, enclosing me some letters from Mr. G. Foresti, who now resides at the Court of your Highness.

The departure of Captain Leake from Jannina was unknown to me until within these few days, when I heard by accident that he had arrived at Malta.

This has caused an interruption in my correspondence with your Highness, which I greatly regret.

I have now to inform your Highness that the very bad state of my health obliges me to return immediately to England, and that in a few days I shall embark on board a frigate which is waiting for me.

Having no secrets from your Highness, I will also confess that the conduct of the Ministers of the Porte towards me has not been such as to make me wish to prolong my stay. While I have exhausted myself in friendly actions towards the Porte, I have experienced no similar return; but in many things the Ministers have held a conduct quite the reverse from friendly. I hope they will behave better to my successor.

Your Highness may depend upon it, that on my return to England I shall never cease exerting myself in every way which may tend to strengthen the friendship so happily established between your Highness and the British Government. I entreat, also, that your Highness will preserve me in your memory, and that you will manifest towards Mr. G. Foresti, who resides at present at your illustrious Court, the same favour and protection by which you distinguished Captain Leake, his predecessor.

Wishing, &c.

To Brigadier-General Oswald, Zante.

Pera, June 12th, 1810.

SIR,

I HAVE received your letter (without date) in which you mention the assistance rendered to you by Mr. G. Foresti during your operations against St. Maura, and I have in consequence authorised that gentleman to continue his residence at Jannina until his Majesty's pleasure can be known.

It is not in my power to place this appointment on a more permanent footing, from the circumstance of my having long ago promised it, as far as it depended on me, to Mr. David Morier, whenever Captain Leake should think fit to retire from the Court of Jannina.

I am preparing for my departure from this place, and think I shall leave it about the 20th of this month. Until the arrival of a new Ambassador, the affairs of the Embassy will be administered by Mr. S. Canning, who will reside here in the character of his Majesty's Minister Plenipotentiary.

The same reason which prevents you from writing to me on many points, operates with equal force upon my own conduct. As your correspondence with the Embassy at Constantinople, however, is likely to become more and more important every day, I shall remove one material obstacle to it, by sending you a cipher the moment I arrive at Malta.

The Russians have crossed the Danube in force, and have already taken Silistria. From thence they are advancing to Schiumla, and will most probably

storm the Grand Vizir's camp at that place. I do not think, however, that they will attempt to cross Mount Hæmus. They will probably content themselves with the capture of Varna, and after that, again offer peace, on condition of retaining the Provinces on the other side of the Danube. The Turks are as obstinate as ever in refusing to make the smallest cession of their territory.

I am, &c.

To Mr. Mannesty, Bussora.

Pera, June 12th, 1810.

SIR,

I HAVE received your letters of the 26th and 30th of March, together with their duplicates, and am much obliged to you for the expedition you made in forwarding my despatches to the Governor-General of India.

My departure for England being now fixed for the end of this month, it will be for my successor to profit by your intimation concerning the packets he may have to address to the Governor-General.

Until the arrival, &c. &c.

I have not written to you on general matters during my residence at Constantinople, as really I had nothing to write about, in which your department was concerned; and as I had given directions to Mr. Morier, whose correspondence with you was on a more regular footing, to keep you informed of all

circumstances of an interesting political nature which might either happen at this place, or might be communicated to us from other parts of the world, I am sure you will have the goodness to accept this apology, when you consider the variety of business which it has fallen to my lot to transact.

I am, &c.

THE END.

LONDON :
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